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CHAPTER I 
BACKGROUND AND HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
The purpose of this study is to achieve an under-
standing of the international attitudes and policies of Cos-
ta Rica from 1919 to 1939. In this chapter, some of the is-
sues and concerns which predate that period, but which have 
significance during it, will be discussed. 
A natural starting point would seem to be an account 
of the history of the birth of the nation. With Costa Rica, 
however, there is considerable difficulty in pinpointing the 
actual date of birth. Under Spanish colonial rule, Costa Rica, 
along with its Central American neighbors, was governed as the 
Captaincy General of Guatemala, whose administrative indepen-
dence from the Viceroyalty of New Spain varied from time to 
time under different circumstances. Within that administrative 
convenience called Guatemala, there had developed regional 
groups whose self identity as "states" was quite distinct, des-
pite their official affiliation, and who reflected the jeal-
ousies of rival states. 1 The usual difficulties in dealing 
1Thomas L. Karnes, The Failure of Union, Central Ameri-
ca 1824-1960 (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina 
Press, 1§61), p. 243. 
1 
2 
with the nationalism of any state are thus complicated when 
one speaks of any of the Central American nations. Costa Ri-
oa in particular manifests differences not only from its 
neighbors but also from the remainder of the hemisphere and 
the world while at the same time being linked to them in a 
unique manner. For example, Costa Rican policies in the 
early twentieth century emphasized isolation from the other 
Central American nations, and the language of unity among 
them was an effective tool used by Costa Rioa at times when 
unilateral policies would not have sufficient force to re-
solve problems. 
The independence of Central America from Spanish domi-
nation was achieved in conjunction with the establishment of 
the empire of Agustin de Iturbide in Mexico. With Iturbide's 
fall from power, this affiliation ended and Central America 
began a separate existence by the formation of a union of the 
diverse "states" of the old Captaincy General. The federal 
association which was formed lasted from 1823 to 1839. At 
that time forces which had traditionally divided the "states" 
of the Captaincy General brought about their division into 
separate nations. 2 Despite this division, federal union was 
muoh sought after throughout the nineteenth century by certain 
individuals in each oountry. 3 There have been twenty-five 
2Mario Rodriguez, Central America (Englewood Cliffs, 
N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1965), p. 49. 
3Chester Lloyd Jones, Costa Rica and Civilization in 
3 
attempts at federal union sinoe that first failure. 4 One of 
the primary forces which brought about the separation was the 
differences among the member states in size and population. 
Guatemala alone had a population nearly eight times that of 
Costa Rica, whose population was among the smallest of the 
five member nations of the oonfederation. 5 The fear of the 
smaller states that their confederation would be dominated by 
the overwhelming populace of Guatemala, plus a growing aware-
ness of the differing needs and goals of their states led to 
the dissolution of the confederation in 1839. 6 For the major-
ity of Central Americans, independent national status had 
begun with the formation of the confederation in 1823. 
Another problem which would manifest itself in Costa 
Rican national life as a consequence of this oonfederative be-
ginning was the ill-defined status of boundaries between Costa 
Rica and her neighbors. The boundary disputes, which would em-
broil Central America during the nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries, were both a cause and effect of the intense national-
ism felt by the various states. 7 In discussions over unsure 
boundaries, nationalism often came into play in the opinions 
the Caribbean (Reprint of 1935 Edition, New York: Russell i 
Russell, 1967>, p. 20. 
4Karnes, ~ailyre of Union, p. 243. 
5Ibid., p. 6. 
6Ibid. 
7Ibid., p. 247. 
of the contesting parties, becoming stronger as it was neces-
sary to justify their own exalted positions. At the same time, 
boundary disputes were occasioned by feelings of nationalism 
and the feeling that the nation should be extended to the far-
thest reaches possible. 
For Costa Rica, there were serious boundary disputes 
with both Nicaragua and Colombia that endured for nearly a 
century each. The Nicaraguan dispute would not be settled 
until the 1930 1 & and the Colombian dispute, carried on by 
the successor state, Panama, would not be resolved until 
1941. 8 In both instances, the conflicts were responsible 
for an increase of Costa Rican nationalism and the adoption 
of a policy of isolationism in Central America. More will 
be said of these disputes below. 
It is quite evident that dealing with the Costa Ri-
can nation in isolation from its world environment is next 
to impossible. Of course. there were throughout the nine-
teenth and into the twentieth century certain issues and 
problems which could be labeled as strictly national. How-
ever, a strong case could be made that even among these "na-
tional" issues there were few that did not have some basis in 
the world conununity and Costa Rica's relationship to it. 
These will be dealt with at a later part of this study. But, 
8Howard L. Blutstein, et al., Area Handbook for Cos-
ta Rica (Washington, D.C.: Government Print!ng Off!ce, 1976>, 
PP• 4~-~S. 
5 
whether one refers to strictly national or international ques-
tions, the self image of the Costa Rican nation would be the 
starting point in determining the origin of policies and atti-
tudes adopted. 
Costa Rica's image of itself as a nation among other 
nations emerged from various factors. Fi~st, and perhaps 
most importantly, Costa Ricans prided themselves on the sta-
bility and continuity of their national goverrunents. They 
were extremely proud of the lack of political uprisings and 
the absence of caudillo rule in Costa Rica. 9 Unlike their 
neighbors, only four constitutions had existed during the 
nineteenth century, discounting the various confederative 
constitutions; also during the nineteenth century, there had 
been only three presidential coups in contrast to f a.r more 
elsewhere. 10 Whether this notion of stability is a true im-
age is not within the scope of this study. However, there is 
some evidence that Costa Rican claims are somewhat justifiable 
if only on a scale relative to their neighbors. 
Second, the Costa Ricans felt themselves to be of a 
higher cultural level than any of their Central American 
neighbors. The reasons for this relate to their claimed 
racial homogeneity. 11 This homogeneity would also contribute 
9Rodr!guez, Central America, p. 49. 
10James l·. Busey, Notes on Costa Rican Democracy, Uni-
versity of Colorado Studies in ~oiitioai Soienoe, No. 2 (Bol-
der: University of Colorado Press, 1962), p. 6. 
11Blutstein, Handbook for Costa Rica, p. 141. 
6 
to the dominance of a select aristocracy or oligarchy in Costa 
Rican political life which in part serves as a causal factor 
12 in the relative political stability noted above. There is 
also the importance given education during the early national 
life, making possible the boast that "Costa Rica has more 
school teachers than soldiers. 1113 Even today Costa Rica has 
no standing army, navy or air force, but relies on a police 
force alone for domestic order which implies that this often 
repeated boast is still true.14 
A third factor shaping Costa Rican self image was her 
dealings with foreign investors. In the majority of oases, 
foreign investments in Costa Rica actually served the best pur-
poses of the nation without substantial loss of political self-
determination which seemed to be the case elsewhere, since Cos-
ta Rica seemed able to turn foreign investments into national 
projects rather than seeing the exportation of all profits from 
such investments. While the idea that Costa Rica had been free 
from control by investors would be challenged in later years, 
in the early twentieth century Costa Rica managed to achieve 
at least economic independence from any other nation, mainly 
12Ibid. 
13u.s. Chargg Leo R. Sack at San Jos& to the Secre-
tary of State, 18 December 1935, Records of the Department of 
State Relating to the Internal Affairs of Costa Rica, 1930-
1939, 818.20/16 1 National Archives, Washington, D.C. 
14Blutstein, Handbook for Costa Rioa, p. 4. 
7 
by means of it~ foreign investors. The question of the nation's 
economic independence from the investors, however, was not 
dealt with at this stage. As will be demonstrated below, the 
most important foreign investors were viewed in Costa Rica as 
Costa Ricans, a status which they apparently accepted. Fur-
ther, their profits were frequently put back into the national 
economy in the form of roads, telegraph lines, eta. Specific 
examples of the positive results of large foreign investments 
can be seen in the fact that through foreign investment, crop 
diversification was first attempted in Central America by Cos-
ta Rica, allowing a lesser degree of dependence on a single 
crop, coffee, and a consequent ability to bargain more freely 
on world markets for necessary imports. 15 In addition, Costa 
Rica was the first Central American state to produce an ex-
port crop of bananas. This capability resulted directly from 
the establishment of the banana industry by Minor c. Keith. 16 
Keith serves as a prime example of the contribution made to 
Costa Rican self sufficiency and economic independence by for-
eign investors. 
As was mentioned, Keith and his fellow investors, 
15chester Lloyd Jones 1 Caribbean Interests of the Unit-
ed States, American Imperialism--Viewpoints of United States 
Foreign ~olicy, 1898-1941 (New York: Arno Press & The New York 
Times, 1970), p. 158. 
16Jones, Costa Rica and Civilization, P• 65. The Watt 
Stewart biography of Keith does not deal specifically with the 
broad issues of Keith's responsibility for changes or improve-
ments in the Costa Rican economy. 
8 
insofar as the Costa Rican nation was concerned, were really 
Costa Ricans, since they had married into prominent Costa Ri-
can families and were genuinely conunitted to the national in-
terests .17 Beyond the consistent reinvestment of profits, 
this committment is reflected by the attitude of Minor Keith 
himself in remembering the Costa Rican nation in his "Last 
Will and Testament," in which he endowed a charitable insti-
tution of a kind to be determined by the nation with the funds 
which remained after the settlement of his debts and provi-
sions for his family. 18 
Economic modifications made possible by foreign in-
vestors such as Keith did a great deal to enhance the pres-
tige of the Costa Rican nation as a trader in world markets. 
By crop diversification, Costa Ricans no longer had to view 
themselves in the shadow of Brazilian price setting for cof-
fee crops. It can be assumed that the reinvestment of pro-
fits into public works or transportation and conununications 
enhanced the Costa Rican self image by demonstrating their 
modernity in such developments. 
17Keith 1 s wife was Cristina Castro Fern!ndez, whose 
father, Dr. Jos& Mar!a Castro had twice occupied the presi-
dency, been the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and was a 
past minister of foreign relations. Her mother, Dofia Pacifi-
ca Fern~ndez de Castro was credited with the design of the 
Costa Rican national flag and coat of arms. Watt Stewart, 
Keith and Costa Rica, A Bio~aphical Study of Minor Cooper 
Keith (Albuquerque: The University of New Mex1co Press, 
1964), pp. 50-51. 
18 Ibid., p. 197. 
9 
A final factor influencing Costa Rican self image 
before 1919 is directly related to the trans-oceanic canal 
projects undertaken or entertained by the United States dur-
ing the late nineteenth and early twentieth canturies. Cos-
ta Rioa in particular, and Central America in general, feared 
United States domination of their nations if such plans were 
brought to fruition. The location of the Panama Canal to the 
immediate south made Costa Rica especially important to the 
defense of Canal approaches, but it would have no control 
over how that defense might be implemented if the projects 
remained solely a United States enterprise. Thus as new 
canal proposals were brought under discussion. Costa Rica 
sought to have itself included as an interested party. Of 
particular concern here is the extremely bitter dispute 
among the United States, Nicaragua and Costa Rica. The pro-
blem between Nicaragua and Costa Rica was rooted in their 
long-standing boundary dispute. At one point in the nego-
tiations over the disputed territory between the two nations, 
a treaty was concluded in 1886 with the mediation of Guate-
mala, which provided that each nation had the responsibility 
to consult with the other before concluding any treaty re-
garding the construction of a canal.19 This agreement was 
disregarded by Nicaragua in the subsequent negotiation of a 
19
charles P. Howland, American Relations in the Carib-
bean, American Imperialism--Viewpoints of United States For-
ergn Policy. 1898-1941 (New York: Arno Press & The New York 
Times, 1970), p. 221. 
10 
canal treaty with the United States. 
When the negotiations between Nicaragua and the Uni-
ted States became publicly known, Costa Rica immediately 
raised the issue of its treaty with Nicaragua. 20 By the ad-
mission of the Costa Rican President, Ricardo Jimenez, the 
issue of canal negotiations was of primary importance to the 
Costa Rican nation, along with the continuing boundary dis-
pute with Panama. 21 which might also be said to have canal-
related implications. The principal concern of Costa Ricans 
in this matter was apparently related to their understanding 
of the nature of the "protectorate" which they understood was 
to be established by the United States in Nicaragua. They 
had reached the conclusion that the treaty embodied, through 
the use of something similar to the Platt Amendment for Cuba, 
a surrender of Nicaraguan sovereignty. 22 Further, it was 
felt that any such protectorate would "seriously affect the 
autonomy of the Republic of Costa Rica." 23 They based their 
20Harley Notter, The Origins of the Foreign Policy of 
Woodrow Wilson (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1937 , 
p. 245. 
21
Message of President Ricardo Jiminez to the Costa 
Rican Congress, 1 May 1914, in U. s. Minister E. J. Hale at 
San Jos~ to the Secretary of State, No. 17, 2 May 1914, Uni-
ted States, Department of State, Papers Relatin~ to the For-
ei n Relations of the United States, 1914 (WashJ.ngton, D.C.: 
overnment rinting f ice, 2 , p.-,,0. 
22Minister of Costa Rica in Washington, D.C. (J. B. 
Calvo) to the Secretary of State, 7 July 1914, 817.812/85, 
ibid., p. 959. 
23Ibid. 
11 
fear on the "special ties" which linked the Central American 
republics and probably on the fear of being surroWlded by two 
United States "puppets."24 
The United States, in response to Costa Rican pro-
tests, noted that the 1886 treaty provided only that Costa 
Rica be consulted but that it did not have the right to veto 
any proposed treaty. Further, the United States Minister in 
Costa Rica assured the President that the United States had 
no intention of violating Cos~a Rican sovereignty in any way, 
and that Costa Rica had nothing to fear from the treaty. 25 
Upon further consideration, the United States Minister sug-
gested to Washington that Costa Rican national pride might 
be assauged by a part ownership of any proposed cana1. 26 HoN-
ever, Costa Rica continued to insist that its primary concern 
in the matter was the preservation of sovereignty in Nica-
ragua and the related sovereignty of all Central America. 27 
Late in 1914, it became evident that any attempt to 
24rbid. 
25secretary of State to u. s. Minister E. J. Hale at 
San Josg, 24 July 1914, 817.812/106a, ibid., p. 963. 
26 u. s. Minister E. J. Hale at San Jos' to the Secre-
tary of State, 13 August 1914, 817.812/134, ibid., p. 967. 
27Repdblica de Costa Rica, Memoria de la Secretar!a 
de Relaciones Exteriores Gracia y Justicia Culto y Bene!i-
cencia Presentada aI Congreso Constitucional por e! Secre-
tario de Estado en el Des acho de esas carteras Manue! Castro 
4- an os : 1pogra a laciona , 1 , p • 
....,._...-..=-__.."'!""'I'"'!""'='-... ...... this publication varies by year--all sub-
sequent references will note the year reported in the publi-
cation and the abbreviated title Memoria. 
12 
deal with Costa Rica on any other Central American matters 
would be useless until the issue of the Nicaraguan treaty, 
the subsequent Bryan-Chamorro Treaty, was resolved. 28 At 
that time, reports of rebels gathering in Costa Rica to move 
against Nicaragua were received in Washington. The United 
States sent word to Costa Rica to see to their removal but 
Costa Rica chose to view the alleged rebels as foreigners re-
siding in Costa Rica who were protected by the provisions of 
the Costa Rican constitution. 29 Whether these individuals 
were rebels setting out to disrupt Nicaragua cannot be deter-
mined. It was obvious, however, that Costa Rica was not going 
to cooperate with either the United States or Nicaragua to 
ascertain the facts. The United State~ decided not to move 
any further than its initial warning on the matter, 30 realiz-
ing that the true issue was not rebels bound for Nicaragua. 
Negotiations were begun in 1915 with the Costa Rican 
Minister in Washington to provide a canal treaty for Costa 
Rica. The issue of the so-called Platt Amendment in the Nica-
raguan agreement was also clarified so that in the view of 
28The Bryan-Chamorro Treaty was concluded in 1916 
and granted the United States the right to construct a canal 
through Nicaraguan territory with important leases on land at 
each end of the proposed canal. Thomas A. Bailey, A Diploma-
tic Bister of the American Peo le, Seventh Edition (New York: 
ppleton- entury-Crofts, 196 , p. 676. 
29u. s. Minister E. J. Hale at San Josg to the Secre-
tary of State, No. 51, 25 December 1914, 817.00/2386, Papers 
Relating to Foreign Relations, 12..!!:!:,9 pp. 183-184. 
30
secretary of State to u. S. Minister E. J. Hale at 
San Jos,, 29 December 1914, 817.00/2382, ibid., p. 184. 
13 
the secretary of State, William Jennings Bryan, Costa Rica 
understood that there would be no protectorate in Nicaragua 
of the magnitude which Costa Rica feared. 31 All seemed well 
on the path to resolution for the time being. However, in 
less than a month the United States Minister in Costa Rica 
reported that it was apparent from the local press in San 
Jose that the misunderstanding over the treaty persisted. He 
further indicated that Costa Rican national pride in the mat-
ter could not be "bought off" as he had initially believed. 
Rather, he now felt that Costa Rica would have to be assured 
further that its national rights were not being violated by 
the Bryan-Chamorro Treaty and any payments to be made to Cos-
ta Rica for similar treaties must be made in proportion to 
the rights of Costa Rica. 32 
Costa Rica went even further in pressing the United 
States on the issue of the canal. The Minister of Foreign 
Affairs in San Jos,, Manuel Castro Quesada, assured the re-
presentative of the United States that Costa Rica did not wish 
to interfere in any way with a canal which would be beneficial 
to it as well as to the rest of the hemisphere. However, 
Costa Rica maintained that the United States, in any negoti-
31secretary of State to u. s. Minister E. J. Hale at 
San Jose, 28 January 1915, 817.812/1066, United States, De-
partment of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations 
of the United States, 1915 (Washington, D.C.: Government 
1'ilinting Office, 1924)-;-p:' 1104. 
32u. s. Minister E. J. Hale at San Jose to the Secre-
tary of State, No. 63, 3 February 1915, 817.812/110, ibid., 
pp. 1105-1106. 
14 
ations regarding canal treaties or any other matters, must 
respect the treaties already in existence. 33 Thus, they 
stated that the United States must respect the Nicaraguan-
Costa Rican treaty of 1886 and must consult Costa Rica before 
concluding any canal treaty with Nicaragua. 
Negotiations continued throughout 1915, while at the 
same time the United States was considering the Bryan-Chamorro 
Treaty in the Senate. Compounding the Costa Rican resistance 
to the treaty was the growing belief in Central America that 
the United States was attempting to subvert any attempts at 
34 federation there. When the treaty was at last approved by 
the United States Senate in February of 1916, Costa Rica, 
along with El Salvador and Colombia, complained bitterly that 
it subverted their rjghts. 35 Although only Costa Rica had a 
treaty with Nicaragua (1886) which was violated by the Bryan-
Chamorro agreement, El Salvador and Colombia joined in the 
protest due to the potential threat to other similar bilater-
al agreements to which they adhered. They were met with 
Secretary of State Robert Lansing's reply that there was no 
jeopardy to their rights implied or stated in the treaty and 
that the matter was concluded between two sovereign states, 
33u. s. Minister E. J. Hale at San Jos' to the Secre-
tary of State, No. 65, 12 February 1915, 817.812/111, ibid., 
p. 1108. 
34 Karnes, Failure of Union, p. 252. 
35Notter, Origins of Wilson's Foreign Policy, p. 497. 
t~e United States and Nicaragua, and was of no concern to 
them. 36 
15 
At this point, Costa Rica took the matter to the Cen-
tral American Court of Justice which had been formed following 
the 1907 Central American Conference held in Washington, D.C. 
as a means to achieve the peaceful settlement of disputes 
among the Central American states. 37 Filing its petition for 
a review of the Bryan-Chamorro Treaty in March, 1916, it re• 
ceived a ruling favorable to its position in September of 
that year. 38 Secretary of State Lansing responded to the de-
cision by stating that the Court had no jurisdiction over the 
matter. 39 Then, in a serious error of judgment, both political 
and legal, the United States and Nicaragua proceeded to com-
pletely ignore the decision of the Court and viewed the Treaty 
as final.~O Both acted completely out of self interest and 
with total disregard for the procedures which had been estab-
lished for the. Jnaintenanoe of peace and cordial relations in 
Central America. 
The Central American Court of Justice, as another at-
tempt at joint action by the Central American republics, was 
36Ibid. 
37The Central American Court of Justice is not fully 
treated in any of the sources cited here. However 9 the most 
complete description can be found in Karnes, Failure of Union, 
p. 202. 
38aowland, American Relations, p. 223. 
39Notter, Origins of Wilson's Foreign Policy, p. ~97. 
4
°Karnee, Failure of Union, p. 252. 
16 
already well on the way to failure before this incident. How-
ever, it can be argued that the Bryan-Chamorro Treaty admini-
stered the final blow to the institution which the United 
41 States had promoted so strenuously only ten years before. 
More important to the study here, however, is the effect of 
this course of events on Costa Rica. The disregard shown by 
the United States for the sovereign rights of the Costa Ri-
can nation would prove a galling sore to Costa Rican national 
pride and hinder amicable relations between the two nations 
for some time to come. The issue of the canal treaty was re-
solved by the acceptance of Costa Rica in 1921 of a payment 
from the United States in return for a cession of canal 
rights through Costa Rican territory. 42 But the enthusiasm 
of the Costa Rican nation for the Central American Court of 
Justice was probably the last time the Costa Ricans became 
seriously involved in any attempts at joint action on the 
part of the Central American nations until the economic 
union formed after the Second World War. 
The Central American Court of Justice was only one of 
the results of the United States-Mexican sponsored Central 
American Conference held in Washington, D.C. in 1907. The 
conference itself was brought about by a variety of factors, 
not the least of which was the desire of the United States 
41Ibid., P• 202. 
42Howland, American Relations, p. 224. 
17 
Secretary of State Elihu Root to begin modification of the 
"Dollar Diplomacy" whioh had characterized policy of previous 
43 years. Root, in cooperation with Porfirio Diaz of Mexico, 
sought a consensus among the Central American states on the 
issues of peace and arbitration of disputes involving only 
central American states. The oonference produced several 
agreements, most of which were ratified by the five partici-
pants, Costa Rioa, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nica-
ragua. As stated previously, the Central American Court of 
Justice, founded as a result of the Conference, was essen-
tially destroyed as a result of the actions of the United 
States and Nicaragua in ignoring the decision of the Court on 
the Bryan-Chamorro Treaty in 1916. The goals of the Conference, 
as expressed by its president Luis Anderson, a Costa Rican, 
included attempts at peaceful and harmonious cooperation in 
Central America as a reasonable alternative to confederation.qq 
These attempts accepted the idea that confederation was simply 
not a workable solution to Central American problems. Essen-
tially it was hoped that with the measures adopted by the con-
ference, including the Court of Justice, the Central American 
states could reach the same spirit of cooperation they had 
43Wilfrid Hardy Calcott, The Caribbean Polic¥ of the 
United States, 1890-1920 (Baltimore: 'i'iie Johns Hopkins Press, 
!942), p. 220. 
~qKarnes, Failure of Union, p. 191. 
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attempted in the past through confederation. 45 Thus it can 
be seen that anything which adversely affected these measures 
would be viewed as an obstruction to Central American unity. 
Another measure of the 1907 Conference which fell in-
to disrepute was the Tobar Doctrine, an agreement which would 
deny recognition to governments which had gained power by 
l t . 46 revo u ion. Costa Rica, along with the other conference 
participants, would adhere to this agreement. But in this in-
stance, the Central American states themselves would find this 
an unacceptable restriction following the problems encountered 
by the revolutionary Tinoco regime in Costa Rica and the 
equally revolutionary Mart!nez regime in El Salvador in achiev-
ing the recognition of the United States after having been rec-
ognized by the other Central American states. The problems of 
both of these regimes will be discussed at greater length in 
subsequent chapters. The important thing to note here is that 
the Central American states reached a decision with regard to 
an internal issue of order on the question of recognition, 
whereas in the case of the Court of Justice, external pres-
sures, combined with the cooperation of one Central American 
state, brought about its demise. 
The decision of the Central American states, led by 
45Ibid. 
~ 6William L. Neumann, Jr., Reco~nition of American 
Governments (Washington, D.C.s Founaations for Foreign Af-
fairs, Pamphlet No. 3, 1947), p. 13. 
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Luis Anderson, the Costa Rican theorist, to refrain from an-
other attempt at confederation in 1907 prevented still anoth-
er failure in the series of attempts to combine five separate 
and sovereign states into a single unit. Both the role of the 
United States in these events and the leadership exercised by 
a Costa Rican in the Washington Conf erenoe would have an impact 
on the events in years to follow. 
Another aspect of the Costa Rican self image as a 
"loner" or leader in Central American affairs was the continu-
ing Panama boundary dispute, which was in many ways similar to 
its problems with Nicaragua. The national press of Costa Rica 
reflected the concern that only isolationism would maintain 
Costa Rican sovereignty with the existence of a United States 
dominated sphere of influence just to the south. 47 Costa Ri-
ca assumed the attitude that it had to deal only with Panama 
on this issue for fear of the interference of the United States. 
However, as events developed, the United States came to the side 
of Costa Rica in the boundary question, perhaps seeking a "trade 
off" in the Nicaraguan question. The support of the Costa Ri-
can position in the dispute came from the mediation of Chief 
Justice White of the United States Supreme Court in 1914. The 
matter was submitted to him for investigation at the insistence 
of Costa Rica and as far as Panama was concerned, it was to be 
47La Republioa (San Jos,), 28 July 1908, cited in 
Karnes, Failure of Union, p. 195. 
merely a clarification of the previous award mediated by 
President Emile Loubet of France, which had ruled in favor 
of Panama. 48 The White award reversed the Loubet decision 
20 
and indicated that the territory in question belonged to Cos-
ta Rica rather than to Panama. All the objections of Panama 
notwithstanding, the United States adhered to this decision 
throughout the discussions which transpired during the 1920's 
and 1930's, which will be discussed in a later chapter. Panama 
objected on the grounds that the United States had, by virtue 
of its canal treaty with them, sworn to guarantee the terri-
torial integrity of Panama, which the White award failed to 
do.49 
This position by the United States had a long-reach-
ing impact on the position of Costa Rica in the Central Ameri-
can community. If it were the intent of the United States to 
seek a favorable Costa Rican attitude toward the Bryan-Chamorro 
Treaty, this did not succeed as has been shown above. It 
might also be speculated that this was part of a "divide and 
conquer" mentality on the part of the United States in its 
relations with Central America. According to at least one 
author, this simply would not have been necessary if the Unit-
ed States had sought to "conquer" Central America,since it had 
49Ibid., II:303-312. 
"th t d' • . 50 the strength to do so wi ou 1v1s1on. 
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It would be entirely misleading to say that Costa Rica 
took on any great significance in the eyes of the United States 
because of its resistance to the Bryan-Chamorro Treaty or, as 
indicated, by the United States's favoritism for its cause 
in the Panamanian boWldary dispute. In fact, quite the con-
tra?'Y might be said to be true. When another matter of great 
importance in inter-American affairs, the recognition of the 
revolutionary government in Mexico, came up for discussion, 
Costa Rica was relegated to the status of a non-participant 
and was notified after the fact of the decision made by the 
United States, Brazil, Chile, Argentina, Bolivia, Uruguay, and 
Guatemala in the matter. 51 For the Costa Ricans, however, the 
question was not of any great importance, since it had already 
made its own policy and was quietly pursuing it. Throughout 
this period of revolution in Mexico, Costa Rica had maintained 
consular posts in the major Mexican cities and continued to do 
so with or without the concurrence of other American states. 52 
The independence of action shown by Costa Rica in the 
foregoing, which characterized its international behavio~ in 
the period before 1919, was indicative of the strong national-
50Karnes, Failure of Union, p. 208. 
51 Secretary of State to the Minister of Costa Rica at 
Washington, 19 October 1915, 812.00/16614a, Papers Relating to 
Foreign Relations, ~. p. 771. 
52Memorias, 1914-1915, p. 123. 
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istic sentiments motivating Costa Rican policies during this 
period. Such independence would continue to mark later Cos-
ta Rican policies. 
This introduction to Costa Rica's policies and atti-
tudes poses more questions than it answers. The paucity of 
information about some of these issues makes them difficult 
to study and even more difficult to fit into any conclusive 
pattern. However, in the following chapters an attempt will 
be made to resolve the major question of Costa Rican self im-
age as it was manifested in national policies and international 
relations during the 1919-1939 period. 
CMP~R II 
THE TINOCO REGIME 
Before considering Costa Rican internationalism during 
the period under study (1919-1939), it is important to note 
the internal political events and issues which would effect 
international policies and attitudes. The most significant 
political development to the 1919-1939 period was the coup 
d'etat led by Federico Tinoco in January, 1917. This coup 
touched all the important issues which were part of Costa Ri-
can internationalism and established patterns which charac-
terize the following twenty years. 
As was indicated previously, political conditions in 
Costa Rica during the nineteenth century, and in the early 
twentieth, were unusually stable for a Central .American re-
public.1 This fact, while a matter of considerable national 
pride, is related by some sources to the strict control of 
the processes of government by a dominant element within 
Costa Rican society, 2 which included its manipulation of an 
1Among other sources see Busey, Notes on Costa Rican 
Democracy, p. 44 Howland, American Relations, p. 220. 
2u.s. Charg' Marshall Langhorne at San Jos~ to the 
23 
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elaborate electoral system characterized by nwnerous checks 
and balances. 3 An assessment of th~ role of an oligarchy in 
Costa Rican politics is extremely difficult to make due to the 
ill-defined nature of that group. The difficulty arises from 
the fact that the "oligarchy" was not a static group, nor was 
membership in it determined by a select list of family names 
or occupations. Yet, most observers of Costa Rican society 
are in agreement that such an oligarchy did exist. Land own-
ership represented the essential ingredient for measuring 
the political power of members of the oligarchy. 4 Much of 
the land held in large lots by Costa Ricans was devoted to 
coffee growing. 5 Eventually, the introduction of bananas as 
a money crop changed the power base in Costa Rican politics, 
but this would not occur until after World War I. However, 
land and the profits it produced were the sole basis for power 
prior to that time. Before the First World War and the emer-
gence of bananas as an important cash crop, the large land-
holders did not control the loyalty of people as a conse-
quence of their landowning. Approximately one half of the 
Secretary of State, No. 64 1 27 May 1913, 818.00/42 1 Records 
of the Department of State Relating to the Internal Affairs 
of Costa Rica, 1910-1929 1 National Archives Microfilm Publi-
cations, Microcopy 669. Referred to hereinafter as MC669. 
3Charles F. Denton, Patterns of Costa Rican Politics, 
The Allyn and Bacon Series in Latin American Politics (Hos-
ton: Allyn and Bacon, Inc., 1971) 1 p. 43. 
4Ibid., p. 18. 
5Blutstein, Handbook for Costa Rica, p. 22. 
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land was divided up into numerous small landholdings operated 
by the owner ~nd his family. The other half of the land was 
tied up in large plantation-size holnings. 6 Labor for the 
plantations was generally drawn from the ranks of the small 
landholders who worked for wages on them. 7 But since better 
than two thirds of the small landholders supported themselves 
solely on the income of-their own land, 8 the large landowners 
could not get any economic strangle hold on their loyalties. 
The greatest strength of the landowning aristocracy 
early in the twentieth century lay in the relative political 
apathy of the small independent landowners. The large land-
owners could well afford political activities and used their 
wealth to dominate the government of the nation. This too 
would change in the course of the early twenthieth century, 
but not until after the educational reforms enacted at the 
turn of the century aroused and equipped a rising middle 
class. 9 But the change of power would be surprisingly free 
of any vehe•ent class antagonism, primarily because of the 
positive results of land ownership by the politically domi-
nated classes. Perhaps an additional reason for the lack of 
hostility between the oligarchy and the lower classes can be 
6nenton, Patterns of Costa Rican Politics, p. 16. 
7Busey, Notes on Costa Rican Democracy, p. 63. 
8Ibid., p. 64. 
9 
.d 0 Ibi ., pp. 5 -51. 
found in the fact that at no time could the oligarchs be 
characterized as nonproductive or parasitic members of so-
ciety which at least one author regards as a primary cause 
for major social upheavals. 10 
25 
Despite changes which would mark Costa Rican society 
and the character of the elements which dominated national 
politics, early in the twentieth century the oligarchy still 
controlled the political life of the nation. As will be dis-
cussed, the strength of this oligarchy would elect Alfredo Gon-
z~lez Flores as President in 1914 and then unseat him in 1917. 
This oligarchy of wealthy aristocrats also had among 
their number the majority of past Presidents as well as gov-
ernmental officials of all levels. This led to a situation in 
which electoral campaigns in Costa Rica were personalist rather 
than ideological in character. There were actually no politi-
cal parties as that term is usually understood until after the 
changes in society which were noted above. 11 All groupings 
which might be construed as political parties were in reality 
personalist organizations which advocated the candidacy of a 
specified individual~ 
A further result of the dominance of Costa Rican poli-
tical affairs by the oligarchy was the fact that, until 1913, 
10ibid., p. 4R. 
11u.s. Charg~ Marshall Langhorne at San Jos~ to the 
Secretary of Secretary of State, No. 64 9 27 May 1913 9 818.00/ 
42, MC 669. 
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presidential elections were conducted by an electoral system 
in the Congress, whose members were also not directly elected 
by the populace. Thus presidential elections were removed 
from the electorate by the oligarchy. 
Election reform laws, which brought about the first 
popular election of the Costa Rican President were put into 
effect for the 1913 elections. 12 The candidates were, as usu-
al, members of the oligarchy. 13 The campaign, as usual, waD 
a battle of personalities rather than of issues. 14 However, 
the results of the voting were inconclusive, with none of the 
candidates receiving a clear majority. 15 This, according to 
one reading of the reformed election laws, left the selection 
of the president in the hands of the Congress so that, despite 
the changes of the law, the election was not a direct one as 
had been planned. 
Again, the campaigning was quite bitter and directed 
at the personalities of the candidates. However, exercising 
its somewhat uncertain prerogative to elect whomever it chose, 
12Busey, Notes on Costa Rican Democracy, p. 4. 
13u.s. Charg(; Marshall Langhorne at San Jos~ to the 
Secretary of State, No. 64 1 27 May 1913, 818.00/42, MC 669. 
14u.s. Charg6 Marshall Langhorne at San Jos' to the 
Secretary of State, 5 June 1913, 818.00/143, MC 669. 
15u.s. Charg~ Marshall Langhorne at San Jos~ to the 
Secretary of State, No. 18 1 9 May 1914 1 818.00/45, MC 669. 
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the Congress selected Alfredo Gonz~lez Flores as President. 16 
In addition, a completely new slate of three candidates for 
the three Desi5nados, or Vice Presidents, was chosen. 17 Usu-
ally these were the select assistants of the president or the 
runners-up in the presidential voting. In this instance, on 
what appeared to be a whim of the Congress, tha Designados 
were no~ chosen from the list of the previous candidates. 
The Congress was not governed by any specific legal ruling 
on this part of the issue. It should be remembered that since 
there were no real political parties or ideological differences 
to speak of among the candidates, a situation placing the run-
ners-up in the Designado position would not necessarily pre-
sent any grave problems. 
There had been considerable politicking throughout 
the Congressional deliberations, with Gonzalez Flores's candi-
dacy advocated by a group led by the prominent Tinoco family.1 8 
As a reward for this assistance, Federico Tinoco was chosen as 
the Minister of War in Gonzalez Flores's cabinet. In addition, 
he received a vague promise of similar assistance from Gonza-
lez Flores in a future presidential election. 19 
Federico Tinoco and his family were members of the 
16Ibid. 
17Ibid. 
18Jones, Costa Rica and Civilization, p. 26. 
19Ibid. 
oligarchy described above. They were not outstanding in 
wealth or reputation among their peers as evidenced by the 
28 
lack of specific information about them. But they were capa-
ble, at the time of the 1914 election, of putting together a 
coalition in the Congress to achieve the election of Gonzalez 
Flores. Since the Tinoco family had the political influence 
to accomplish this, it is somewhat puzzling that they did not 
seek to elect one of their own family. However, this probably 
can be answered by the politics of the day in that the time 
was not yet right for a Tinoco candidacy. 
The unusual means by which Gonzalez Flores was elected 
would be extremely important to subsequent events. According 
to at least one Costa Rican historian, the election was re-
ceived with considerable indignation by the populace at large 
due to its affront to the dignity of the constitution. 20 The 
Congressional choice of an individual who was not one of the 
original candidates would become a matter of some dispute as 
well. Whether the Congress had the right to overlook the three 
candidates who had undergone the popular vote would be in-
creasingly questionable as the President's popularity waned, 
and the issue provided a point at which his enemies could 
strike. However, the role of the Tinoco family in the polit-
ical maneuvers which brought about the election of Gonzalez 
20 Le6n Fernandez Guardia, Historia de Costa Rica (2 
Tomes, San Jose: Imprenta Falco Hermanos & Co., n.d.), II: 
104. 
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Flores would be overlooked or simply forgotten. 21 
The personal involvement of the Tinocos in the elec-
tion was important, especially in the re·wards they were prom-
ised or thought they had been promised. In any event, it is 
important to remember that this election, despite its alleged 
popular beginnings, was like those which had preceded it in 
that it was an internal affair of the oligarchy rather than 
a universal reflection of Costa Rican public opinion. 
Gonz~lez Flores as President proposed several reform 
programs. the most important of which were economic changes 
f . . 1 . 22 to meet recent 1nanc1a crises. In attempting to estab-
lish relative fiscal stability for the nation, he proposed 
tax increases and some new taxes. 23 The main thrust of this 
tax program would have been felt by the oligarchy• who bit-
terly resented any imposition of taxes upon their wealth. 24 
In some ways it is extremely difficult to comprehend Gonz(lez 
Flores's motivations for a program with such predictable re-
actions. However, it can only be said in his defense, for 
21Ibid. 
22special Report on the Political and Financial Situ-
ation of Costa Rica from Vice Consul Albert B. Pullen at Port 
Limon to the Secretary of State, 18 December 1917 1 F. W. 
818.00/-- MC669. 
23u.s. Charge ad interim Stewart Johnson at San Jos' 
to the Secretary of State, No. 124• 2 May 1918, 818.00/--. 
MC 669; u.s. Charg~ E. J. Hale at San Jose to the Secretary 
of State• 31 January 1917 1 818.00/67, MC 669. 
24Ibid. 
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lack of any contrary evidence, that this may have been the 
only viable avenue open to him for additional tax revenues. 
The diRcontent was heightened further by the bitterness felt 
at this reward for the assistance in securing Gonzalez Flo-
res's election, plus the fact that he attempted to stifle 
criticism of his measures by allegedly hindering the "free-
dom of the press" and of the vote of the populace in the 
Congressional elections of 1915. 25 Although it is difficult 
to determine whether the ambition of Tinoco himself or the 
instigation of the oligarchs brought about succeeding events, 
the issue is not really a crucial one. 26 
Further, there were negotiations in progress between 
Gonzalez Flores and foreign investors who were interested in 
receiving oil exploration concessions from the Costa Rican 
government. Gonz~lez Flores exercised his influence in favor 
of one group of foreign businessmen, which stirred some ser-
ious animosity on the part of those who were left out, not 
to mention the Costa Ricans who were associated with these 
groups. One such group had forged rather strong ties with 
the Tinoco clan and hoped to benefit from the close associa-
tion of the family with the government. When their proposal 
was passed over, the Greulich-Valentine or Sinclair-Greulich 
25Leon Fernandez Guardia, Historia de Costa Rica, II: 
104. 
26u.s. Charge ad interim Stewart Johnson at San Jos' 
to the Secreta:C'y of State, No. 124, 2 May 191S, F.W. 818.00/ 
--, MC 669. 
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group (the two names are interchangeable> 27 conducted some 
rather indiscreet business with the Tinocos, which would have 
a serious bearing on the future course of events surrounding 
Tinoco. More will be said about this below. 
The momentum against Gonz!lez Flores continued through-
0 ut his term. However, since reelection was not permissable 
bY the Constitution, his return to the presidency was not of 
great concern until late in 1916 when rumors began to circu-
1ate that he either intended to seek reelection or at least 
control a successor of his choice. who clearly would not be 
Federico Tinoco. The issue was complicated by an alleged an-
nouncement from a prominent member of the oligarchy, Manuel 
Castro Quesada, that he would lead the reelection campaign 
for Gonzalez Flores. 28 The only source for this news of Gon-
z!lez Flores's intentions and Castro Quesada's role in the 
matter is Tinoco himself. 29 A possible explanation for the 
assumption that Gonzalez Flores sought his own continuation 
27nr. Greulich was a United States investor who re-
presented not only his own interests but also those of the 
Sinclair Oil Company. The Valentines, Lincoln G. and Washing-
ton s., were "agents at lax'ge" functioning for various in-
terests throughout Latin America, in this instance for the 
G~eulich-Sinclair concern. 
28w. H. Field (Montealegre & Bonilla, Import & Ex-
pert), to J. H. Stabler, Department of State, 31 January 
1917 9 818.00/78• MC 669. 
29President Federico Tinoco to u.s. Minister E. J. 
H~le at San Jes~, 27 January 1917, Enclosure in u.s. ~~nister 
E. J. Hale at San Jose to the Secretary of State• No. 111, a ~rch 1917• 818.00/111, MC 669. 
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in power was that he was attempting to name his successor to 
the presidency. Since such a practice might be construed as 
a violation of free election laws, he may be culpable in part 
for the wrongs attributed to him in this matter. However, 
even pro-Tinoco sources do not directly maintain that Gonza-
lez Flores intended to bypass constitutional elections for 
his chosen successor. 30 Later events would not confirm or 
deny the allegations, but the fear among the oligarchy that 
Gonzalez Flores would seek a second term or would use his 
power as an incumbent to forward a chosen successor who would 
continue his policies was strong. While they could obviously 
have prevented such abuses, the oligarchs would resent any 
interruption of the status quo and the potential loss of pro-
fit to their various business enterprises which such actions 
might represent. 
On January 27, 1917, Federico Tinoco, with the assis-
tance of his brother Joaquin and others, very peacefully 
seized the telegraph and radio facilities and, by late after-
noon, he had been installed in the presidential palace, taking 
power on the basis of Gonzalez Flores's unconstitutional in-
tent to remain in office. 31 Gonzalez Flores, in the company 
30carlos Monge Alfaro, Historia de Costa Rica (Decima 
Edicion, San Jose: Imprenta Trejos, 1960), p. 269. 
31
"Proclama del General Don Federico Tinoco al Pueblo 
de Costa Rica," from La Gazeta, 28 enero 1917 in La ca{da del 
Gobierno Constitucional en Costa Rica, El Golpe de Estado de 
~7 de Enero de 1917 (New York: DeLaisne & Carranza~ 1919), p. 
33 
of some of the members of his Cabinet and a few Congressmen, 
fled to the Am~rican legation where he was granted asylum 
pending the instruction of the State Department, which were 
delayed because of Tinoco's control of all outgoing conununi-
cations. 32 
Depending on the account which can be believed, the 
revolution of January,1917 was either a bloody, cutthroat 
manifestation of Tinoco's power hunger, 33 or it approached 
comic opera proportions. 34 Since the accounts reflect the 
partisanship of the witnesses, it is likely that neither ex-
treme is accurate. There were, however, few, if any, casu-
al ties reported35 as a result of the coup; therefore, it can 
be assumed that the bloodthirsty description is considerably 
exaggerated. Further evidence is that Gonzalez Flores and 
his group were allowed to leave the country unmolested. 36 
9, r. W. 818.00/--, MC 669. This source will be cited here-
inafter as La Ca!da del Gobierno Constituoional. 
32 George W. Baker, Jr., "Woodrow Wilson's Use of the 
Hon-Recognition Policy in Costa Rica," The Americas, Vol. 22 
(July, 1965), p. 8. This work is an extract from Baker's 
major work on Wilson's foreign policy. 
33Ex-president Don Alfredo Gonzalez Flores and Ex-
charg~ to the U.S. Rafael Oreamuno to ::?resident Woodrow Wil-
son, 12 November 1918 9 818.00/509 1 MC 669. 
34John M. Keith to U.S. Minister E. J. Hale at San 
Jos~, 7 March 1917, Enclosure #1 in u.s. Minister E. J. Hale 
at San Jose to the Secretary of State, No. 113, 15 March 1917, 
818.00/116, MC 669. 
35u.s. Minister E. 
tary of State, No. 113, 15 
36Ibid. 
34 
Tinoco's support for this coup came from several 
sources. Among these he claimed a wide popular following, 
with substantial support among the important people of Costa 
Rica and the approval of the majority of the Congress as the 
"savior of the country. 1137 It is difficult to uphold his 
claim to popular support. The views expressed in the nation-
1 f bl T . 38 b . h a press were avora e to inoco, ut since t ere were 
strict codes of censorship enforced by him, admitted by all 
sides of the question, press opinion is of little significance 
in answering this question. However, there was obviously no 
broad popular movement to bring about his downfall, and when 
he was finally supplanted, it was again by the powerful oli-
garchy which had brought him to power. In the interim, how-
ever, the country seemed to be united behind him and a "con-
dition of complete harmony" existed. 39 
There is another side to the possible sources of sup-
port for Tinoco 1 s coup other than those motivated by his 
stated claim to solving an unconstitutional situation. 40 
37Monge Alfaro, Historia de Costa Rica, ::?• 259. 
38Proceso De La Restauracion 0 La Intervenci6n Ameri-
cana En Costa Rica (San Josfi: Imprenta Librer!a Y Encuader-
naci5n Alsina, 1922), p. 21. 
39 John M. Keith to u.s. Minister E, J. Hale at San 
Jos~, 7 March 1917, Enclosure #1 in u.s. Minister E. J. Hale 
at San Jos~ to the Secretary of State, No. 113, 15 March 1917, 
818.00/116, MC 669. 
40President Federico Tinoco to U.S. Minister E. J. 
Hale at San Jose, 27 January 1917, Enclosure in U.S. Minister 
E. J. Hale at San Jos' to the Secretary of State, No. 111, 3 
March 1917, 818.00/111, MC 669. 
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Gonz~lez Flores and many of his supporte~G would claim and 
insist they could prove that Tinoco had been paid to rebel 
against legally constituted authority by United States finan-
cial interests. This claim t~at Tinoco was a puppet of Amer-
ican capitalism referred to information which linked him to 
Lincoln G. Valentine, the representative of the Greulich oil 
intcresto. For the benefit of the United States State De-
partment, a pamphlet of unknown authorship was published by 
the Gonz!lez Flores's lobby in Washington, which presented 
genuine documents proving that Valentine had planned to buy 
the favor of the Tinocos by granting them large portions of 
the capital stock of the oil corporation which would be formed 
to work the concession granted by the Costa Rican govern-
ment. 41 According to this pamphlet, Valentine had undertaken 
this plan when Gonz~lez Flores chose another concessionaire 
42 
over the Greulich proposal. Tinoco then allegedly used the 
"constitutional" argument merely to deceive the people. 43 
This pamphlet was also presented to the United States Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee as it took up the matter of re-
cognition of the Tinoco government. 44 For the sake of its 
41La Ca{da del Gobierno Constitucional, p. 14. 
42 sworn Statement of Lincoln G. Valentine, Enclosure 
#2 in U.S. Minister William J. Price in Panama to the Secre-
tary of State, No. 1868, 27 March 1918, F. w. 818.00/--, MC 
669. 
43 , La Caida del Gobierno Constitucional, p. 14. 
44Ibid., p. 49. 
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credibility, it is unfortuna"te that there is no further in-
formation available concerning the origins of this pamphlet. 
It was one of a group of unnumbered documents preceding the 
regularly nurr..bered documents in Microcopy 669. 
Here again, the facts of the matter are somewhat dif-
ficult to ascertain. Valentine was by no means an idealistic 
individual who would be limited by the constitutional means 
available to him to get the concession if these proved im-
possible or would deprive him of profits. In the manner of 
lobbyists, he certainly was not above granting favors to in-
fluential individuals in the government who would further his 
cause. In the realm of Costa Rican politics, presents of 
stock and direct financial support for those governmental of-
ficials who would further one's cause were not frowned upon. 
In fact, such gifts and gratuities were considered part of 
the operating expenses of most major corporations. Thus, it 
is entirely likely that Valentine had paid the Tinocos to 
support his claim and would be willing to pay handsomely for 
the new Tinoco government to annul the concession granted to 
others by Gonz!lez Flores and grant it instead to the Greu-
lich interests. It should be remembered that the evidence 
supporting the case against Tinoco and Valentine was a part 
of Gonzalez Flores's attempt to bring about United States in-
tervention in Costa Rica and it is thus difficult to deter-
llll.ne the truth in the matter. 45 However, it was concluded by 
45Proceso de Restauracion, p. 15. 
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John Fos"ter Dulles, actinz as a special investigator for the 
State Department, that there had been absolutely no foreign 
involvement in the instigation of the coup and that the en-
tire issue was one of domes-tic politics. 46 
In any case, after the substantial investments in 
time, effort, and money made by ?alentine, the Greulich in-
terests did not receive the concession which Tinoco granted 
to a British concern, nominally headed by a United States 
. . Am 47 citizen, ory. Valentine himself received less than cour-
teous treatment by the Tinoco government, which at one point 
jailed him. 48 It is simply not realistic to say that Tinoco 
would treat the source of his funds for revolution and con-
tinuation in power in this fashion. There may be some truth 
to the allegations that Valentine had influenced Tinoco and 
others who were dissatisfied with Gonz~lez Flores in planning 
the coup, but that is what Tinoco himself claimed publicly. 49 
The importance of this whole issue to this study is 
46 John Foster Dulles to the Secretary of State, 1 May 
1917, 818.00/142, MC 669. 
47u. s. Consul Benjamin F. Chase at San Jose to the 
Secretary of State, No. 494, 11 March 1919, 818.00/571, MC 
669. 
48Lincoln G. Valentine to W. H. Field, 1 February 1919 1 
Enclosure in U.S. Consul Benjamin F. Chase at San Jos~ to the 
Secretary of State, No. 494, 11 March 1919, 818.00/571, MC 669. 
49p . . T. . . E J resident Federico inoco to U.S. Minister • • 
Hale at San Jose, 27 January 1917, Enclosure in U.S. Minister 
E. J. Hale at San Jose to the Secretary of State, No. 111, 3 
March 1917 11 818.00/111, MC 669. 
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that the State Department and Woodrow Wilson chose to believe 
Gonzalez Florea'a claims about Tinoco'• sources of support. 
There were conflicting reports aa to the popularity of Tino-
co' s regime, but due to the policies adopted by the Wilson 
administration 1 they chose to accept only those reports which 
supported the view that a president who rose to power without 
benefit of an election muat be unpopular. The acceptance of 
Gonzalez Florea in 'the United States legation and his subse-
quent welcome to Washington would further make it extl"emely 
difficult for Tinoco or his adherent• to get a just hearing 
in Washington for their government. Even though Lincoln G. 
Valentine would come forward and sign an affadavit for the 
American Consul in San Joa' swearing that he had not paid 
Tinoco to engineer the coup, this story waa believed until the 
last day of the Tinoao regime. 50 In addition 1 once Valentine 
had been ruled out aa the source of funds for the coup, Minor 
c. Keith was proposed as a possible donor due to his support 
of the Tinoco regime. 51 There was even consideration in the 
United States of treason charges against Keith for hia acti-
vities which were viewed aa inimical to the interests of the 
United Statea. 52 
SO Ibid. 
51Memorandum of John Foster Dullea to Hon. Charles 
Warren, Department of Juatice 1 2- August 1917, 818.00/23-a, 
MC 669. 
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The coup d'etat had other important ramifications for 
Costa Rican international affairs. First and foremost was 
the damage done to the constitution. John M. Keith, 53 the 
nephew of Minor C. Keith and a long time resident of Costa 
Rica, who, though a United States citizen, had married into a 
prominent Costa Rican family, believed Tinoco had no alterna-
tive but to rewrite the constitution. According to Keith, 
the coup d'etat completely discredited the constitution as if 
it were a "humpty dumpty" which could not be put together 
again. 54 Keith argued, however, that this was not due to any 
lack of democratic spirit on the part of the Costa Ricans or 
Tinoco, but rather reflected the fact that the Latin American 
mind did not associate the spirit of a democracy with the man-
made instrument of a constitution. Like all other man-made 
devices, constitutions occasionally died and had to be re-
placed by newer and younger instruments. 55 Therefore, the 
loss of a aone~itution could not be viewed as the loss of a 
democracy, but merely as a change or improvement on the ac-
cessories of democracy, and in this case, since the revolt 
53John Keith had extensive business ties in Costa Ri-
ca. He did not, as had his uncle, sell the major part of his 
holdings to the United Fruit Company. Keith expressed a know-
ledgeable sympathy for the Costa Ricans and Tinoco. 
54John M. Keith to U.S. Minister E. J. Hale at San 
Jos,, 7 March 1917, Enclosure #2 in U.S. Minister E. J. Hale 
at San Jos' to the Secretary of State, No. 113, 15 March 1917, 
818.00/116 9 MC 669. 
55 Ibid. 
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had come in response to a corrupt government, the revolt 
could be. viewed as the first step in reform. 56 However, this 
view was not shared by the United States government in the 
policies which it adopted toward Tinoco, as will be discussed 
in the next chapter. 
Relevant to the internal affairs of Costa Rioa, how-
ever, is the fact that the gradual severing of economic ties 
with the United States resulting from nonrecognition contri-
buted to the general economic instability of the Tinoco gov-
ernment and, as United States Minister E. J. Hale had pre-
dicted, its eventual political demise. 57 Politically, the 
tacit support of the United States for Gonzllez Flores's con-
tentions concerning Tinoao's motives did Tinoco grave damage. 
In effect, the United States harbored Costa Rican dissidents, 
encouraged them in their resistance to the de facto govern-
-
ment and thus gave heart to those dissidents who were in Cos-
ta Rica, preventing Tinoco from ever establishing real politi-
l b ·1· 58 ca sta 1 ity. 
In spite of these handicaps, Tinoco managed to hold 
his presidency together for over two years. During that 
time, according to the account one consults, there was either 
56Ibid. 
57u.s. Minister E. J. Hale at San Jos' to the Secre-
tary of State, 18 August 1917, 818.00/134, MC 669. 
58Le6n FernAndez Guardia, Historia de Costa Rica, II: 
105. 
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democratic rule based on a truly constitutional presidency 
(Tinoco had held elections within four months of attaining 
pow~r) 59 or there was severe oppression supported by phony, 
engineered elections led by a tyrant, as Gonzalez Flores con-
tended. 60 In this instance, it is not too difficult to de-
termine the truth. There was certainly some lack of politi-
cal freedom under the Tinoco regime. But when it would not 
have been necessary to do so, he held elections to legalize 
his position. In addition, Tinoco arranged for a new con-
stitution to be written. For the reasons noted above by John 
M. Keith, this was an absolute necessity for his duration in 
power and for the continued health of the democratic system 
in Costa Rica. However, these same facts viewed by a new 
United States Consul in San Jos,, Benjamin F. Chase, led to 
far different conclusions. According to the individuals who 
held that post during the Tinoco presidency (Primarily Ben-
jamin F. Chase and Stewart Johnson), there were constant 
purges of opposition leadership, the jails were full of politi-
cal prisoners and free men were afraid to walk the streets. 
As to the first contention, it was only natural that Tinoco re-
move those opposed to his presidency from all positions in the 
government. Second, the political prisoners received an early 
59u.s. Minister E.J. Hale at San Jos~ to the Secre-
tary of State, 2 April 1917, 818.00/123 1 MC 669. 
60u.s. Charg' ad interim Stewart Johnson at San Jos6 
to the Secretary of State, 2 June 1917 1 818.00/164, MC 669. 
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amnesty, with Gonz!lez Flores and all of his main officers 
allowed to leave Costa Rica in peaoe within a matter of weeks 
after theaoup. 61 As to the third contention, even the State 
Department was a little leery of Chase's evaluation, since he 
had requested gun boats off the Costa Rican coast to protect 
American lives and' property. It was noted in a State Depart-
ment memorandum that Chase was being a little "hysterical" 
about the state of affairs in Costa Rica. 62 
Once again it is important to emphasize that while 
Tinoco was no altruist, it is the opinion of this author that 
he did the best job possible as president under some extremely 
difficult circumstances. If there was political bribery and 
graft, this was as much a part of Gonzalez Flores's presidency 
as it was of Tinoco's. If there were concessions to the in-
terests of foreign capitalists on Tinoco's part, this was also 
a part of Gonz,lez Flores's strategy to achieve the most ad-
vantageous financial arrangements for the nation. It is impor-
tant to remember on this issue that, although the charge that 
Tinoco was bought by Valentine was ma, de• the concession which 
was at stake was finally granted to another individual. Fi-
nally, if there was a repression of opposition spokesmen and 
leaders under the Tinoco regime, this, too, was a part of the 
long-established political tradition in Costa Rica. Had Tinoco, 
61Baker, "Wilson's Non-Recognition Policy," p. 9. 
62Acting Secretary of State Polk to the American Mis-
sion in Paris, 15 May 1919, 818.00/613 1 MC 669. 
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as Minister of War, spoken out against Gonzalez Flores's politi-
cal policies and presidency, he would have been replaced in of-
fice at the very least. 
When in the summer of 1919 Tinoco'& regime fell, there 
was no great victory to be celebrated for the forces of right 
and democracy. The physical defeat of the Tinoco regime was 
accomplished by revolutionary forces harbored in Nicaragua with 
the encouragement or at least the tacit approval of the United 
States. 63 The leadership of these forces was comprised of the 
members of the oligarchy who were as disenchanted with Tinoco 
in 1919 as they had been with Gonzalez Flores in 1917. Finally 
involved in that defeat was the strangulation of the internation-
al side of the Costa Rican national image. It is a sign of the 
importance of that international side that the deprivation of 
normal relationships with the rest of the world conununity of 
nations, would, within a matter of two years, bring about the 
fall of an inunensely popular regime which had had as its start-
ing point the restoration of constitutional rule and the sup-
port of the powerful oligarchy. However, the question of Cos-
ta Rican internationalism during the Tinoco period and in the 
years immediately following them will be discussed in the next 
chapter. 
63non Alfredo Gcnz!lez Flores and Rafael Oreamuno to 
President Woodrow Wilson, 12 November 1918, 818.00/509, MC 
669. 
CHAPTER III 
THE TINOCO REGIME AND RECOGNITION 
(JANUARY, 1917-MAY, 1918) 
In the matter of the recognition of the Tinoco aoup 
d'etat by the United States and by the rest of the world, 
there were a number of legal questions to be resolved. 
First, it was necessary to consider the standing in interna-
tional law of Tinoco's government. Traditionally, recog-
nition was granted to de facto governments by the majority 
----
of nations due to the impartiality of such a position. To 
adopt a policy of 2! jure recognition implied partisanship, 1 
since it involved interpretation of the law of another state. 
Conditions could be added to the de facto recognition, such 
----
as the United States's addition of the ability of an incumbent 
regime to pay the nation's debts before being judged~ facto. 2 
This, of course, presumed that the incumbent regime was not 
really out of line with the political philosophy of those 
nations from whom recognition was sought. However, with a 
morally righteous statesman like Woodrow Wilson in control of 
1Neumann, Recognition, p. s. 
2Ibid., p. 7. 
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the mechanisms of international relations, there was a shift 
in the emphasis from ~ fscto to ~ jure recognition, and the 
adcition of the concept of constitutionalism to the conside:r--
ation of~ jure status. 3 This implied that the new govern-
ment, in order to achieve the status of a recognized state, 
must be in compliance with the body of law of the nation in 
question, as interpreted by other nations. In effect, there 
was to be a constitutionally valid line of succession from 
one government to the next, much like a royal blood line in 
its application. 
Thus, in the case of Tinoco's coup, the problem was 
already clouded by the question of Tinoco's legitimacy within 
the context of Costa Rican law. If, as Tinoco himself main-
tained, Gonzalez Flores had preempted the constitution in 
seeking reelection, 4 then he was not legitimately entitled 
to a continuation in power. However, this assumption did not 
extend legitimacy to Tinoco or to any other usurper, unless 
it could be proven that he had acted within the provisions of 
the constitution. The proper legal remedy would have been 
simply to defeat Gonz~lez Flores in his bid for reelection. 
However, this too was a complicated issue. As the incumbent 
3Ibid., P• 13. 
4
"Prcclama del General don Federico Tinoco al Pueblo 
de Costa Rica," from La Gazeta 1 28 enero 1917 in La Ca!da del 
Gobierno Constitucional, p. 9; Federico Tinoco to U.S. Minis-
ter E. J. Hale at San Joe,, 27 January 1917, Enclosure #1 in 
U.S. Minister E. J. Hale at San Jes~ to the Secretary of State, 
No. 111, 3 March 1917, 818.00/111, MC 669. 
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president, Gonzalez Flores controlled the very closed Costa 
Rican electoral system. In addition, one of the marks of his 
regime had been the electoral frauds perpetrated on the people 
of Costa Rica. 5 So, it might be argued from Tinoco's view-
point that since Gonzalez Flores had effectively cut off all 
legal remedies, revolution was justifiable. 
This left Tinoco no other avenue but revolt in the 
context of the Jeffersonian nineteenth century liberal philo-
6 
sophy which he apparently espoused. The next stage in the 
legal complex then became whether Tinoco was the appropriate 
leader of any such revolution. Obviously, Woodrow Wilson, 
who referred to Tinoco as " ••• that impossible person," did 
not regard him as such. 7 Moreover, Wilson would not allow 
that there was even a need for revolution in Costa Rica, ad-
hering to the Tobar Doctrine of the 1907 Central American 
treaties and his own 1913 declaration, which repudiated all 
changes of government by revolutionary means. 8 It would be 
his view that there was absolutely no excuse for revolution as 
a means of remedying the political or legal problems of the 
5James L. Busey, "Presidents of Costa Rica," The Ameri-
.£!!.• Vol. 18 (July, 1961), p. 65. 
6Federico Tinoco to u.s. Minister E. J. Hale at San 
Jos~. 27 January 1917, Enclosure #1 in U.S. Minister E. J. 
Hale at San Jost to the Secretary of State, No. 111, 3 March 
1917, 818.00/111, MC 669. 
7woodrow Wilson to the Secretary of State, 9 August 
1919, 818.00/82~, MC 669. 
8Neumann, Recognition, p. 13. 
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Costa Rican nation. All appeals by the "advocates of demo-
cracy" in Costa Rica to the contrary, 9 Wilson would not modify 
bis stand that Tinoco had seized power without legal right to 
do so. 10 
An understanding of the nature of the revolution and 
its ramifications upon the constitutional structure of Costa 
Rican government would have been most useful to Wilson in his 
decisions on the Tinoco I'egime. The conunents of John M. Keith, 
referred to in the previous chapter, would have provided much 
of the information required to make an intelligent and just 
decision. Unfortunately, Keith's insights were not shared by 
the policy makers in the United States, although they had re-
ceived a copy of his letter to United States Minister Hale in 
Costa Rica as a part of Hale's regular dispatohes. 11 
In many respects, Tinoco was most unlucky in that it 
was Woodrow Wilson to whom he had to look for acceptance. To 
Wilson, as to any righteous and moralistic United States demo-
crat, there could be no excuse for the destruction of a con-
stitution nor of a constitutionally elected government. 
9woodrow Wilson to the Secretary of State Robert Lan-
sing, 3 April 1918 1 in Ray Stannard Baker, Woodrow Wilson, 
Life & Letters (8 Vols., New York: Gresnwood Press PUbfish-
ers, 1968), 8:70. 
10
charg& ad interim Stewart Johnson at San Jos' to the 
Secretary of State, 26 April 1918, 818.00/111, MC 669. 
11John M. Keith to u.s. Minister E. J. Hale at San 
Joa~, 7 March 1917, Enclosure #1 in u.s. Minister E. J. Hale 
at San Jos' to the Secretary of State, No. 113, 15 Maroh 1917 1 
818.00/116, MC 669. 
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The United States Minister in Costa Rica during the 
coup, E. J. Hale, disagreed with the home government. Basic-
ally in agreement with his friend, John M. Keith, Hale indi-
cated in his reports to the Secretary of State that while the 
revolutionary natU!'e of Tinooo's rise to power was deplorable, 
he felt that for practical reasons and out of deference to the 
right of the nation to self determination, the government should 
be reoognized. 12 Hale was not alone in his conclusion. John 
Foster Dulles, a Special Agent for the Secretary of State, rec-
ommended recognition of the Tinoco regime because he observed 
that there could be no guarantees that any successor govern-
ment would be any improvement over Tinoco. 13 Further, Dulles 
noted that Tinoco was inclined to ref use financial aid which 
had been offered by the German conununity in Costa Rica in order 
that he remain clearly pro-Ally in the war effort. 14 The 
possibility that Tinoco might turn to the pro-German group in 
Costa Rica was also raised by the conunanding officer of the 
United States military forces in the Panama Canal zone. 15 
General Plummer also warned that this would threaten the de-
12u.s. Minister E. J. Hale at San Jos~ to the Secre-
tary of State, No. 113, 15 March 1917, 818.00/116, MC 669. 
13summary of the Confidential Report on Costa Rica by 
John Foster Dulles to the Secretary of State, 21 May 1917, 
818.00/200, MC 659. 
1 4rbid. 
15Report of Brigadier General Plummer, Conunanding Gene-
ral, Panama Canal Zone, 2~ May 1917, Enclosure in Secretary of 
War to the Secretary of State, 8 June 1917, 818.00/166 1 MC 669. 
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fense of the Canal zone. 16 His concern extended further to 
the possible restoration of Gonz!lez Flores, whom he reported 
was decidedly pro-German. 17 In spite of the fact that Hale 
had such support for his views, he was quietly replaced in 
April, 1917. There is no correspondence which directly in-
dicated the reasons for his removal, but his successors at the 
United States Legation in San Jos' ~ere far less sympathetic 
to the Costa Ricans, Tinoco, and John M. Keith's advice than 
Hale had been. 
The problem which confronted the Wilson administration 
can be further clarified in view of the fact that Tinoco, after 
the fact, decided that Gonz!lez Flores had not been constitu-
tionally elected, even though Tinoco was himself a part of the 
government. The constitutionality of Gonz&lez Flores's elec-
tion was supported by some of the legal advisors called in by 
the State Department to assess the matter, 18 but it was not 
this issue that concerned Wilson. He simply refused to recog-
nize the government of Federico Tinoco and the changed consti-
tution which it enacted because of their revolutionary origins. 
Furthe:rmore, Wilson either directly or by omission allowed the 
United States to appear to support any and all insurgent groups 
against Tinoco. Although he would later deny that this had 
16rbid. 
17 Ibid. 
18Baker, "Wilson's Non-Recognition Policy," p. 4. 
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been the case, it is likely that without the encouragement 
that the United States would not intervene, many of the in-
surgents would never have initiated their movements. Nica-
ragua, in partj.cular, was careless in letting it be known 
that various Costa Rican insurgent groups were forming within 
its boundaries and that no action would be taken against them 
beyond meaningless warnings.19 
So extreme was the dislike and discontent of the Unit-
ed States with the Tinoco regime that at one point it enter-
tained the idea of funding Gonzalez Flores to lead an expedi-
tionary force from the United States against Tinoco, with the 
assurance of special agents of the State Department that this 
would turn the tide in an irreversible fashion against Tinoco. 20 
It can be strongly argued that only the involvement of the Unit-
ed States in the World War at that time prevented the implemen-
tation of this plan, but it was fortunate for the future rela-
tions between the two countries that it did not do so. 
The issue of United States recognition was important 
to Tinoco. The lack of an accredited relationship with the 
19senator George H. Moses to the Acting Secretary of 
State Polk, 19 January 1919, 818.00/542 1 MC 669; Acting Secre-
tary of State Polk to Senator George H. Moses, 28 January 1919, 
818.00/542 1 MC 6691 U.S. Charg~ Walter c. Thurston at San Jos' 
to the Secretary of State, No. 216, 14 October 1921, 718.00/1, 
Records of the Department of State Relating to the Political 
Relations Between Costa Rica and Other States, 1910-1929, Na-
tional Archives Microfilm Publications, Microcopy 671. Referred 
to hereinafter as MC 671. 
20Memorandum of John Foster Dulles to the Secretary of 
State, 27 August 1917, 818.00/315 1 MC 669. 
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United States was an economic death knell for the Tinoco re-
gime, coming as it did hard on the heels of the German sub-
marine blockade of Europe, an<l the subsequent shift of Cos-
te. Rican trade to the United States. 21 There was the continual 
fear that the United States might choose to extend the nonre-
cognition so that United States citizens would be forbidden 
to trade with Costa Rica, which would be a rapid and painful 
death for the nation as well. In fact, one of E. J. Hale's 
replacements, Stewart Johnson, suggested that the "requisi-
tion" for the war effort of United States ships used for the 
exportation of Costa Rican crops would inunediately topple the 
most stable government.22 
In addition, there was the fact that the nonrecogni-
tion policy severely restricted the involvement of United 
States citizens in Costa Rican economic affairs in general. 
As has been mentioned, there was consideration given to pro-
secution of Minor c. Keith for his involvement with Tinoco, 
which was precisely the kind of pressure the Tinoco regime 
feared might be exerted. For the purpose of clarity, the 
issue of United States and nonrecognition and its impact on 
Costa Rican internationalism will be discussed at a later 
point in this study. 
21Baker 1 "Wilson's Non-Recognition Policy," p. 12. 
22 u.s. Charg~ ad interim Stewart Johnson at San Jos~ 
to the Secretary of State, No. 154 1 11 Aug~st 1917 9 818.00/ 
210, MC 669. 
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The pressures exerted by Alfredo Gonz~lez Floz•es and 
his party in Washington, D.C. upon President Wilson to effec-
tuate a nonrecognition policy were not so significant as they 
would have liked to believe. They would claim that it was 
only on the basis of their appeal to Wilson for justice that 
he decided not to extend recognition to Tinoco under any cir-
cumstances.23However, this was not quite the case. For Wilson, 
as for all idealists, there was simply no gray area in the de-
cision not to recognize Tinoco. The fact that he was a revolu-
tionary leader, no matter what the cause he espoused, was 
enough to deny him the legal status he sought in the world 
community of nations. Tinoco, and a variety of the supporters 
of his coup, would claim that such rigidity condemned the p6o-
ple of Costa Rica, as well as those of the rest of the world, 
to endure tyrannies, unjust rulers, and all violations of their 
natural rights at the hands of anyone who could manipulate an 
election in his own favor as Gonzalez Flores had done. 24 
The issue of Tinoco's recognition by the United States 
was not a simple matter. There were arguments on both sides 
of the issue which complicated the policy decisions developed 
by Wilson's subordinates and which were quite separate from 
23Alfredo Gonzalez Flores, Manifesto a Mis Compatriotas 
(Sa.'1. Jos~: Imprenta Minerva, 1919), pp. 4-5. 
24Federico Tinoco to u.s. Minister E. J. Hale at San 
Jos~, 27 January 1917, Enclosure #1 in U.S. Minister E. J. 
Hale at San Jos~ to the Secretary of State, No. 111, 3 March 
1917, 818.00/111, MC 669. 
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Wilson's personal moral decision. First, there was the in-
volvement of foreign investors and interests in the instiga-
tion and support of the Tinoco regime. The role of Lincoln 
G. Valentine and the Greulich oil interests, which was dis-
cussed in the previous chapter, would be reopened and reexa-
mined repeatedly throughout the two years of Tinoco's tenure 
at the insistence of Gonzalez Flores and his adherents in 
Washington. 25 In the view of these individuals, the interests 
of American capital in Costa Rica, which had been thwarted 
by Gonzalez Flores's plans for the nation's economic stabil-
ity and independence, would bring about the Tinoco coup and 
control its course. 26 As has been demonstrated, however, the 
individuals involved in this particular concession later, 
quite vehemently, denied these charges. 27 The facts of the 
case are extremely difficult to ascertain, but it is evident 
that the favored position which Valentine sought with the 
Tinoco regime and the favored position which Gonzalez Flores 
claimed Valentine had received is simply not borne out by the 
facts or the treatment Valentine subsequently received at the 
hands of Tinoco. 28 
25Alfredo Gonz!lez Flores, El Petroleo y la Pol!tica 
en Costa Rica (San Jos~: Imprenta Trejos Afios, 1920) 1 passim. 
26La Ca!da del Gobierno Constitucional, p. 52. 
27Lincoln G. Valentine to W. H. Field, 1 February 
1919, Enclosure in u.s. Consul Benjamin F. Chase at San Josa 
to the Secretary of State, No. 494, 11 March 1919 1 818.00/571 1 
MC 669. 
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While it may well be true that the search fo~ petro-
leum off the Coast of Costa Rica was of great interest to en-
trepreneurs of several nationalities during this period, it 
is unlikely that the economy of Costa Rica would have changed 
overnight from an agriculturally dominated one to one of an 
industrial character. Then, too, the big money normally as-
sociated with oil and its discovery would not have been in 
evidence at the early stages of exploration. In 1922 9 there 
was a controversy over the failure of various concessionaires 
29 to pay the government appropriate fees for their grants. 
They claimed in their own defense that they had found no oil 
and therefore could not share the profits of such oil with 
C R • • 3G the osta ican nation. So it is unlikely that during the 
Tinoco presidency any substantial amounts were actually paid 
out to Costa Ricans. Soma fees may have been granted to ob-
tain concessions and shares of future profits promised, but 
without some production to pay the bills, there was likely 
to be little more than promises. 31 
29secretary of State to the u.s. Minister in Costa Ri-
ca (Davis), 13 June 1922, 818.6363/120, United States, Depart-
ment of State, Pa ers Relatin to the Forei n Relations of the 
United States 1 22 Was 1ngton 1 overnment rint ng 
fice, 19§8) 9 IsiOOl)-1001. 
aoibid. 
31rn the evidence presented by Gonz!lez Flores in the 
case against the Greulich oonoern• reference was made to pro-
viding Tinoco with capital stock in the oil corporation being 
formed. Obviously 9 there would be no income from these shares 
until oil was being produced. La Ca!da del Gobierno Constitu-
cional 1 p. 52. 
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Another factor that complicated the recognition of 
Tinoco in the eyes of Wilson's subordinates was the involve-
ment of Minor c. Keith with the Tinoco regime. At first, it 
was thought that Keith had interests of a purely business na-
ture, separate from official affairs of state. 32 Subsequent-
ly, Keith was accused of supporting the Tinoco coup for his 
own politioal purposes, 33 or of supporting it for the conces-
sions which he might receive, 34 which would seem to put him 
in the same category as Valentine. Here, too, the facts are 
somewhat difficult to ascertain. An investigation was under-
taken by the United States Department of Justice at the in-
sistence of the Department of State concerning the scope of 
Keith's involvement with Tinoco in the interests of pursuing 
a criminal case against him for his activities to the detri-
ment of the United States. 35 It was found that Keith had 
backed various bond issues, in return for which he had re-
ceived a variety of concessions, including cattle grazing 
32u.s. Charg~ ad interim Stewart Johnson at San Jos' 
to the Secretary of State, 28 July 1917, 818.00/193, MC 669. 
33u.s. Consul Benjamin F. Chase at San Jos' to the 
Secretary of State, 4 December 1918, e18.00/520, MC 669. 
34 swnmary of the evidence adduced in the Supreme Court, 
Special Term, Part III, Before Mr. Justice Greenbaum In the 
Case of Lardizabal vs. Valentine, 19 January 1918, and State-
men~s made by Witnesses to Counsel and Department cf Justice 
Concerning the Revolution Which Occurred in Costa Rica, 27 
January 1917, 818.00/385, MC 669. 
35 Ibid. 
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d d P "f' c h' . 1 36 lan s an a aci 1c oast s 1pp1ng monopo y. In fact, it 
should be noted that these concessions were not made to Keith 
outright but had to undergo Congressional approval. In some 
instances, such approval was quite difficult to achieve. 37 
The only arrangement between Keith and Tinoco which could not 
be construed as a "good business" deal for Keith was his guar-
antee of a shipping service from Costa Rica's Pacific Coast 
38 
with no guaranteed profit. But from Keith's point of view, 
this investment may have paid off in other, far more profit-
able ventures. What might be an accurate description of the 
Keith interest in the political stability of Costa Rica. 
Thus he felt it important to 9Upport a de facto government 
which demonstrated a measure of stability in order to maintain 
"business as usual" as much as possible. 39 However, to ob-
servers at the State Department, who looked for a culprit in 
th T ' ff • 11' C K 'th 11 t h . 4o e 1noco a air, inor • ei was an exce en c oice. 
36u.s. Charg~ ad interim Stewart Johnson at San Jos' 
to the Secretary of State, No. 143, 20 July 1917, 818.00/73, 
MC 669. 
37specific reference is to a cattle concession sought 
by Keith and presented by Tinoco for Congressional approval 
which took a great deal of effort on Tinoco's part to reach 
approval. U.S. Charg~ ad interim Stewart Johnson at San Jos' 
to the Secretary of State, 11 October 1917, 818.00/73 9 MC $.69. 
38Memorandum of John Foster Dulles to the Secretary of 
State, 15 January 1919, 818.otl/307, MC ~69; U.S. Charg& ad in-
terim Stewart Johnson at San Jos~ to the Secretary of State, 
No. 154, 11 August 1917, 818.00/210, MC 669. 
39 Baker, "Wilson's Non-Recognition Policy," p. s. 
40
woodrow Wilson to the Secretary of State, 21 July 
1919, 818.00/306, MC 6sg. 
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Surprisingly enough, although his nephew John M. Keith was 
also financially tied to the regime, and was quite outspoken 
in his support of it, he was not found culpable in the same 
degree as was his uncle. 41 
There were other issues involved in the arguments on 
the recognition of the Tinoco regime for the Wilson adminis-
tration. As was noted previously, some strategists felt that 
the defense of the Panama Canal Zone was extremely vital if 
the United States were to become involved in ths European 
war. 42 A failure to recognize Tinoco might throw the govern-
ment to the German side in the conflict, especially in view 
of the rather large and active German comm.unity in San Jos~ 
which had repeatedly offered Tinoco funding. 43 There were 
those who argued that Tinoco ought to be recognized,since he 
was anti German whereas Gonzalez Flores had been decidedly 
pro German. 44 This was demonstrated by the fact that one of 
41John M. Keith also subscribed extensively to the Ti-
noco bond issues. U.S. Consul Benjamin F. Chase at San Jos~ 
to the Secretary of State, Telegr~m, 19 May 1918, 818.00/434, 
MC 669. 
42 Report of Brigadier General Plununer, Commanding Gen-
eral, Panama Canal Zone, 24 May 1917, Enclosure in Secretary 
of War to the Secretary of State, 8 June 1317, 818.00/166, MC 
669. 
~ 3Summary of John Foster Dulles's Confidential Re~ort 
on Costa Rica to the Secretary of State, 21 May 1917, 818.00/ 
200 9 MC 669. 
44u.s. Minister E. J. Hale at San Jos~ to the Secre-
tary of State, No. 89, 15 November 1914, 818.00G58/02, MC b69i 
Special Agent· John Foster Dulles to the Secretary of State, 1 
May 1917, 818.00/142, MC 669. 
Gonz~lez Flores's closest advisors was Juan Kumpel, a Ger-
man. 45 
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It was also reported that Tinoco had reopened a ser-
ies of prewar negotiations with German interests for the pur-
chase of coal lands in Costa Rica. 46 The worry over such an 
entanglement was serious but not serious enough to prompt 
President Wilson to act, even though there were also reports 
that the German government had offered to recognize Tinoco. 
There was no raaction, probably because Tinoco refused the 
G Offer. 47 erman 
It seems puzzling that Tinoco would have refused the 
German offers of aid and recognition, given his eagerness to 
achieve recognition and legitimacy. However, in his refusal 
of German offers, Tinoco probably acted for practical reasons. 
For the most beneficial results of recognition, the resump-
tion of high levels of trade with Europe, so long as the Uni-
ted States withheld recognition, was necessary. Costa Rica 
would therefore have to wait until the conclusion of the war 
45Baker, "Wilson's Non-Recognition Policy," p. 12; 
U.S. Minister William J. Price to the Secretary of State, 14 
March 1917, 818.00/115, MC 669; U.S. Charge at Panama to the 
Secretary of State, No. 1298, 14 March 1917, 818.00/118, MC 
669. 
46u.s. Consul Benjamin F. Chase at San Jose to the Sec-
retary of State, 3 May 1918, 818.00/2, MC 669. 
~ 1 , . h s f s U.S. Charge in Venezuela to t e ecretary o ta~e, 
No. 1019, 12 October 1917, 818.00/249, MC 669; Summary of Mr. 
Dulles's Confidential Report on Costa Rica to the Secretary of 
State, 21 May 1917, 818.00/200, MC 669. 
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before such a program would be effective. Furthe~, since Cos-
t~ Rica itself had no merchant marine fleet, it was dependent 
upon other nations, in this instance primarily on United States's 
shipping, to deliver its products to markets. While nonrecogni-
tion by the United States continued, it would not be a practical 
policy for Tinoco or any other Costa Rican pr~sident to antag-
onize Woodrow Wilson and the United States any further by align-
ment in any way with Germany, even the acceptance of recognition. 
Therefore, it can be assumed that Tinoco acted out of practical 
good sense with regard to his German policy. 
Another part of the concern engendered by the war was 
the proximity of Costa Rica to the Panama Canal Zone and the 
threat to the defense of the Canal if Costa Rica took an anti-
American stance in the war. 48 How great a threat Costa Rica 
alone could have posed to the Canal is questionable. However, 
the importance of the Panama Canal to the United States policy 
in the Caribbean cannot be overestimated. 49 It is important 
to remember that at this time Costa Rica had no standing army 
as such and relied only on its militia units and local police 
forces so that outside troop or naval assistance would have been 
necessary for any direct threat to the Canal. By 1918, however, 
48Report of Brigadier General Plununer, Commanding Gene-
ral, Panama Canal Zone, 24 May 1917, Enclosure in Secretary of 
War to the Secretary of State, 8 June 1917, 818.00/166, MC 669. 
49Howland, American Relation~, p. 311. 
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with the lessened potential for direct German s~pport, it was 
unlikely that Costa Rica posed any serious threat beyond that 
of a nuisance. It is difficult to examine this question clear-
ly, since at no time did Tinoco take an anti-Ally stand in the 
war. Had he done so, it might have prompted an entirely .dif-
ferent approach from the United States. 
In the issue of Tinoco's recognition, the war and the 
safety of the Western Hemisphere received much mention from in-
dividuals who were not primarily motivated in that direction 
because they knew of its importance to President Wilson. None-
theless, there were other arguments advanced to Wilson and his 
subordinates for the recognition of Tinoco. Not the least 
among these were the concerns of American businessmen who had 
interests in Costa Rica or who were intending to beoome in-
volved there through recently granted Tinoco concessions. 50 
Letters arrived at the State Department throughout the Tinoco 
tenure from a wide variety of businessmen imploring the Unit-
ed States government to recognize Tinoco because delay of re-
cognition would cost American citizens hard earned profits, not 
to mention the taxes which the government would miss as a con-
sequence. 51 
-·-----------
50woodrow Wilson to Secretary of State Lansing, 3 Ap-
ril 1918, Baker, Wilson's Life & Letters, 8:70; U.S. Consul 
Benjamin F. Chase-at San Jos~ to the Secretar·y of State, 14-
De.cember 1918, 818.00/520, MC 669; Monge Alfaro, Historia de 
Costa Rica, p. 254. 
51William Sulzer to the Secretary of State, 30 January 
1917, 818.00/63, MC 669; W. H. Field to Woodrow Wilson, Enclo-
61 
The response of the Wilson administratio~ to these in-
quiries and requests was, of course, an unqualified "No!" Wil-
son indicated in fact that he felt loyal American businessmen 
would cease all business affairs in Costa Rica so long as Tin-
oco remained in power. 52 Failing that, he entertained some 
direct action against these businessmen who did not follow his 
advice, 53 as in the case of Minor C. Keith. While Keith had 
achieved some measure of notoriety for his activities in Cos-
ta Rica because of the size of his investments and the stature 
of his prestige there, he was not unique in his involvement. 
At the same time that attempts were made to exert pressure on 
the Wilson administration, the same individuals were also ad-
vising and encouraging Tinoco with regard to his course toward 
Wilson. 54 There was even one report that Keith was responsible 
for advising Tinoco to declare war on Germany as a sure avenue 
to the recognition of the United States. 55 While his motives 
sure in Woodrow Wilson to Secretary of State Lansing, 3 April 
1918, Baker, Wilson's Life & Letters, 8:70. 
52William Sulzer to the Secretary of State, 30 January 
1917, 818.00/63, MC 669. 
53woodrow Wilson to Senator Joseph E. Ransdall, 5 March 
1918, Baker, Wilson's Life & Letters, 8:13; Woodrow Wilson to 
Secretary of State Lansing, 21 July 1917, 818.00/306, MC 669. 
54William Sulzer to the Secretary of State, 30 January 
1917, 818.00/63, MC 669. 
55u.s. Consul ad interim Stewart Johnson at San Jos~ 
to the Secretary of State, 19 July 1917~ 818.00/306, MC 669. 
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raay not have been altruistic, Keith, like Tinoco, probably 
sought ·the most advantageous position possible for Costa Ri-
ca. This could only be realistically interpret€d as a pro-
Ally stance and at the optimum, a cobelligerency with the Unit-
ed States. However, none of these arguments was taken to 
heart by Wilson, although at various times he did reflect 
some irritation that reaterialistic interests of businessmen 
would interfere with principle. 56 He also refused to allow 
the profits of American businessmen to involve him in an "in-
trigue" in Costa Rica which would have brought about Tinoco's 
replacement. 57 Therefore, it might be said that while Wilson's 
moral stand on the issue of recognition was not open to sugges-
tion from the standpoint of pecuinary gain, neither was it 
open to the suggestion of fomenting further revolution to right 
an alleged wrong. However, as will be demonstrated below, Wil-
son would not take any negative position toward the revolution 
which was eventually begun against Tinoco from Nicaragua despite 
its violation of provisions of the Tobar Doctrine and the 1907 
Washington Treaties. 
The husinessmen who had no luck with Woodrow Wilson or 
his subordinates in the State Department next turned to the 
Congress. Senator Lodge asked the White House about the delays 
56woodrow Wilson to Senator Joseph E. Ransdall, 5 March 
1918, Baker, Wilson's Life & Lett~, 8:13. 
57woodrow Wilson to Secretary of State Lansing, 3 Ap-
ril 19~8, ibid., 8:70. 
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in recognition of the de facto regime on behalf of several 
important business interests included among his constituency.SS 
There were hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Commit-
tee on the issue of recognition, prompted by the presence of 
Gonz!lez Flores and his cohorts in Washington. 59 However, con-
trary to their wishes in the matter, Senator George H. Moses, 
sponsor of a subsequent resolution for immediate recognition 
of the Tinoco regime, was not impressed by their lobbying ef-
forts or evidence.60 
Tinoco did not go unrepresented in the matter. Early 
in his administration he had employed the services of the prom-
inent law firm of Douglas, 0 1 Bear and Douglas, who numbered 
among their attorneys the former Secretary of State under Wil-
son, William Jennings Bryan.61 Bryan communicated directly 
with President Wilson on the matter of Tinoco's recognition, 
only to be rebuffed.62 Wilson asked Bryan to remain uninvolved 
58Baker, "Wilson's Non-Recognition Policy," p. 17. 
59Don Alfredo Gonz~lez Flores and Rafael Oreamuno to 
Woodrow Wilson, 12 November 1918, 818.00/509, MC 669. 
60senate Resolution 362, Con~essional Record, 65th 
Congress, 3rd Session, p. 23, cited Ii Baker,"Wilson 1s Non-
Recognition Policy," p. 13. 
61Paxton Hibben, The Peerless Leader William Jennin s 
Bryan (New York: Russell & Russe 1, 1967 , p. 376. 
62Reference to the letter is made in Woodrow Wilson to 
William Jennings Bryan, 23 July 1918, Baker, Wilson's Life & 
Letters, 8:291. 
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in the Tinoco affair but failed in that effort. 63 Bryan was 
paid handsomely for his involvement as a prestigious lobby-
ist for Tinoco in Washington, 64 and it is probably as a result 
of his efforts; along with a few of the other pressures brought 
to bear, that the Moses Resolution reached the Senate floor at 
all. Unfortunately for Tinoco, the Congressional delibera-
tions and lobbying took a gX'eat deal of time, and as Gonz!lez 
Flores and Benjamin F. Chase had predicted, time was his un-
doing. 65 Before the matter came to a final vote, Tinoco had 
been overthrown. However, this did not occur before Presi-
dent Wilson had to answer some rather penetrating questions 
posed by the Senators concerning his activity or lack thereof 
in regard to Central American affairs relating to Costa Rica. 66 
For example, by the time the hearings got under way, 
the United States was overlooking the revolutionary movements 
sponsored in and launched from Nicaragua against !inooo. 67 
63woodrow Wilson to William Jennings Bryan, 19 July 
1918, ibid., 8:286. 
64Hibben, William Jennings Bryan, pp. 361, 376. 
65Manuel Castro Quesada to the Secretary of State, 28 
February 1917, F. W. 818.00/--, MC 669; Don Alfredo Gonz!lez 
Flores and Rafael Oreamuno to Woodrow Wilson, 12 November 
1918, 818.00/509, MC 669; U.S. Charg' Benjamin F. Chase at San 
JosG to the Secretary of State, No. 573, 818.00/658, MC 669. 
66Earl B. Gaddis, Secretary of the Senate Foreign Re-
lations Conunittee to F. K. Polk, Acting Secretary of State, 16 
December 1918, 818.00/522, MC 689. 
67President Woodrow Wilson to the American Legation in 
San Jos6, 29 December 1917, 818.00/287 1/2, MC 669. This dis-
patch comments on the diplomatic difficulties which Wilson 
65 
Although Gonz(lez Flores was worried about the warnings sent 
out by the State Department to Nicaragua, 68 and such activity 
was expressly forbidden by the Washington treaties of 1907, 
the intent of the United States in the matter was obvious. 
These same treaties were those by which Wilson refused to re-
cognize Tinoco•s government. But an issue of even greater con-
cern to the Senate was the failure of the United States to ex-
tend recognition to Tinoco once Costa Rica had declared war 
on Germany in May, 1918, so the question of aid to revolution-
aries was put in the background. 69 For the sake of clarity, 
the declaration of war and its ramifications will be consi-
dered in a succeeding chapter. 
The pressures brought to bear on the Wilson adminis-
tration to recognize Tinoco were minimal compared to the pres-
sures brought to bear on Tinoco to achieve that recognition. 
First and foremost were the economic problems encountered by 
his regime as a consequence of the nonrecognition policy. 70 
foresaw if the movements were encouraged or even given tacit 
approval by the United States. 
68Don Alfredo Gonz(lez Flores and Rafael Oreamuno to 
Woodrow Wilson, 12 November 1918, 818.00/509, MC 669. 
69Earl B. Gaddis, Secretary of the Senate Foreign Re-
lations Committee to F. K. Polk, Acting Secretary of State, 16 
December 1918, 818.00/522, MC 669; Woodrow Wilson to the Sec-
retary of State, 5 August 1919, 818.00/807, MC 669; Ricardo 
Fern(ndez Guardia, Cartilla Hist6rica de Costa Rica (Sexta 
Edici6n, San Jos': Librer!a e fmprenta Escolares, 1933), p. 
126. 
70u.s. Minister E. J. Hale at San Joa' to the Secre-
tary of State, 18 April 1918, 818.00/134, MC 669. 
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While there was never any embargo or quarantine of Costa Rica, 
there were apparently a number of businessmen who held back 
investments from Costa Rica until such time as the relations 
between that nation and the United States were regularized. 71 
Tinoco became so desparate on the issue of recognition that 
at one point he offered to cede the Cocos Islands to the Uni-
ted States and to provide teZ'?'itory for a United States mili-
tary installation in Costa Rica in return for recognition. 72 
The United States was not at this time, no~ would it be in the 
future, interested in such a proposition, although the islands 
would be assessed closely for their potential strategic value. 
The necessity of achieving United States recognition 
was all the more important for Tinoco, since several nations 
declared that they intended to follow the lead of the United 
States regarding recognition of Costa Rica.7 3 Although this 
tendency would be modified as Tinoco maintained himself in 
power for a time, the initial damage done to Costa Rican sta-
ture was severe. European nations, favorably impressed by the 
71woodrow Wilson to William Jennings Bryan, 23 July 
1918, Baker, Wilson's Life g Letters, 8:291. 
72special Agent John Foster Dulles to the Secretary 
of State, 16 April, 1918, 818.00/142a, MC 669. 
73rnternal Memorandum, Department of State, Stabler 
to the Secretary of State, 25 June 1917, 818.00/171, MC 669--
France; Internal Memorandum, Department of State, 19 April 
1918, 818.00/404, MC 669--Sweden. Both notes refer to un-
official visits of members of the respective nations' lega-
tions in Washington to the State Department to sound out Uni-
ted States attitudes and to indicate the policy plans of 
their nation. 
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declaration of war on the part of Costa Rica, would soon seem 
to realize that Tinoco had maintained himself in power success-
fully for an ample period of time to be considered a de facto 
government. The reactions of the European powers will be dis-
cussed in greater detail in the following chapter. 
Within the Latin American community, the response was 
not unanimous. Within the limited sphere of Central America 
where United States influence can be said to have been the 
strongest in the early twentieth century, there was almost un-
animous disregard for Wilson's warnings. Even though Robert 
Lansing, Secretary of State, acting on Wilson's instructions, 
warned that the Central American nations would be viewed in a 
distinctly unfriendly light if they recognized Tinoco, 74 all 
of the Central and South American states except Nicaragua and 
Panama eventually did so. 75 
These states hesitated for a time in their recogni-
tion to insure that Tinoco would be able to sustain himself 
in power and that the United States would not take any direct 
action against him. Although Wilson considered a suggested 
invasion against Tinoco, 76 he did not authorize it, choosing 
74circular letter to all American Missions in Central 
America (except Costa Rica) from the Secretary of State, 21 
September 1917, 818.00/231b, MC 669. 
75Neumann, Recognition, p. 18. 
76u. s. Consul Benjamin F. Chase at San Jos' to the 
Secretary of State, 18 June 1919, 818.00/703, MC 669. 
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instead the middle course of nonrecognition. 77 The invasion 
was suggested to Wilson by the Special Agent of the State De-
partment, John Foster Dulles. Dulles's plan was based on the 
belief that popular discontent with the Tinoco government in 
Costa Rica would prompt a revolutionary movement against it 
if a spark were ignited. 78 Therefore, Dulles suggested that 
the United States government discreetly arm and supply Gonz!-
lez Flores and a band of his supporters and provide them with 
transportation to Costa Rioa.79 Once they had landed on Costa 
Rican shores, the populace would rise in support of their 
movement and Tinoco would be overthrown. 80 This strategy, 
which sounds very much like the United States activity sur-
rounding the abortive Bay of Pigs invasion into Cuba in 1961, 
was never tested and never got beyond the stage of an internal 
memorandum. Nonetheless, it does demonstrate the strength of 
sentiment against the prolongation of Tinoco's presidency. 
However, the choice of nonrecognition by the United 
States allowed the small nations of Central America to do what 
they pleased with respect to Tinoco, whereas an invasion would 
not have. In fact, aid was received by him at various times 
77Baker, "Wilson's Non~Recognition Policy," p. 4. 
78Memorandum of John Foster Dulles to the Secretary of 
State, 27 August 1917, 818.00/315, MC 669. 
79Ibid. 
BOibid. 
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from the Cabrera administration in Guatemala. 81 Part of the 
explanation for the rebellion of the Central American states 
against the stated wishes of the United States may be found 
in the fact that there was speculation by some of the Central 
American leadership that the United States refused recogni-
tion to prevent any further discussion of a Central American 
. 82 
union. 
Responding to this favorable climate in Central Ameri-
ca, Tinoco sent special missions to the other Central Ameri-
can republics seeking aid and comfort from them and their ad-
vice on how to achieve United States recognition. 83 He also 
attempted to enlist their aid in convincing Wilson of the jus-
tice of his position. 84 However, Tinoco did not rely solely 
on the agency of other governments to press his case. In ad-
dition to his missions to Latin America, he also funded agents 
81u.s. Charg' ad interim Stewart Johnson at San Jos' 
to the Secretary of State, No. 206, 19 December 1917, 818.00/ 
298, MC 669; Memorandum from Mr. Robbins, Latin American Divi-
sion, Department of State, to the Secretary of State, 7 March 
1917, 818.00/108, MC 669; American Legation in Guatemala to the 
Secretary of State, 17 June 1919, 818.00/697, MC 669. 
82Minister in Honduras, Dennis, to the Secretary of 
State, 28 May 1925, 813.00/1241, Reference Note 818.00/1118, 
MC 669. 
83u.s. Charge ad interim Stewart Johnson at San Jose 
to the Secretary of State, 15 October 1917, 818.00/242, MC 
669; American Legation in Honduras to the Secretary of State, 
12 June 1919, 818.00/681, MC 669. 
84Legation of El Salvador in Washington to the Secre-
tary of State, 7 July 1919, 818.00/739, MC 669; American Le-
gation in Salvador to the Secretary of State, 4 February 1917, 
818.00/70, MC 669. 
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to travel to the United States to procure arms and produce 
propaganda for him. 85 As has already been mentioned in this 
context, Tinoco acquired the services of William Jennings 
Bryan to lobby on his behalf with President Wilson. 
The remainder of Latin America, those nations in con-
tinental South America, were also of some assistance to Tino-
co. Several times the Chilean ministers in San Jos' or in 
Washington acted as an emissary between Tinoco and the United 
States. 86 There was also a plan to gather together the repre-
sentatives of the various South American states in San Josi 
for a conference to propose a course of action to the United 
States. 87 Unfortunately for Tinoco, the results of this con-
ference had little effect on the policy of the Wilson adminis-
tration. However, it was reported that Tinoco had received 
aid from various Latin American representatives in Costa Rica 
in organizing an alleged anti-American campaign in response to 
85u.s. Minister E. J. Hale at San Jos' to the Secre-
tary of State, Telegram, 21 April 1917, 818.00/137, MC 669; 
U.S. Consul Benjamin F. Chase at San Joe' to the Secretary of 
State, No. 619, 11 July 1919, 818.00/791, MC 669. 
SSH. P. Ketcher, Office of the Counselor, to the Sec-
retary of State, 23 June 1919, 818.00/715, MC 669; U.S. Consul 
Benjamin F. Chase at San Jos' to the Secretary of State, 19 
June 1918, 818.00/709, MC 669. 
87u.s. Consul Benjamin F. Chase at San Jos' to the 
Secretary of State, No. 617, 9 July 19191 818.00/783, MC 669; U.S. Consul Benjamin F. Chase at San Jos~ to the Secretary of 
State, 4 October 1918, 818.00/491, MC 669; U.S. Consul Benja-
min Jefferson at Managua to the Secretary of State, No. 697, 
23 June 1919, 818.00/760, MC 669; Navy Department to the Sec-
retary of State, Conference on the u.s.s. Castine, 20 June 1919, 
818.00/705, MC 669. 
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the continuation of nonrecognition. 88 
It is impossible to determine whether this campaign 
was genuinely anti-American or whether it was simply a device 
employed by Tinoco to antagonize the United States into some 
reaction which somehow could be turned to advantage due to the 
lack of any but general references to it. 89 In the last months 
of his regime, perhaps out of desparation or perhaps out of 
anger, Tinoco allowed the campaign and cooperated with it, 
showing at least that the Latin American nations with whom the 
campaign was shared accepted the sovereignty of the Costa Rican 
nation. 90 
In the end, there remained only one group whose favor-
able inclination toward Tinoco went unanswered. These were 
the individuals who were motivated by humanitarian concerns 
with regard to the Tinoco regime in Costa Rica. Their con-
cerns can be classes as "humanitarian" in that they were con-
cerned with the impact of nonrecognition upon the well-being 
of the Costa Rican people in general. For example, United 
States Minister E. J. Hale expressed the worry that nonrecog-
nition would lead to economic hardship for the nation and star-
vation for the less well to do Costa Ricans. 91 The small land-
88u.s. Consul Benjamin F. Chase at San Jos~ to the Sec-
retary of State, No. 619, 11 July 1919, 818.00/791, MC 669. 
ssrbid. 
90Ibid. 
91u.s. Minister E. J. Hale at San Jos~ to the Secretary 
of State, 18 April 1917, 818.00/134, MC 669. 
72 
owners, in particular, who were dependent on the income pro-
duced by their cash crops would be hardest hit. In addition, 
Hale was concerned about the effects of political instability, 
which might lead to civil war and, in his view, unnecessary 
loss of life. 92 Also among this group was Hale's close 
friend, John M. Keith, who viewed Tinoco as the lesser of two 
evils and felt that the failure of the United States to recog-
nize Tinoco could only bring hardship to the Costa Rican nation 
and people. 93 Both Hale and Keith felt that the continued non-
recognition invited counter-revolution. 94 Even these concerns 
met a negative response from Wilson, who responded to Hale's 
. b • . f . . s J ~ 95 suggestions y removing him rom his post in an ose. 
Although he had been supported in his position by the 
report of Special Agent John Foster Dulles working for the 
Secretary of State, 96 Hale had failed to couch his recommen-
dations in appropriate language or to show appropriate dis-
dain for a revolutionary government. Further, his opinion was 
suspect for his association with one of the Keiths, albeit a 
92Ibid. 
93John M. Keith to U.S. Minister E. J. Hale at San 
Jos~, 7 March 1917, Enclosure #1 in U.S. Minister E. J. Hale 
at San Jos~ to the Secretary of State, No. 113, 15 March 1917, 
818.00/116, MC 669. 
9~Ibid.; Emilio Artega, San Joa~, Costa Rica, to the 
Secretary of State, 25 February 1918, 818.00/351, MC 669. 
95Baker, "Wilson's Non-Recognition Policy," p. 13. 
96John Foster Dulles to the Secretary of State, 1 
May 1917, 818.00/142, MC 669. 
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less-than-notorious Keith. 
It is the opinion of the author that of all the ad-
vice and suggestions which Wilson received, that of E. J. Hale 
and John M. Keith was by far the most reasonable and intelli-
gent. It was not founded in any way on personal concern but 
rather was a reflection of a long thought-out process of un-
derstanding for the intricacies of the Costa Rican system and 
people. That Wilson chose to rebuff their advice was sad from 
the standpoint of his own position and that of the United 
States in subsequent years, but for Tinoco it was disastrous. 
It may be that the intertwining of the recognition issue with 
some of the issues surrounding the United States' entry into 
World War I kept some of the pro-recognition arguments from 
Wilson's serious consideration. However, Costa Rica's decla-
ration of war against Germany should have resolved any con-
fusion which may have arisen. The following chapter will dis-
cuss the declaration of war and its aftermath. 
CHAPTER IV 
COSTA RICA AND WORLD WAR I 
The regime of Federico Tinoco in Costa Rica declared 
was on Imperial Germany in May, 1918.1 Tinoco had been re-
ported to be of pro-Allied sympathies even before he assumed 
power in January, 1917.2 As indicated in the previous chap-
ter, his predecessor, Alfredo Gonz~lez Flores, on the other 
hand, was alleged to be pro-German or at least under the in-
fluence of various Germans in Costa Rica. 3 It is difficult 
to determine just how serious the pro-German influence in 
Costa Rica was before the declaration of war. However, it 
may be assumed that it was approximately the same as other 
nations in Central America, which were also the recipients 
of various German offers of investment and funding early in 
the twentieth century. 4 There is really little likelihood 
1Ricardo Fern!ndez Guardia, Cartilla Hiat5rica, p. 126. 
2special Agent John Foster Dulles to the Secretary of 
State, 1 May 1917, 818.00/142, MC 669. 
3American Legation in Panama to the Secretary of 
State, No. 1298, 14 March 1917, 818.00/118, MC 669. 
4u·.s. Charg~ ad interim Stewart Johnson at San Jos& 
to the Secretary of State, No. 323, 20 August 1918, 818.00/ 
474, MC 669. 
74 
75 
that Costa Rica could have declared a formal position other 
than the one it eventually chose, but it is possible that it 
might have maintained the somewhat hostile neutrality which 
characterized the positions of Mexico and Argentina during the 
war. While neither of these nations was overtly hostile to the 
Allied interests, they were found to be less than responsive 
to certain war efforts instigated by the United States. 
For the time being, however, Federico Tinoco had to 
pursue a policy which took into account his non-recognized sta-
tus in the world community of nations. Despite any inclinations 
he might have, there were strong sentiments among other nations, 
especially the United States, that this status prevented him 
from the sovereign act of a declaration of war. 5 This brings 
the discussion to a consideration of Tinoco's motives for the 
declaration of war. 
As far as Woodrow Wilson and the anti-Tinoco forces 
were concerned, the declaration of war against Germany was sim-
ply a ploy on Tinoco's part to achieve recognition from the 
United States. 6 In views held by these individuals, there 
was no sincerity or principle involved in the decision to de-
clare war but rather a matter of political expediency for a 
5Robert Lansing, Secretary of State, to Woodrow Wilson, 
9 August 1919, 818.00/830, MC 669. 
6Memorandum from Mr. Stabler, Department of State, Di-
vision of Latin American Affairs, to the Secretary of State, 26 
May 1917, 818.00/316, MC 669. 
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very hard-pressed government. 7 To complicate the picture, it 
was reported that Minor C. Keith, who supposedly advised Tin-
oco to declare war, 8 was far more interested in courting the 
good will of Britain and France than in achieving the formal 
recognition of the United States. 9 Keith may have believed 
that recognition would follow from the acceptance of European 
powers of Costa Rican cobelligerency in the war. In addition, 
it may also be that Keith felt it important to court the good 
will of these nations in an attempt to restore some of the 
trade which had gone on between Costa Rica and Europe prior 
to the outbreak of the war. However, without the protection 
of a sizeable navy, Costa Rica could hope for little improve-
ment in its European trade until the war ended or until it 
could count on the protection of the United States Navy. So 
it might be said that there were economic as well as political 
motives for the declaration of war. 
Some measures of consideration must also be given to 
the possibility that Tinoco and the Costa Rican Congress acted 
out of sincerity in their declaration. The possibility of this, 
however, diminishes in view of Tinoco's serious problems and 
his need to seek a solution. But it would be a gross insult 
7Ibid. 
Bu.s. Charg' ad interim Stewart Johnson at San Jos' to 
the Secretary of State, 19 July 1917, 818.00/306, MC 669. 
9rbid. 
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to Costa Rican national pride to say that it might be less 
convinced of the rightness of its action than was Brazil or 
any of the European belligerents, or even the United States. 
The preoccupation of Costa Rica with its domestic problems and 
political entanglements, not to mention the threat of invasions 
from neighboring territory which sought to depose Tinoco, make 
it extremely difficult to perceive if there was any real ground-
swell of public opinion in favor of the declaration of war. 
But it is important to note that Tinoco could have solved some 
of his internal problems by accepting the aid proffered by the 
German community in Costa Rica as was discussed in the previous 
chapter. Thus, while Tinoco's declaration of war was probably 
founded in the expected international benefits he would re-
ceive, primarily in the form of recognition at least by the 
European powers, there was also probably a measure of convic-
tion that the cause of the Allies was a just one. 
It is also necessary to take into consideration the 
various other influences which brought Tinoco to the stage of 
a formal declaration of war rather than maintaining neutrality 
as was the pattern among most of the Latin American states. 10 
Since foreign investors played such a key role in the Costa 
10Neutrality was maintained by Argentina, Chile, Colom-
bia, Mexico, Paraguay, El Salvador, and Venezuela. Relations 
with Germany were severed, thus achieving a de facto neutrality 
by Bolivia, Ecuador, Dominican Republic, Peru and Uruguay. War-
ren H. Kelchner, Latin American Relations with the League of 
Nations (Boston: World Peace Foundation Pamphlets, Vol. XII, 
NO: 6, 1929), p. 16. 
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Rican economy, their influence on Tinoco must be taken into 
account. The benefits of the regularization of Costa Rica's 
international status to the businessmen would have been im-
measurable, if only the harassment of the State Department of 
the United States were removed as a factor in their daily op-
erations. Further, there may have been an increase of invest-
ments from foreign sources which were severely restricted by 
the injunctions of Woodrow Wilson, not to mention the impact 
of the war itself upon commerce. 
Assessment of the impact of such regularization is not 
easy. Had the status of Costa Rica changed to that of a dip-
lomatically recognized state, there were no guarantees that 
investors in war time industries elsewhere in the world would 
shift any of their capital to Costa Rica. This may in itself 
be a partial explanation for the declaration of war. If the 
Costa Rican economy could reflect a war time "boom," investors 
might have been found. But here again there were no guarantees 
and no real proof. 
Tinoco also had to deal with the pressures exerted by 
the other Latin American states. Other Central American na-
tiona also declared war on Germany, 11 but in the Costa Rican 
view, this, as well as other Latin American declarations of 
war, would be due to the domination of the United States. 12 
11Besides Costa Rica, war was declared by Guatemala, 
Honduras, Nicaragua and Panama. Kelchner, Latin America and 
the League, p. 16. 
12Ibid., p. 37. 
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Costa Rica had never felt any real co!!l1Tlunity of interest be-
tween itself and the Central American neighbors, pridefully 
disdaining all but perfunctory relationships on the basis of 
its own superiority. Thus, it would have been nearly impos-
sible for Costa Rica to accept the possibility that Central 
America could share its motivations. 
For the nations of South America, which mostly ad-
hered to the path of neutrality, there were the additional 
motivations that the trade with Europe would eventually be 
resumed after the war had ended. A declaration of war might 
alienate a potantial future customer for their raw materials. 
Then too, there were sizeable and influential German 
communities throughout Latin America, 13 which would tolerate 
a neutral national position but might have become active op-
ponents of any government which declared war against their 
homeland. These views would be passed on to Tinoco by the 
representatives of states such as Chile, which sought to aid 
Tinoco. There is not sufficient documentation available on 
the size of the German community in Costa Rica to allow an 
13ror example, in early discussions of the Paris Peace 
Conference, Wilson attempted to have Brazil given extra rep-
resentation to prevent further "Germanization" in Brazil. Unit-
ed States, Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign 
Relations of the United States, Paris Peace Conference, 1919 
~ 13 Vols. , \1fashington, D. C. : Government Printing Office -;-1942-
1947), III:533-534. (Referred to hereinafter as Paris Peace Con-
ference); American Legation in Venezuela to the Secretary of 
State, No. 1019, 12 October 1917, 818.00/249, MC 669. 
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accurate assessment of their direct influence on Tinoco. How-
over, the commentary of United States representatives in Costa 
Rica would indicate that this group was sufficiently large or 
14 influential enough to occasion some concern on their part. 
From the foregoing, the question is raised as to how 
Tinoco could completely disregard the impact of his declara-
tion of war upon the German community in Costa Rica, or for 
that matter, upon the future of trade relations with Germany. 
As has been stated repeatedly before this, the most influential 
people in Costa Rica were the businessmen who had sizeable in-
vestments there. Leading these were Minor Keith and his ne-
phew, John M. Keith. Primarily, the investors were United 
States citizens who may or may not have adopted Costa Rica as 
a "home away from home" as the Keiths had done. The natural 
inclination of such individuals would be to maintain some de-
gree of affinity with the United States at least to the ex-
tent of not declaring war upon that country. Therefore, they 
would counsel neutrality at the least, and a declaration of 
war against Germany as an optimum. Given these factors, it 
might be argued that Tinoco's declaration of war reflected an 
attempt on his part to reward the United States based inter-
14The reports of John Foster Dulles and General Plum-
mer concerning the potential influence of this community upon 
Tinoco are the primary sources for this conclusion. Summary 
of John Foster Dulles's Confidential Report on Costa Rica to 
the Secretary of State, 21 May 1917, 818.00/200, MC 669; Report 
of Brigadier General Plummer, Commanding General, Panama Ca-
nal Zone, 24 May 1917, Enclosure in Secretary of War to the 
Secretary of State, 8 June 1917, 818.00/166, MC 669. 
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ests which had remained loyal to him. 
An additional aspect of this kind of policy motivated 
by public relations concerns was that Tinoco may have felt 
that the declaration of war would stir up United States publi c 
opinion in his favor to the extent of overridine Wilson's de-
cision not to recognize him. In fact, it was primarily on the 
issue of his declaration of war that the United States Senate 
queried Wilson most strongly. 15 They asked how the United 
States could continue to deny diplomatic recognition to any 
nation which had, at considerable risk to its own well being, 
declared war against an enemy of the United States.16 Of 
course, the risk taken by Costa Rica by declaration of war so 
late in the contest was minimal, with more real advantages for 
the nation than disadvantages. So, to a certain extent, if 
this was a part of Tinoco's plan, it worked. Unfortunately 
for Tinoco, the results of this effort came too late for his 
benefit. By the time hearings in the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee were concluded, delayed to a certain extent by Wil-
son's intransigence and the lobbying efforts of Gonz~lez Flo-
res and his adherents, Tinoco had fallen from power and the 
question of recognition was purely academic. 
Once the declaration of war was made in May, 1918, 
there was nothing for Tinoco to do but to await the judgment 
15senator George H. Moses to the Acting Secretary of 
State, F. K. Polk, 19 January 1919, 818.00/542, MC 669. 
16Ibid. 
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of the world community of nations. Shortly thereafter, arrange-
ments were made with Spain to see to the protection of Costa 
Rican lives and property in Germany and Belgium. 17 Notifica-
tion of the declaration of war was sent to the representatives 
of the Allied Powers located in Paris. 
One disheartening response came when K. Matsui, rep-
resentative of Japan, merely notified his home government and 
then responded to that effect to Manuel de Peralta, the Costa 
Rican diplomat in Paris. There was no indication in Matsui's 
letter of the forthcoming recognition of the Tinoco govern-
ment by Japan.18 On the other hand, far more positive res-
ponses were received. Great Britain's representative, S. Der-
by, indicated not only his own pleasure at the news that a-
nother nation had joined the ranks of the defenders of demo-
cracy, 19 but also indicated in another communique that Costa 
Rica was welcomed on an official level by the British goVErn-
ment. 20 This response reflects some of the quandry in which 
Great Britain found itself with regard to Tinoco. At first, 
the British government simply adhered to the policy of the 
17El Marques de Amposta to Don Manuel de Peralta, 3 de 
Junio de 1918, Documents Distributed to the Public, Paris 
Peace Conference, 1919, Authentic Delegation Propaganda MSS, 
Hoover War Library, Stanford University, Stanford, California. 
Photoduplicated copies. Referred to hereinafter as Delegation 
Propaganda. 
ibid. 
18K. Matsui to Manuel de Peralta, le 31 mai 1918, ibid. 
19s. Derby to Manuel de Peralta, le 29 mai 1918, ibid. 
20s. Derby to Manuel de Peralta, le ler Juin 1918, 
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United States with regard to recognition.21 Later, as Tinoco 
began open manifestations of his sympathy with the Allied 
cause and showed signs of being willing to engage openly in 
hostilities, it seemed as if the British government would mod-
ify its own position. But by the time the Costa Rican declara-
tion of war was made known, the British apparently postponed 
recognition until they could find a way to do so without antago-
nizing President Wilson. The French, too, had begun to modify 
their viewpoint, although they were also bound by a desire not 
to offend Wilson. For example, in February, 1918 the French 
Minister in Washington, D.C., M. Laboulaye, called at the 
State Department to ask whether the United States would have 
any objections to the French government sending two military 
instructors to Costa Rica as requested by the Tinoco govern-
ment. 22 It is unclear whether the United States objected. 
When Costa Rica declared war, France also sent a note of grat-
itude to Manuel de Peralta. 23 
Even the United States Minister in Paris, W. G. Sharp, 
was forced to respond in the proper courteous diplomatic f ash-
ion to the announcement. His note, while couched in basical-
ly the same language as the others received by Manuel de Pe-
21Baker, "Wilson's Non-Recognition Policy," p. 12. 
22Memorandum from Mr. Stabler at the Division of Latin 
American Affairs to the Secretary of State, 25 February 1918, 
818.00/--, MC 669. 
23M. Pichon to Manuel de Peralta, 21 mai 1918, Dele-
gation Propaganda. 
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ralta on behalf of Costa Rica, was somewhat lengthier than the 
average and spoke of the "noble determination of the valiant 
Republic" (Costa Rica) which had disregarded the disinterested-
ness of some nations and had placed itself squarely on the side 
of the fo1•ces of law versus those of oppression. Sharp went 
on to say that this declaration would lead to a closer sym-
pathy among all of the sister republics of the Americas. 24 
While this sentiment expressed to the Costa Rican government of 
Federico Tinoco might seem to be out of line with the overall 
policy of the Wilson administration, it does reflect the mor-
al fairmindedness which was also characteristic of Wilson's 
policies. It is interesting to note the cordial manner in 
which the declaration of war was received in Paris as opposed 
to the blatant way in whi·oh it was ignored in Washington. If 
Tinoco had taken heart from Sharp's reference to the possi-
bility of closer relations among the American republics, he 
was to be sadly disappointed by the reaction of the United 
States government on an official level. There were little if 
any grounds for a great deal of optimism on the part of Costa 
Rica if only the degree of its participation in the war effort 
is taken into consideration. The nation did little more than 
offeI' its harbors to Allied vessels, but at no time were Costa 
24w. G. Sha~p to Manuel de Peralta, le 13 mai 1918, 
ibid. 
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Rican troops employed.25 
There was some question whether Wilson was even aware 
that Tinoco had issued the declaration of war. However his di-
ary indicated that he had been aware of the declaration from 
the first but simply chose not to react to it. 26 Later, in 
reference to the Paris Peace Conference, he would return to 
his intransigent opinion of the Tinoco regime and its legiti-
macy. 27 For the time being, however, Tinoco had only Sharp's 
letter with which to console himself. 
Of course there were Other responses to the declara-
tion of war, most of which were markedly similar in their 
language and in the pro f orma manner in which they expressed 
the pleasure of their governments at the Costa Rican action. 
They were meaningless in that they did not convey a recogni-
tion on a formal level of Tinoco's government. The same 
forces which had prevented recognition from being granted 
previously still seemed to be in control of the situation in 
the spring of 1918. Thus, the letters from Great Britain, 
25"Plan for the Preliminary Convention Between the 
Allied Ministers," 5 January 1919, Paris Peace Conference, I: 
386. This allocated representation to the conference on the 
basis of direct involvement in the war and relegated Costa Ri-
ca to the same level as neutral non-participants. 
26Baker, Wi~so~~~ Life S Letters, 8:163. 
27
"Secretary's Notes of a Conversation held in M. 
Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, 13 January 1919," in at-
tendance: Lloyd George, Woodrow Wilson, Georges Clemenceau, 
Sonmino (Italy), Matsui (Japan), et al. Paris Peace Confer-
~_nce, III: 534. 
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France, Serbia, Italy, and Belgium, among others, were of abso-
lutely no value to Tinoco. The United States Minister 1n Hon-
duras, Charles B. Curtis, warned that these letters might be 
used by the Tinoco government to present a case for recognition. 
Hhile the letters themselves may have been valid, Curtis felt 
that the United States should make it clear to all interested 
parties that the letters did not constitute formal diplomatic 
recognition. The Charge d'Affaires in Costa Rica agreed that 
Tinoco might consider the letters as an indication that his 
government had been recognizect. 28 Further, the letters would 
be useless to Tinoco's successors 1n their attempts to be ad-
mitted to the Paris Peace Conference as befitted their role 
as a belligerent. 
As indicated above, there were communications from 
other governments. Spain's Minister of Foreign Affairs, El 
Marques de Amposta, communicated with Peralta from Madrid that 
the government of Spain would be pleased to take on the pro-
tection of Costa Rican lives and property in Germany and Bel-
gium pending the resumption of diplomatic relations at the 
end of the war. Further, Spain expressed an interest that 
those Germans who resided in Costa Rica be treated fairly so 
28u.s. Minister Charles B. Curtis at Tegucigalpa to 
the Secretary of State, No. 805, 30 August 1918, 818.00/483, 
MC 669; U.S. Charge ad interim Stewart Johnson at San Jos~ to 
the Secretary of State, No. 362, 8 October 1918, 818.00/495, 
MC 669. 
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long as they continued to observe Costa Rican law. 29 Since 
Spain had recognized Tinoco's goverrunent, 30 the question of 
the acceptance of its declaration of war had no weight in de-
ciding that the government was legitimate. 
Another important letter was the one received from the 
Brazilian representative, Olyntho de Magalhaes. He, too, pointed 
out the pleasure of his government at receiving the declaration 
of war and the notice that Costa Rica had joined those disin-
terested nations in the pursuit of justice and the preservation 
of civilization. An interesting facet of the Brazilian mes-
sage, however, is the closing statement of the Minister with 
regard to the obligatory nature of the note. 31 It would seem 
that the Brazilian Minister, representing the only active bel-
ligerent among the Latin American nations, apologized for the 
necessity of communicating his pleasure at Costa Rica's action 
in a form letter. Although this was not directly stated, there 
is a great deal of flattery reflected concerning Costa Rica's 
action. The question of Brazilian leadership among the Latin 
American nations in subsequent events relating to the League 
of Nations and the Paris Peace Conference will be discussed in 
subsequent chapters. However, it could be that the Brazilian 
29El Marqu's de Amposta to Manuel de Peralta, 3 de 
Junio de 1918, Delegation Propaganda. 
30u.s. Minister at San Jos' to the Secretary of State, 
23 August 1917, 818.00/211, MC 669. 
3101yntho de Magalhaes to Manuel de Peralta, Delegation 
Propaganda. 
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government felt that in this case "imitation was the sincer-
est fol'Dl of flattery,'' and that it now saw a special kinship 
with Costa Rica for its action. How this response might have 
been anticipated by Tinoco, and how much he may have counted 
upon Brazilian support for his regime with the United States, 
since Brazil had already recognized him is questionable. How-
ever, it is an aspect of the declaration of war which should 
not be overlooked. 
For whatever reasons, Tinoco declared war on Germany 
and Costa Rica aligned itself officially with the Allied pow-
ers. The rewards received by the Costa Rican nation~were min-
imal in terms of increased international prestige or recogni-
tion. As has already been mentioned, there was a movement in 
the United States to reconsider the policy of the Wilson admin-
istration toward Costa Rica. But before this movement really 
got off the ground, Tinoco was overthrown. The revolutionary 
movements which brought about his political demise, launched 
from Nicaragua, were another bone of contention with the in-
terested Senators, 32 but here, too, their interest was too late 
to be of any benefit to Tinoco. 
In addition, although the declaration of war brought 
a great deal of sympathy from the involved European powers, 
that sympathy did nothing to improve Tinoco's condition. 
32senator George H. Moses to the Acting Secretary of 
State, F. K. Polk, 19 January 1919, 818.00/542, MC 669. 
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Neither the British, the French nor any of the other belliger-
ents could afford to alienate Woodrow Wilson in any way that 
would jeopardize the assistance they were receiving from the 
United States in the war effort. So while they might have been 
inclined to extend recognition to Tinoco and even to resume 
their pre-war levels of trade with Costa Rica, both were im-
possible. Recognition would have incurred the wrath of the 
United States. Moreover, resumption of trade was impossible 
while their resources were tied up in the war. 
A possible remedy for this situation was seen in the 
peace negotiations that followed the war. For the Tinoco re-
gime, these efforts were simply too late. But Wilson's atti-
tude toward the Tinoco regime extended to its immediate suc-
cessor, that of Juan Bautista Quir6s. Quir6s had been appoin-
ted by Tinoco to assume the provisional presidency as he was 
fleeing the country in July, 1919.33 As the United States had 
warned, Quir6s was also refused recognition because he had been 
appointed by an unconstitutional president and therefore was 
himslf illegitimate. 34 Not even Quir6s's obvious desire to 
33u.s. Minister in San Jos~ to the Secretary of State 
23 May 1919, 818.00/437, MC 669; American Legation in San Jos~ 
to the Secretary of State, 13 August 1919, 818.00/829, MC 669. 
34
secretary of State to U.S. Minister in San Jos,, No. 
11, 19 August 1919, 818.00/829, MC 669; Memorandum, Division of 
Latin American Affairs (Stabler) to the Secretary of State, 6 
February 1917, 818.00/105 1/2, MC 669; Secretary of State to 
the U.S. Minister in San Jos~, 30 August 1919, 818.00/866a, MC 
669. 
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placate the Wilson administration by holding elections as soon 
as possible and by offering to step down in favor of whichever 
individual the United States designated satisfied Wilson.35 
It was felt that Quir6s acted out of fear for the approach of 
the revolutionary troops from Nicaragua. These troops were 
the ones about which the United States had issued the warnings 
but which Nicaragua had continued to harbor. 
It would be difficult to say that the activities of the 
Wilson administration with regard to the recognition of a Cos-
ta Rican government and the attitudes toward the recognition 
of a Costa Rican declaration of war constituted anything less 
than a direct interference in the internal affairs of the Cos-
ta Rican nation. Because of the instrusion of World War I, 
what might have been solely a Western Hemispheric affair was 
catapulted onto the stage of worldwide affairs. Obviously, Cos-
ta Rica had suffered a gross insult at the hands of the United 
States. How this would continue and develop through the Paris 
Peace Conference and the early years of the League of Nations 
will be discussed in the next chapter. 
35u.s. Minister in San Jos' to the Secretary of State, 
22 August 1919, 818.00/845, MC 669. 
CHAPTER V 
COSTA RICA AND THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS 
The conclusion of World War I occurred before the 
United States and Costa Rica resolved the problems of the rec-
ognition of the Tinoco government. Thus, because of pres-
sures exerted by the United States on the European Allied pow-
ers, Costa Rica never achieved the status of a recognized bel-
ligerent in the war effort. 1 This fact assumed greater sig-
nificance as plans were made for the Paris Peace Conference. 
Preliminary planning, conducted by various committees and 
which reflected several years' thought on the part of all of 
the nations in question, recognized the importance of including 
the nations which had not participated in the war, in particu-
lar the Latin American states, in the deliberations. 2 One 
suggestion of the planning committees indicated that the Latin 
American states were to be included only because of the in-
1James Brown Scott and David Hunter Miller to Woodrow 
Wilson, 30 December 1918, Skeleton Draft of Peace Treaty, Ap-
pendix on Signatories, Exclusions from Belligerents, Paris 
Peace Conf.185/151, Paris Peace Conference, !:305; Robert 
Lansing to Woodrow Wilson, 9 August 1919, 818.00/830, MC 669. 
2Memorandum by D. H. Miller to Woodrow Wilson on Re-
vised French Proposal of 21 November 1918, Paris Peace Confer-
!.!!Q.!, !:355. 
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terest of the United States in having them in attendance and 
because whether they deserved inclusion or not, the Latin Ameri-
can states themselves would expect to be counted in on the de-
liberations. 3 At one point, it was even suggested that the 
United States could represent Latin America to "avoid crowd-
ing" at the peace deliberations. 4 That the Latin American 
states expected to be included is undeniable, especially in 
connection with those Latin American states which had declared 
war on Germany. Surprisingly enough, however, Costa Rica was 
not included in this category because of the insistence of 
Woodl'Ow Wilson that it not be.5 
Wilson tried to control the planning stages of the 
Paris Peace Conference by striking a bargain with the major 
powers on the status of Costa Rica in exchange for their de-
sires on organizational matters. 6 He insisted that the ques-
tion of the inclusion of Costa Rica in the deliberations was 
a moot one, since that state did not have the official status 
3Ibid. 
4French Foreign Office's Scheme of Procedure, Part III, 
Representation of the Powers and of the States, 15 November 
1918, ibid., !:348. 
5 Robert Lansing, Secretary of State, to Woodrow Wil-
son, 9 August 1919, 818.00/830, MC 669. 
6
secretary's Notes on a Conversation held in M. Pichon's 
Room at the Quai d'Orsay, 13 January 1919, in attendance: Lloyd 
George, Woodrow Wilson, Georges Clemenceau, Sonmino (Italy), 
Matsui (Japan), et al., Paris Peace Conference, III:534. 
93 
of a recognized nation as far as the United States was con-
cerned. 7 Therefore, if Costa Rica were included in the con-
ference, the United States would object most strenuously. The 
implication which can be drawn from Wilson's comments was that 
he would have separated the United States from the proceedings 
of the Conference rather than be forced into an ipso facto rec-
ognition of Costa Rica, as his advisors warned him he would 
be.a The European powers, primarily the Great Powers who were 
involved in these early d~liberations, acceded to Wilson's de-
mands. 9 This point was not a particularly difficult one for 
Wilson to achieve 7since Lloyd George, who represented Great 
Britain, was adamantly opposed to any status for the Latin 
American belligerents which would equate them with the small 
powers of Eu~ope which had incurred the devastation of the war 
upon their homelands and had sacrificed so many lives, while 
the Latin American states had done virtually nothing. 10 Wil-
son further strengthened his argument by declaring that the 
question of Costa Rican participation and recognition was not 
7Ibid. 
8Ibid.; Memorandum by D. H. Miller to Woodrow Wilson 
on Revised French Proposal of 21 November 1918, ibid., !:355. 
David Hunt Miller advised Wilson that admission of Costa Rica 
to the Conference would constitute recognition. 
9secretary 1 s Notes on a Conversation held in M. Pichon's 
Room at the Quai d'Orsay, 13 January 1919, in attendance: Lloyd 
George, Woodrow Wilson, Georges Clemenceau, Sonmino (Italy), 
Matsui (Japan), et al., ibid., III:534. 
10ibid., III:534-535. 
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one which belonged before a world group, since the problems 
entailed in the question of the constitutionality of its gov-
ernment were purely American ones. That is to say, they were 
of concern only in the Western Hemisphere.11 Wilson explained 
that Costa Rica had only declared war on Germany as a ploy to 
achieve the recognition of the United States. Since United 
States nonrecognition was based on a policy designed to dis-
courage revolution in the Americas, he asked to be upheld in 
not recognizing Costa Rica's belligerency so that the solidar-
ity of American policies could be maintained. 12 
The status which Woodrow Wilson and the other leaders 
discussed was not a matter of great significance. For pur-
poses of representation at the Paris Peace Conference, several 
categories of nations were devised, including the major belli-
gerents, small European belligerents, nonparticipating belli-
gerents, neutrals, and so on. 13 There were also distinctions 
made as to the special interests some nations, such as those 
being newly formed, might have in the peace deliherations. 1~ 
In one of the preliminary plans for the conference, Costa Rica 
was included among those nations which had not participated 
11Ibid. 
12rhid. 
13Memorandum by D. H. Miller to Woodrow Wilson on the 
Revised French Proposal of 21 November 1918, ibid., !:355. 
14Ibid. 
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directly in the war effort and which had no special interests 
in the war settlements.15 In effect, this included Costa Ri-
ca among the neutrals and the nations being formed which re-
ceived only one plenipotentiary each. 16 However, not even 
that single representative was granted Costa Rica as Woodrow 
Wilson was able to convince the leadership of the major Eu-
ropean delegations to accede to his demands with regard to 
Costa Rican recognition.17 
Wilson's claims that the issue of Costa Rican recog-
nition was not one over which the world group had any author-
ity reflected not only his continued intransigence with re-
gard to the Costa Rican situation in particular, but it also 
reflected a response on his part to the critics of his world 
peace plans in the United States. Since part of those plans 
for the peace conference included the formation of a world 
peace organization, there was concern by some United States 
Senators that such an organization would jeopardize the Mon-
roe Doctrine. 18 This issue is more accurately placed in the 
15Plan for the Preliminary Conventions Between the 
Allied Ministers, 5 January 1919, Paris Peace Conference, I: 
393. 
16Ibid., I:386. 
17secretary's Notes on a Conversation held in M. Pi-
chon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, 13 January 1919, ibid., III: 
534-535. 
18nenna Frank Fleming, The United States and the 
League of Nations (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1932), p. 54. 
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questions surrounding the formation of the League of Nations 
and will be discussed in greater length in that context. How-
ever, for the time being, it should be noted that Wilson had 
to begin early in his discussion in Paris to demonstrate that 
nothing to which he agreed in Paris would in any way endanger 
the status or prerogatives of the United States in the Ameri-
cas. 
As was mentioned previously, Costa Rica did not ac-
cept the decisions of the preliminary conferences in Paris. 
Manuel de Peralta, the Costa Rican diplomat in Paris, circu-
lated copies of the letters which he had received regarding 
the declaration of war to all of the delegates at the Peace 
Conference. 19 In addition, there was an open letter to all of 
the delegates which emphasized the Costa Rican position in the 
war and indicated the justice of Costa Rica's participation in 
the conference.20 But these efforts were to no avail. 
Since Costa Rica had not been admitted to the Peace 
Conference, a state of war still existed between it and Ger-
many. This was finally solved by an enactment of the Costa 
Rican legislature which was answered by a decree of the Ger-
man government proclaiming an end to the state of war.21 At 
19see the individual letters referred to in the pre-
vious chapter to Manuel de Peralta from El Marqu's de Amposta, 
K. Matsui, s. Derby, w. G. Sharp, et al. 
20open letter to "Messieurs les Plenipotentiares," le 
febrier 1919, and a statement to the Peace Conference at large 
dated 28 February 1919, Delegation Propaganda. 
21The Treaty of Peace Between the Allied and Asso-
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the same time, the status of Germans residing in Costa Rica 
was clarified with a law allowing them to seek naturalization 
under Costa Rican law, which they had not been able to do dur-
ing the hostilities because of the closed diplomatic channels.22 
However, the United States Consul in Costa Rica reported that 
there had been no confiscations of German properties during the 
war. Nor had there been any adherence to the "Enemy Trading 
List" published by the United States to prevent the infiltra-
tion of German firms into the Americas.2 3 This proved that no 
serious efforts had been made to participate in the war effort. 
While the failure of the Tinoco government to achieve 
representation at Paris was attributable to the same problems 
which led to nonrecognition by the United States, it was the 
expectation of the Costa Rican government after the overthrow 
of the Tinoco regime that it would be included in the delibera-
tions of the Conference. However, since the Conference was 
essentially over before relations between the United States and 
ciated Powers and Germany, signed at Versailles, 28 June 1919, 
Paris Peace Conference, X:735-736. 
22Pan American Union, Bulletin L (January, 1920), p. 
102. 
23secretary of State to the U.S. Minister in Switzer-
land (Stovall), No. 2776, 23 September 1918, "Reports on Cen-
tral American legations--Information on treatment of Germans," 
763.72114A/185c, United States, Department of State, Papers Re-
lating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1918, 
Supplement 2, The World War (Washington, D.C.: Government 
Printing Office, 1933), p. 89. 
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Costa Rica were regularized, this was not possible. There was 
little if any concern on the part of other Latin American 
states for the status of Costa Rica at the conference, since 
it seemed that each nations was most concerned with its own 
status there and the promotion of its own ideas.24 The sup-
port which the Tinoco regime had received from Latin America 
ended with his fall from power. As was mentioned in the pre-
vious chapter, his immediate successor, the provisional presi-
dent, Juan Bautista Quir5s, never received United States rec-
ognition and was soon replaced by Francisco Aguilar Barquero, 
who had been one of the Designados in the Gonz~lez Flores ad-
ministration. 25 Barquero called elections which resulted in 
the election of Julio Acosta late in 1919. 26 
Julio Acosta had been part of the insurgent group which 
caused Tinoco's fall from power, and much of his support in the 
election derived from his opposition to the Tinoco regime.27 
24Kelchner, Latin America and the League, pp. 21-40. 
25u.s. Minister at San Jos' to the Secretary of State, 
2 September 1919, 818.00/870, MC 669; U.S. Minister Benjamin 
F. Chase at San Jos' to the Secretary of State, No. 687, 9 
September 1919, 818.00/904, MC 669. 
26Le6n Fern~ndez Guardia, Historia de Costa Rica, II: 
108; U.S. Consul Benjamin F. Chase at San Josi to the Secretary 
of State, 8 December 1919, 818.00/944, MC 669. 
27u.s. Consul Benjamin F. Chase at San Jes~ to the Sec-
retary of State, No. 714, 21 October 1919, 818.00/928, MC 669; 
U.S. Consul Benjamin F. Chase at San Jose to the Secretary of 
State, No. 685, 4 September 1919, 818.00/899, MC 669; U.S. Con-
sul Benjamin F. Chase at San Jos' to the Secretary of State, 
No. 826, 12 August 1920, 818.00/1000, MC 669. 
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In effect, according to Benjamin F. Chase, the United States 
Consul at San Jos~, the majority of the voters viewed Acosta's 
election as a final repudiation of Tinoco. 28 But there was 
another aspect of the election to be considered. The anti-
American press campaign which began in the last days of the 
Tinoco regime flourished during Acosta's election campaign, 
heightened by the failure of the nation to be admitted to the 
Paris Peace Conference as a result of Woodrow Wilson's efforts.29 
Further, it was maintained in at least one publication that 
Quir6s had been replaced by Barquera on "radiographic" orders 
from United States Secretary of State Robert Lansing as well 
as through the influence of a group of Wall Street capitalists. 30 
The election of Acosta, the failure of Costa Rica to 
obtain representation at the Paris Peace Conference, and the 
failure of any Latin American state to come to the nation's 
aid gave the distinct impression to the Costa Rican public 
that the only sovereignty which remained to the nation was 
that allowed by the United States, 31 which finally extended 
28u.s. Consul Benjamin F. Chase at San Jos' to the 
Secretary of State, No. 714, 21 October 1919, 818.00/928, MC 
669. 
29u.s. Consul Benjamin F. Chase at San Jos~ to the 
Secretary of State, No. 709, 14 October 1919, 818.00/927, MC 669. 
30La Verdad {San Jos~), 7 September 1919, cited in U.S. 
Consul Benjamin F. Chase at San Joa~ to the Secretary of State, 
No. 687, 9 September 1919, 818.00/904, MC 669. 
31Ibid. 
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recognition to Acosta's government late in 1920. 32 This bit-
terness would not come to full bloom during the Acosta presi-
dency, despite the fact that some of the delay in extending 
recognition to Acosta was due to Wilson's illness following 
the peace aonf erence and his campaign for the support of the 
League of Nations. 33 
Wilson's campaign for the support of the League of Na-
tions in the United States was quite difficult due to substan-
tial differences of opinion as to what the League would mean 
to the United States. Wilson had a great deal of support for 
his view that it should be a universal alliance for the preser-
vation of peace as opposed to a supranational power, with a 
military arm, which would enforce the preeminence of certain 
powers. 34 Further, Wilson saw the League as a logical, world-
wide extension of the United States 1 s effort, by means of the 
Monroe Doctrine, to prevent the spread of reactionary ideologies.as 
However, there was significant opposition to the League 
32secretary of State to the U.S. Consul at San Jos,, 
Telegram #16, 2 August 1920, 818.00/991a, MC 669. 
33u.s. Consul in Costa Rica to Joseph R. Tumulty, Sec-
retary to President Wilson, 26 November 1919, 818.00/949a, MC 
669. This letter stresses that, although Wilson was ill, im-
mediate recognition was important. 
34Arthur s. Link, Wilson the Diplomatist, A Look at 
His Major Foreign Policies (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 
1957), p. 119. 
35Gordon Levin, Jr., Woodrow Wilson and World Politics 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1968), p. 181. 
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in the United States, the leadership of which found several 
strong arguments with which to lead their campaign. One such 
argument was that the League of Nations would subvert the 
Monroe Doctrine and the position of leadership of the United 
States in the Western Hemisphere, not to mention the neces-
sity for revision of the Constitution. 36 The rationale for 
this opposition lay in the fact that any of the other members 
of such a worldwide organization would be able to challenge 
the position of the United States granted by the Monroe Doc-
trine. 37 Within the context of a peace organization in which 
all sovereign states were equal members, any of the Latin 
American nations, not to mention any nation hostile to the 
United States, could challenge a unilateral doctrine embrac-
ing the entire hemisphere as the Monroe Doctrine did. A po-
tential threat to that doctrine existed in that Mexico could 
lead such a challenge to United States policy as revenge for 
the treatment it had received during its revolution, 38 es-
pecially since Mexico had been granted membership in the 
League of Nations on the basis of United States recommendation. 39 
36rleming, The U.S. and the League, p. 54. 
37Ibid., p. 151. 
38Ibid., p. 123. 
39James Brown Scott and David Hunter Miller to Woodrow 
Wilson, 30 December 1918, Skeleton Draft of Peace Treaty, Ap-
pendix on Signatories, Exclusions from Belligerents, Paris 
Peace Conf. 185.1/151, Paris Peace Conference, !:315. 
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No consideration was given to the possibility that Costa Rica 
had equal grounds for challenge based on its problems due to 
the unilateral decision of the United States not to recognize 
the Tinoco regime and thereby to exclude Costa Rica from the 
Paris Peace Conference. The leaders of the opposition to the 
League in the United States used the term "Monroe Doctrine" 
freely in their arguments, mustering support for their posi-
tion among masses of people who probably were not even aware 
of what the doctrine meant. 40 If the arguments of this op-
position group were carried to a logical conclusion, it would 
follow that no Latin American nation should belong to the 
League of Nations because of the exclusive hegemony reserved 
to the United States in the Western Hemisphere on the grounds 
that each nation posed a threat to a unilateral policy of the 
United States. 41 
Wilson received some support for his problems from 
Great Britain in answering this criticism which was under-
standable in view of the role of that nation in the formula-
tion of the Monroe Doctrine, as well as its interest in pro-
tecting similar arrangements of its own. 42 The British sug-
gested that the League Covenant include a recognition of the 
special nature of the arrangements that existed in the Western 
40r1eming, The U.S. and the League, p. 76. 
41Ibid., p. 214. 
42 Ibid., p. ass. 
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Hemisphere by virtue of the Monroe Doctrine. 43 It was even 
suggested that the Monroe Doctrine be mentioned by name. By 
the same token, there was French opposition to including the 
Monroe Doctrine specifically on the rationale that official 
recognition of the doctrine might limit future United States 
involvement in Europe, which could jeopardize French safety.44 
Another problem arose over whether the Covenant should 
define the Monroe Doctrine specifically. If it were defined, 
then any United States application of the doctrine would be 
subject to scrutiny as to how it fit the description laid out 
in the Covenant. 45 If it were not defined, there was still the 
problem that the doctrine could be challenged by any member of 
the League. 46 In the end, the problem was resolved by includ-
ing a mention of the Monroe Doctrine as a "regional arrange-
1.J 7 
ment" in Article 21 of the League Covenant. This satisfied 
the fears of the United States's opposition to the League on 
the basis of potential jeopardy to the doctrine but at the 
43Ibid. 
44Ibid. 
45Ibid., pp. 214, 309. 
46Ibid. 
47woodrow Wilson's Statement to the Members of the 
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 19 August 1919, Ray 
Stannard Baker and William E. Dodd, eds., The Public Papers 
of Woodrow Wilson, 6 Vols., War and Peace, Presidential Mes-
sages, Add~esses and Public Paper~ (1917-1924) {Vols. 5 & 6, 
New York: Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1927), 5:577. 
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same time left it sufficiently vague enough to satisfy those 
who feared that the enforcement of its provisions would be 
taken out of the hands of the United States. 
Surprisingly enough, there was little response to 
this inclusion on the part of the Latin American states which 
stood to lose the most by it. At least for the time being, 
all of these states were willing to allow the mention of the 
Monroe Doctrine to stand. 48 For the most part, in the early 
days of the League, Latin America was aligned with the small 
neutral nations of Europe in seeking a guarantee of their ter-
ritorial integrity and sovereignty from the organization, sup-
porting disarmament and cooperating on the issue of Germany's 
admission to the League. 49 In fact, it was precisely this guar-
antee that Wilson used in his arguments against the jeopardy 
to the Monroe Doctrine. He claimed that any organization which 
guaranteed the integrity of nations could not in any way inter-
fere with an internal affair such as the Monroe Doctrine. 50 
In this, Wilson had been advised by former president William 
H. Taft that the political approval of the League Covenant 
48Salvadorean Minister of Foreign Affairs (Paredes) to 
the Secretary of State, No. 752, 14 December 1919, 710.11/433, 
United States, Department of State, Papers Relating to the For-
eign Relations of the United States, 1920 (3 Vols., Washington, 
D.C.: Government Printing Office, 19~ !:224-225. 
49r. P. Walters, A History of the League of Nations 
(2 Vols., New York: Oxford University Press, 1952), I:271. 
SOFleming, The U.S. and the League, p. 86. 
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would be more certain if the Monroe Doctrine were recognized 
in the Covenant. 51 
Another aspect of Latin American participation in the 
early days of the League of Nations was the attempt to bring 
about the consolidation of a Latin American bloc in the League. 
More than any other group, the Latin American nations acted 
in concert in the League of Nations by rotating their repre-
sentation on the Council, by decisions made in conferences 
among their delegates and by providing some leadership for 
member states in policy decisions. 52 However, few if any of 
the policy decisions in the early life of the League of Na-
tions concerned Latin America directly.5 3 One of the earli-
est questions was the admission of those Latin American states 
which had not been granted original membership in the organi-
zation. Costa Rica was finally admitted to membership in the 
League in December, 1920.54 There was no solution to the 
problems which had surrounded its exclusion from earlier 
meetings, but by that time the United States had formally 
recognized its government. Joining the League of Nations 
changed very little of Costa Rica's relations with the re-
s1rbict., PP· 183-184. 
52Kelchner, Latin America and the League, p. 11; Wal-
ters, League of Nations, I:335. 
53Kelchner, Latin America and the League, p. 140. 
5 ~Le6n Fernandez Guardia, Historia de Costa Rica, I: 
108; Pan American Union, Bulletin LVII (February, 1923), p. 
206. 
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mainder of the world, since it had little part in the Latin 
American coalition, being preoccupied with its internal prob-
lems and the restoration of its relationship with the United 
States. 
When the invitation to join the League was finally ex-
tended to Costa Rica, the Acosta Administration immediately ac-
cepted in time to send a delegate to the First Session. Man-
uel de Peralta was assigned to attend the sessions in Geneva 
as well as to continue to hold his post as ambassador to 
France.SS However, the readiness of the Costa Rican govern-
ment to join the League was not unanimously popular in Costa 
Rica. Much of the unpopularity was related to the sentiments 
expressed toward the Presidency of Julio Acosta himself. Acos-
ta took office in May, 1920 and was noted for his efforts to 
restore the economic and political stability which had been 
seriously damaged during the Tinoco interlude.S 6 Depending 
upon the time and place, one finds Acosta referred to as either 
vary popular or very unpopular. 57 As far as the two United 
SSPan American Union, Bulletin LVII (February, 1923), 
p. 206. 
56u.s. Chargg Roy T. Davis at San Josg to the Secre-
tary of State, No. 123, 23 March 1923, 818.00/106~, MC 669; 
Leon Fern!ndez Guardia, Historia de Costa Rica, II:108. 
57For references that Acosta was popular see: U.S. 
Consul Benjamin F. Chase at San Josg to the Secretary of State, 
30 September 1919, 818.00/909, MC 669; his unpopularity was 
referred to in: U.S. Consul Benjamin F. Chase at San Josg to 
the Secretary of State, No. 709, 1~ October 1919, 818.00"927, 
MC 669. 
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States Chal"g's in San Jos6 during this time were concerned, 
Acosta's identification with the overthrow and replacement 
of the Tinoco regime made him a well-liked leader. 58 How-
ever, both Benjamin F. Chase a.nd Walter C. Thurston noted 
that Acosta had serious problems due to his over-identifica-
tion with the United States. 59 While it may well be tX'tle, as 
Chase in particular observed, that the Costa Rican nation was 
grateful to be rid of the problems of the Tinoco yeal"s, 60 there 
was also strong sentiment in reaction to the sacrifices of na-
tional prestige which had occu?'I'ed because of United States 
policy toward the nation. 61 Unfortunately for Acosta, he was 
directly associated with, or identified as, one of those indi-
viduals responsible for the policy which had been adopted toward 
the United States a.nd Woodrow Wilson to the detriment of national 
58u.s. Consul Benjamin F. Chase at San Jos,·to the 
Secretary of State, No. 685, 4 September 1919, 818.00/899, MC 
669. 
59There was also specific mention that Tinoco's fall 
had been caused by U.S. nonrecognition. U.S. Charg& Clarence 
B. Hewes at San Jos' to the Secretary of State, No. 289, 13 
July 1923, 818.00/1076, MC 669; U.S. Consul Benjamin F. Chase 
at San Jos' to the Secretary of State, No. 872, 14 October 1920, 
818.00/1005, MC 669. 
60u.s. Consul Benjamin F. Chase at San Jos,·'to the 
Secretary of State, No. 816, 12 August 1920, 818.00/1000, MC 
669. 
61
u.s. ChargG Clarence B. Hewes at San Jos& to the Sec-
retary of State, No. 282, 29 June 1923, 818.00/1073, MC 669; 
U.S. Charg' Clarence B. Hewes at Sa.n Jos' to the Secretary of 
State, No. 264, 25 May 1923, 818.00/1068, MC 669; U.S. Charg~ 
Walter C. Thurston at San Jos' to the Secretary of State, No. 
14, 7 February 1921, 818.00/1023, MC 669. 
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pride. 62 An excellent example of this was the resignation of 
Juan Bautista Quir6s from the provisional presidency to which 
Tinoco had appointed him before fleeing the country. In the 
view of many Costa Ricans, Quir6s could have held elections 
just as legally and just as effectively as did Francisco Aguilar 
Barquero, whom the United States had seen as an acceptable 
provisional president. 63 
Then, too, there was the delay in the United States ex-
tension of recognition to Julio Acosta once he had been consti-
tutionally elected. 64 There was a time lapse of nearly nine 
months from the election and four months from the inauguration 
before full diplomatic recognition of Costa Rica was extended 
by the United States.SS Although the delay was due in part to 
Woodrow Wilson's illness at the time, this was no consolation 
to Costa Ricans. Further, the delay could be seen as proof 
that Acosta was no United States puppet as some maintained, but 
Acosta himself did nothing to help his own cause in the issue, 
choosing instead to issue statements about the "close ties and 
62Monge Alfaro, Historia de Costa Rica, p. 279. 
63u.s. Consul Benjamin F. Chase at San Jos'' to the 
Secretary of State, No. 687, 9 September 1919, 818.00/904, MC 
669; Monge Alfaro, Historia de Costa Rica, p. 279. 
64u.s. Consul Benjamin F. Chase at San Jos' to the Sec-
retary of State, No. 709, 14 October 1919, 818.00/927, MC 669. 
65u.s. Consul Benjamin F. Chase at San Jos' to the Sec-
retary of State, 8 December 1919, 818.00/944, MC 669. 
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friendship" between Costa Rica and the United States. 66 From 
the foregoing, one can speculate that the advocates of na-
tional pride in international relations would view a refusal 
to join the League of Nations on Acosta's part as a far more 
desirable policy to promote Costa Rican status in the world 
community of nations. Nonetheless, Acosta accepted the mem-
bership. 
Apart from specific issues within Costa Rica which 
argued against membership in the League of Nations, there 
were broader issues which encompassed much of Latin America 
and which, in general, revolved around the uselessness of 
the League in the affairs of the Western Hemisphere. For ex-
ample, the issues which preoccupied the League of Nations as 
a whole in the early years of its existence were primarily 
ones of organization and structure of the activities of the 
League. What became apparent was that each of the member 
nations, including the Latin American states, had its own 
view of the purposes of the organization and i• some instances, 
was intransigent in seeing its own views brought to frui-
tion. 67 Unfortunately for the Latin American states and the 
smaller states of Europe, the design of the League gave the 
66Extract from Address of President Julio Acosta to 
the Congress, 1 May 1920, cited in U.S. Consul Benjamin F. 
Chase at San Jos~ to the Secretary of State, No. 779, 14 May 
1920, 818.00/983, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations, 
~' I:884. 
67 Walters, League of Nations, !:93-94. 
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greatest emphasis to the so-called Great Powers. This spread 
of authority within the League, which is reflected in the 
United Nations by the Security Council, would be a bone of 
contention for the smaller nations. 68 
For the most part, they met this problem by seeking 
the seating of the small states on the League Council with 
permanent status similar to that of the Great Powers. 69 Bra-
zil was in the forefront of those states which felt that it 
had the right to be so situatect. 70 The Latin American nations 
seemed to agree that at least one of their members should sit 
on the Council 1 but the problem of choice soon resolved itself 
into a struggle for the leadership of the Latin American con-
tingent. 71 
Initially, the Latin American states were included 
with a group of European states which shared a temporary seat 
on the Council which rotated among them a11. 72 This meant 
that at some times, there was no Latin American representa-
tion on the permanent governing body of the LeaJue. All of 
Latin America had agreed upon the necessity of a permanent 
seat for one of its members, but Brazil managed to arrange 
68Ibid., I:35. 
69 Ibid. 1 !:126-127; Kelchner, Latin America and the 
League, p. 65. 
70walters, League of Nations, I:126-127. 
71Kelchner, Latin America and the League, pp. 21, 67. 
72 Ibid., pp. 66-67. 
111 
matters so that it would acquire that position for itself 
when the seat was eventually granted. 73 When the Council 
was reorganized in 1~25-1926, Brazil was not satisfied with 
the arrangements and tendered i·ts resignation from the Lea-
74 gue. The rules of procedure did not make the decision a 
final one for two full years, but Brazil withdrew at the time 
of its notification. 
When Brazil resigned, the question of leadership among 
the Latin American states was again open to discussion. A 
logical successor in terms of contemporary La.tin American 
politics might have been Mexico or Argentina. Since Mexico 
had not yet joined the League and would not do so until 
1931, 75 this left Argentina, which had not had representa-
tion at the League since its legation walked out during the 
First Session over the question of German repreeentation. 76 
Chile stepped in and took advantage of the absence of Mexico 
d Ar t . d 1 d B 'l 77 U l'k B 'l h an gen ina an rep ace razi • n 1 e razi , owever, 
Chile was not convinced of the relevance of LeaJue membership 
to American affairs and was quite outspoken in that belief. 78 
73Ibid., p. 90. 
74Ibid., pp. 71, 90. 
75 Fl ' Th U S d h Le 11 1 e~ng, e •• an t e ague, p. ~17, n •• 
76walters, The League of Nations, I:24. 
77Kelchner, Latin America and the League, p. 90 • 
. 78 
Ibid., PP• 89-90. 
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As a consequence, the Chilean delegates were not in a posi-
tion of sufficient authority to prevent the diminution of 
Latin American representation at Geneva or the withdrawal of 
other Latin American states from the League. In fact, for 
the same arguments which Chile presented as to the unimportance 
of the League to the Americas, more and more Latin American 
states bP.gan to dive~t their energies from the League to the 
Pan American Union and the Inter-American conferences. 79 
In an attempt to answer some of the Latin American 
grievances about the irrelevance of the League to American 
problems, a Latin American Liaison Office was formed which 
was to provide a two-way channel for information from and 
h La . Am . . 80 about t e tin erican nations. As it developed, this 
office became a training school for diplomats of the Latin 
American states, since it provided internships for promising 
young Latin Americans as well as some public informaiton ser-
vices about the League in the home states of Latin America. 81 
However, in general, it must be admittec that Latin 
America was less than a wholehearted participant in the League 
of Nations. In its early years, several Latin Americans 
served in positions of responsibility in the League, such as 
President of the League Assembly, president of some of the 
79Ibid., pp. 89-90. 
SOibid., p. 147. 
81Ibid., p. 162. 
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League divisions, and chairmen of some of the League Commit~ 
tees. 82 The International Labor Office was also a dubious 
success insofar as Latin America was concerned. It is inter-
esting to note that of all the Latin American nations, Costa 
Rica was the only one never to send a delegate to the Interna-
tional Labor meetings. 83 For the most part, however, Latin 
America ~elegated the affairs of the League to a secondary 
position in its concerns, as few League measures ever re-
ceived ratification from the Latin American states. 84 Further, 
arguing that the League did not deal with American questions, 
the Latin American states unanimously opposed attempts to 
raise budgets or quotas for the financing of the League. 85 
Add to these problems the fact that few of the European na-
tions recognized the advantages possible with full Latin Amer-
ican participation, 86 and Latin American dissatisfaction be-
comes understandable. 
Among the Latin American states, Chile soon became a 
leader in the discontent with League membership. 87 After Bra-
zil resigned over the issue of its permanent seating on the 
p. 451. 
82Pan American Union, Bulletin LVII (November, 1923), 
83Kelchner, Latin America and the League, pp. 196-197. 
84Ibid., p. 163. 
BSibid., p. 171. 
86walters, The League of Nations, I:392. 
87Ibid., !:341. 
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League Council, Chile assumed the position of prominence which 
it had held. 88 Chilean delegates were quite explicit in their 
explanation that the Pan American Union handled American ques-
tions quite effectively and was therefore more important to 
the Latin American states than was the League. 89 This position 
served to put the Pan American Union and the League into com-
petition, a situation which neither organization anticipated 
or welcomed. Nevertheless, the logic of the Chilean arguments 
was not lost on the Latin American membership. The strongest 
part of their argument was that the United States did not be-
long to the League 90 and that it insisted on the separation of 
American questions from League conoerns. 91 If it was admitted 
that the United States held a dominant position in the Americas, 
or at least aspired to one, then it only made sense that any 
discussions involving American problems had to be conducted 
where the United States could be involved in arbitration and 
r.egotiation. More on the development of the inter-American sys-
tem during this period will be discussed in subsequent chapters. 
However, it should be noted that it was precisely the success 
of the Latin American states in their dealings with the United 
States through the Inter-American Conference system during the 
88Ibid. 
89Kelchner, Latin America and the League, pp. 89-91. 
90walte~s, The League of Nations, !:350-351. 
91Kelchner, Latin Amer.;pa_and the League, p. 89. 
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1920's and early 193D's which led to the growing disenchant-
ment of those states with the League of Nations. 
Costa Rica was no exception to these general patterns. 
Represented at the League by Manuel de Peralta, who had cele-
brated his fiftieth anniversary in the diplomatic service of 
the Costa Rican nation in 1923, Costa Rica took no position 
of prominence in the early years of the League of Nations. 92 
It was, as mentioned, the only nation never to send a delegate 
to the International Labor meetings. The main preoccupation 
of Costa Rica during the early 1920's was with domestic af-
fairs and the restoration of smooth-running constitutional 
government. For the most part, the relationships maintained 
with European nations were on matters of trade. However, 
there was the intrusion of the problems occasioned by the 
nullification of the legislation of the Tinoco regime. 93 The 
most serious problems, after a somewhat difficult passage of 
the laws of nullification, arose from the cancellation of the 
Amory oil concession. Great Britain objected s~renuously to 
this cancellation of a concession granted to its nationals, 
demanding indemnification if the concession was not upheld.94 
92Pan American Union, Bulletin LVII (February, 1922), 
p. 206. 
93 Le6n Fern!ndez Guardia, Historia de Costa Rica, II: 
108. 
94u.s. Consul Benjamin F. Chase at San Jos~ to the Sec-
retary of State, 16 July 1920, 818.6363Am6/42, Papers Relating 
to Foreign Relatio~s, 1920, !:836-839. 
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The United States took a neutral stand in tha matter after 
having ascertained that the nullification acts did not affect 
any American holdings. 95 The negotiations on the Amory con-
cession continued for a number of yaars, with the matter fi-
nally settled in favor of the cancellation in the Costa Rican 
courts. 96 
The Amory concession, along with the activities of the 
nation with regard to the League of Nations, would do much to 
discredit President Julio Acosta as a puppet of the United 
States.97 The anti-American sentiment, which had been manu-
factured at the end of the Tinoco regime, was heightened by 
policies which seemed to favor United States investors over 
English businessmen, 98 although the picture was quite different 
from the United States's viewpoint.99 Evidence to support the 
view that Acosta was controlled by the United States was found 
95u.s. Consul Benjamin F. Chase at San Jos' to the Sec-
retary of State, 4 September 1920, 818.602/12, ibid., I:838. 
96Pan American Union, Bulletin LVIII (February, 1924), 
p. 196. 
97u.s. Consul Benjamin F. Chase at San Jos' to the Sec-
retary of State, No. 872, 14 October 1920, 818.00/1005, MC 669; 
U.S. Charge Walter c. Thurston at San Jos& to the Secretary of 
State, No. 14, 7 February 1921, 818.00/1023, MC 669. 
98u.s. Consul Benjamin F. Chase at San Jos' to the Sec-
retary of State, No. 872, 14 October 1920, 818.00/1005, MC 669. 
99u.s. Charg~ Walter c. Thurston at San Jos~ to the 
Secretary of State, No. 97, 1 June 1921, 818.60/--, MC 669. 
117 
in his public statements as well as in various other policies 
undertaken by his administration.100 A revival of the Panama-
nian boundary dispute in 1921 with armed action by both parties, 
which led to favoritism for Costa Rican interests by the Unit-
ed States, was also detrimental to Acosta in this sense. Pana-
ma insisted that the issue be taken before the League of Na-
tions~ while Costa Rica insisted that the arbitration of the 
United States was effective in solving the problem. 101 In es-
sence, this prevented League interference since the League 
could only arbitrate upon the invitation of the disputants. 
Panama argued that the exclusion of the boundary dispute on the 
basis of Article 21 (the recognition of the Monroe Doctrine) 
did nothing but secure the power of the United States in the 
Americas.102 More will be mentioned concerning this dispute 
in the discussion of American affairs. As far as public opin-
ion and the press were concerned, United States favoritism for 
Costa Rica in the matter probably stemmed from Acosta's con-
cessions to the United States. 103 
100Pan American Union, Bulletin LI (December, 1920), 
p. 634; U.S. Consul Benjamin F. Chase at San Jos~ to the Sec-
retary of State, No. 779, 14 May 1920, 818.00/983, Papers Re-
lating to Foreign Relations, ~' I:884. 
101Kelchner, Latin America and the League, p. 120; 
Controversia Entre Panaml y Costa Rica, II:160. 
109. 
102
controversia Entre Panam! y Costa Rica, II:239. 
103te5n Fern!ndez Guardia, Historia de Costa Rica, II: 
' 
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In addition to these problems, there was the matter 
of the affordability of League membership. That is to say, 
Costa Rica felt that the quota fees which it paid to the 
League of Nations were simply not worth the return in ser-
vices or prestige which it received. 104 However, in the 
final analysis, there were other factors which affected Cos-
ta Rica's decision, as well as the decisions of other Latin 
American states, to dissociate themselves from the League of 
Nations. In Costa Rica, the matter of resignation from the 
League for what were ostensibly financial reasons came under 
discussion as early as 1921. 105 It was maintained that in a 
time of economic crisis such as then existed, the membership 
fees for the League were an expense that could not be justi-
fied and therefore, they should be eliminated. 106 But since 
Costa Rica's share of the League budget came to only $24,000 
per year,107 this argument can be seen as somewhat superficial. 
For whatever reasons, Julio Acosta chose not to con-
sider resignation from the League during his term of office. 
Perhaps he hoped, as did many other Latin American leaders and 
104u.s. Charg~ Walter c. Thurston at San Jos~ to the 
Secretary of State, No. 94, 7 May 1921, 818.00/1036, MC 669; 
Memorias, 1924, p. vii. 
105u.s. Charg~ Walter c. Thurston at San Jos~ to the 
Secretary of State, No. 94, 7 May 1921, 818.00/1036, MC 669. 
iOSibid. 
107Ibid. 
119 
those of the small nations of Europe, that the League would 
be able to protect their interests against the hegemony of 
the Great Powers; in the Latin American case the hegemony of 
the United States in the Western Hemisphere.10 8 But by the 
mid-1920's this hope would be seen as futile and other ave-
nues would be sought by which to seek the same solution. Thus, 
a major campaign issue for the 1924 Costa Rican presidential 
elections was the anti-American sentiment of some Costa Ricans 
and the associated desire to resign from the League of Nations.109 
Since Acosta was not eligible for reelection under the term~ 
of the Costa Rican constitution, the issue of his relationship 
with the United States and Woodrow Wilson did not have a direct 
bearing on the campaign. However, the plans of the candidates 
for the presidency with regard to the national policies toward 
the United States and the League of Nations was quite impor-
tant.110 
It should be noted that United States representatives 
like Walter c. Thurston, who served for about three years as 
the United States Charge in San Jos~, reported to the State 
Department that much of the anti-American sentiment which sur-
f aced during the election campaign was attributable to Mexican 
108Kelchner, Latin America and the League, p. 13. 
109u.s. Charg~ Clarence B. Hewes at San Jos~ to the 
Secretary of State, No. 280, 22 June 1923, 818.00/1077, MC 
669; U.S. Charg~ Clarence B. Hewes at San Jos~ to the Secre-
tary of State, No. 264, 25 May 1923, 818.00/1068, MC 669. 
110Ibid. 
120 
propaganda efforts in Costa Rica. 111 In addition, he noted 
the adverse effect on United States-Costa Rican relations re-
sulting from the development of closer ties between Spain and 
C R• d ' h' . d 112 I h 0 osta 1ca uring t is perio • n is assessment, Thurston 
completely overlooked the impact of events in recent years on 
Costa Rican attitudes and failed to see that Mexico and Costa 
Rica shared problems in achieving recognition from the Wilson 
administration which had probably developed a special kinship 
between them. Perhaps he can be excused for this oversight in 
light of general State Department attitudes on the same sub-
ject. 
There was at least one State Department missive which 
expressed considerable consternation over Costa Rican hostil-
ity toward Nicaragua in the early 1920 1 s. 113 If one discounts 
all potential national rivalries between these two states, 
not to mention the actions of Nicaragua in the Bryan-Chamorro 
T~eaty, there still remains the fact that Nicaragua harbored 
111u.s. Charg6 Roy T. Davis at San Jos~ to the Secre-
tary of State, No. 310, 17 August 1923, 818.00/1078, MC 669; 
U.S. Charg~ Walter C. Thurston at San Jos~ to the Secretary 
of State, No. 14, 7 February 1921, 818.00/1023, MC 669; U.S. 
Charg~ Walter C. Thurston at San Jos~ to the Secretary of 
State, No. 216, 14 October 1921, 718.00/1, MC 671. 
112u.s. Charge Walter c. Thurston at San Jose to the 
Secretary of State, No. 216, 14 October 1921, 718.00/1, MC 
671; U.S. Charge Benjamin F. Chase at San Jose to the Secre-
tary of State, No. 872, 14 October 1920, 818.00/1005, MC 669. 
113u.s. Charg' Walter c. Thurston at San Jos~ to the 
Secretary of State, No. 216, 14 October 1921, 718.00/1, MC 
671. 
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the insurgent forces which eventually overthrew the Tinoco re-
gime, which many Costa Ricans viewed as a constitutional govern-
ment. Yet it is precisely this Nicaraguan policy which the 
State Department cited as good and sufficient reason for the 
existence of cordial relations between the two nations.114 
The rationale for this would be, of course, that Tinoco was a 
tyrant who had to be replaced at any cost.11 5 Therefore, Cos-
ta Rica should be grateful to Nicaragua for its assistance in 
the elimination of Tinoco. It can be seen that whatever mis-
conceptions Thurston or his colleagues may have had with re-
gard to Costa Rican attitudes, they came by them quite honest-
ly. 
Before turning to the outcome of the 1924 elections, 
it is also important to consider the overall status of Costa 
Rica's foreign affairs, since this would have significant im-
pact on the eventual decision of the president elected in that 
contest with regard to the League of Nations. If it was true 
that the League was essential to the relationsh~.p between Cos-
ta Rica and the world conun.unity of nations, then perhaps 
there would have been grounds for opposing the resignation. 
However, it is apparent that Costa Rica conducted a broad 
range of foreign policy quite separate from its membership 
in either the Pan American Union or the League of Nations. 
114rbid. 
115Ibid. 
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In the realm of inter-American affairs, which will 
be discussed at greater length in succeeding chapters, Costa 
Rica pursued quite independent policies in the early 1920's. 
For example, during 1921 and 1922, it was associated with 
another Central American Union project. 116 Further, the ne-
gotiations with Panama over the disputed boundary continued 
for Costa Rica refused League mediation and rejected the at-
tempts of the United States to interfere in the armed dispute 
which arose. 117 The period was also characterized by a quite 
amicable relationship with Mexico. 118 While these develop-
ments will be discussed at greater length below, on the whole 
it could be said that Costa Rica certainly had no need of the 
League of Nations in its dealings with other American states. 
Within this same period as well, Costa Rica would express some 
criticism of the Pan American Union and the preeminence of the 
United States in its affairs. The criticism was directed a• 
gainst the Pan American Union following the failure of that 
body to adopt some Costa Rican suggestions for organizational 
116Karnes, Failure of Union, p. 213. 
117u.s. Charg' Walter C. Thurston at San Jos' to the 
Secretary of State, No. 94, 7 May 1921, 818.00/1036, MC 669; 
Secretary of State to U.S. Charg~ Walter c. Thurston at San 
Jose, 718.00/325a, United States, Department of State, Papers 
Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1921 
(2 Vols., Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office,""1936), 
!!:181. 
113u.s. Charg~ Walter c. Thurston at San Jos~ to the 
Secretary of State, No. 14, 7 February 1921, 818.00/1023, MC 
669. 
changes, so it might be argued that there were more hurt 
feelings than good reasons involvect.119 
123 
In the realm of European affairs, the most important 
single problem which arose, other than that of League mem-
bership, was the settlement of claims which arose due to the 
nullification of the acts of the Tinoco regime. Most sig-
nificant among these was the Amory oil concession, which in-
volved Great Britain and which had been associated with a 
loan negotiated with the Royal Bank of Canada. 120 As was 
discussed previously, the Amory concession matter was finally 
resolved in the Costa Rican courts, with the help of media-
tion by Chief Justice White and former President Taft of the 
United States. It was Taft's conclusion that the Tinoco re-
. h b . . . 121 gime ad een in fact a legitimate government. Although 
Great Britain approached the United States for assistance in 
settling the matter, it was decided by the State Department 
that the matter was not subject to official intervention, 
since it could be handled under Costa Rican law. 122 This de-
cision was an important one for Costa Rica, since it allowed 
a resolution of national problems on purely national grounds, 
119u.s. Charge Clarence B. Hewes at San Jose to the 
Secretary of State, No. 251, 4 May 1923, 818.00/1065, MC 669. 
120 , , U.S. Charge Walter c. Thurston at San Jose to the 
Secretary of State, No. 216, 14 October 1921, 718.00/1, MC 671. 
121Neumann, Recognition, p. 18. 
122 Ibid. 
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with the aid of voluntary mediation by individuals whom it 
had chosen. However, Great Britain criticized the United 
States for taking a position favorable to its own interests 
rather than one which reflected the justice of the situa-. 
tion. 123 This did not in any way affect Costa Rican-British 
relations and so the independence of Costa Rica's policy was 
preserved. 
Therefore, it can be seen that Costa Rica had no need 
for the League of Nations to conduct its foreign affairs. 
This will become even more apparent as these issues are dis-
cussed at greater length in succeeding chapters. However, it 
can be seen that while there may have been emotionalism or 
anti-Americanism attached to the resignation from the League, 
the decision was probably one made on logical, well-reasoned 
principles, including of course, the financial issue. 
Thus, in December, 1925 Costa Rica's delegate at Ge-
neva presented written notice of resignation to the Secretary 
~eneral of the League to become effective January 1, 1927, 
citing financial considerations as the reason for its deci-
sion to withdraw. 124 It was reported by the Minister of For-
eign Affairs that the decision to resign had been made after 
the League published and publicized a list of "debtors," which 
123u.s. Consul Benjamin F. Chase at San Jos~ to the 
Secretary of State, No. 823, 6 August 1920, 818.00/000, Pa-
pers Relating to Foreign Relations, 1:.21..Q., I:835. 
124M . 192'' .. 
_emorias, ----:!.' p. v11. 
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included Costa Rica. He asserted in his ann11al message to 
the Congress that such an action gave serious offense and 
insult to the Costa Rican people. 125 Further, the report 
specified that the $18,700 owed to the League (or 74,671 co-
lones) could have been used far more profitahly for aqueducts, 
roads, or schools. 126 The matter remained in abeyance for 
the two calendar years required by the League Covenant for 
effective resignation. 127 Just prior to that date, however, 
a letter was sent by the League Secretariat asking that Costa 
Rica reconsider its decision to withdraw. 128 It should be 
noted that one historian of the League explains that this 
letter was sent to Costa Rica not because of any real concern 
over the Costa Rican resignation, but simply because similar 
letters had been sent to Brazil and Spain on the occasion of 
their resignations and it was considered necessary to extend 
the same courtesy to Costa Rica to avoid insult. 129 
In reality, the Costa Rican response to this letter 
~·ms not a shocking one, al though its implications might be 
construed as such. In its response,. Costa Rica indicated 
125 Ibid. 
126 Ihid., P• viii. 
127Ibid., p. VII. 
128rrancisco J. Urrutia, El Presidente en ejercicio del 
Consejo de la Sociedad de las Naciones a Su Excelencia el Sefior 
Ministro de Relaciones Exteriores, San Jose, Costa Rica, 14 de 
marzo de 1928, Hemorias, 1928, p. 63. 
-129
walters, The League of Nations, I:38. 
126 
that in order for it to make any reevaluation of its deci-
sion to resign, it would have to have the League's definition 
of the term "Monroe Doctrine" as it appeared in Article 21 of 
the League Covenant. 130 This request was surprising for a 
number of reasons. First, there had been no indication in 
the original letter of resignation that there was any objec-
tion to the contents of Article 21. 131 This would not have 
been a surprise in itself, since Article 21 had been a prob-
lem from the start. 132 Second, it had probably never occur-
red to the preparers of the League Covenant at the time that 
Article 21 was included that they would be put in the posi-
tion of defining a United States policy such as the Monroe 
Doctrine without having the United States able to speak for 
't lf 133 i ee • The third occasion of surprise was the source of 
these problems: Costa Rica. Costa Rica had never been an 
outstanding member of the League of Nations, nor had it even 
indicated any tendency to act outside of the pattern for Latin 
130League of Nations, Official Journal, IX:432, cited 
in Kelchner, Latin America and the Lea~ue, p. 132; Rafael Cas-
tro Quesada, Secretario de Re!aciones ~xteriores to Sefior Don 
Francisco J. Urrutia, Presidente del Consejo de la Sociedad 
de las Nacioner:;, 18 de julio de 1928, Memorias, 1928, pp. 65-
67. -
131 Manuel M. de 
ello de Vars, Ministro 
lica de Costa Rica, 14 
154-155. 
Peralta to Senor Lie. don Rafael Argu-
de Relaciones Exteriores de la Repub-
de enero de 1925, Memorias, 1924, pp. 
-
132walters, The League of Nations, I:38. 
133Fleming, The U.S. and the League, p. 214. 
127 
America. Unless the unusual ci!:'cu.r,1stances surrounding its 
adJI1ission to the League were considered, there was, in fact, 
no reason to suspect that Costa Eica was bold enough to per-
petrate any such shocking or independent actions. 
The League Secr·etariat, as well as the General Ass em-
bly when the matter was brought before it, was at a loss as 
134 to how to proceed. At first, an atter,1pt was made to ac-
quire a definition of the Honroe Doctrine from the United 
States. 135 For all of the reasons which had been used in op-
position to the League of Nations on the grounds of its po-
tential for interference in inter-American affairs, plus the 
fact that the United States did not belong to the League, the 
Unl.'ted States refusect. 136 Th th 1 d' d en, ano er p an was iscusse 
whereby the League Covenant would be modified to exclude Ar-
ticle 21. 137 Here, Great Britain objected for the same rea-
sons for which it had supported the inclusion of the Article 
in the first place, namely the protection of its own "region-
al understandings."138 Finally, it was decideC::. to inform 
Costa Rica that it was not in the power of the League to de-
134walters, The Lea,gue of Nations, I:390. 
135rbid., I:391. 
136Ibid. 
137Ibi<l. 
138rbid.; Fleming, The u.s. and the League, p. 185. 
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fine the Monroe Doctrine, since it was a "regional understand-
ing" with which, as Article 21 made clear, the League would 
not interfere since it represented a previous binding agree-
ment among member states rather than anything for which the 
League was responsible. 139 On that note, Costa Rican res ig-
nation became effective. 
Where did this unusual request come from? It could 
be speculated, quite convincingly, that the requested defini-
tion of the Monroe Doctrine was meant as a way of bothering 
the United States or tugging at Uncle Sa~'s beard, by intima-
ting a misapplication of the Monroe Doctrine. 140 Or, it 
might be that Costa Rica truly sought a definition of a poli-
cy which it believed interfered with the effectiveness of the 
League in American affairs. 141 However, since it had been the 
obvious intent of Costa Rica to resign from the League of Na-
t ions for some time before this request was made, it became 
evident that the question was posed in an attempt to force a 
definition of a policy which simply could not bn furnished by 
the League. Therefore, Costa Rica accomplished the embarass-
139Pr6cope, Presidente en ejerc1c10 del Consejo de la 
Sociedad de las Naciones to el Sefior Secretario de Estado de 
Costa Rica, San Jos~, 1 Septiembre de 1928, Memorias, 1928, 
pp. 67-68. ----
140 , , U.S. Charge Clarence B. Hew~s at San Jose to the 
Secretary of State, No. 251, 4 May 1923, 818.00/1065, MC 669. 
141Rafael Castro Quesada, Secretario de Relaciones Ex-
teriores to Senor don Francisco J. Urrutia, Presidente del 
Consejo de la Sociedad de las Naciones, 18 de julio de 1928, 
Memorias, ~. pp. 65-67. 
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ment of the United States and of the League of Nations in 
one blow, preserving once az,ain its jndependence of action in 
world affairs, unless, of course, Costa Rica was "put up to 
it" by Mexico or Chile, two outspoken critics of United States 
influence in the Wester1n Hemisphere as suggested by the Uni-
ted States CharGe Roy T. Davis. 142 This issue will be dis-
cussed in succeedinL chapters. However, since there is no 
evidence to support this possibility, it must be assumed that 
Costa Fica acted completely on its own and would continue to 
do so. 
The decision to withdraw frOrn. the League of Nations had 
been made by Julio Acosta's successor, Ricardo Jimenez. 143 By 
the time this decision was reached, there was little if any 
United States encouragement or pressure for remaining in the 
League. In addition, the resignation served the purpose of 
establishing Costa Rican independence from United States in-
fluence insofar as Costa P-i.can public opinion was concerned. 
The preoccupation of the United States with its own internal 
affairs, plus isolationist sentiment there, prevented any re-
action to Costa Rica's Monroe Doctrine question which might 
have presented problems for Costa Rica. However, the same 
142u.s. Charge Roy T. Davis at San Jose to the Secre-
tary of State, 1 May 1924, 818.00/1108, MC 669. 
143Manuel M. de Peralta to Senor Lie. don Rafael Argu-
ello de Vars, Ministro de Relaciones Exteriores de la Repub-
lica de Costa Rica, 14 de enero de 1925, Hemorias, ~, pp. 
154-155. 
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purpose was served whether the United States objected or not. 
Costa Rican independence in its international affairs was 
established and its path was clear for full participation in 
the Pan American Union. 
CHAPTER VI 
COSTA RICA AND THE AMERICAN COMMUNITY 
OF NATIONS: THE 1920~S 
As has been established, the couJ:"Se of international 
events from 1900 to 1920 led to a situation in which Costa 
Rica, along with other Latin American states, essentially 
pUJ:"Sued a foreign policy limited to solely American or West-
ern Hemispheric concerns. It weuld hardly be realistic to 
assert that 1920 marked a demarcation line for Costa Rica, 
after which diplomatic relations with the nations outside the 
Americas ceased to have any importance. However, as will be 
discussed in this and the succeeding chapter, the period fol-
lowing 1920 was, for Costa Rica, a time in which American or 
regional affairs took on primary importance in international 
relations. The main goals of Costa Rica's foreign policy was 
to improve Costa Rica's status in the Americas. 
If it were the intention of Costa Rican policy makers 
to concentrate on hemispheric affairs, then logically a start 
would have been to be made in improving the nation's bilater-
al relations in the Americas. It is difficult to ascertain 
how this would be done on the basis of available evidence. 
All that can be accurately demonstrated is the actual course 
131 
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of Costa Rican policy as reported officially by representa-
tives of the United States and more importantly by the Cos-
ta Rican Ministers of Foreign Affairs in their annual reports 
when these are available. 
In terms of the Costa Rican policy makers themselves, 
the election of Julio Acosta as President was reviewed in 
preceding chapters. His term of office extended from 1920 to 
1924. The 1924 election was marked by the same initial prob-
lems as had marked the 1914 election of Alfredo Gonzfilez 
Flores. None of the candidates for office received the re-
quired constitutional majority, putting the election into the 
hands of the Congress. 1 The Congressional deliberations end-
ed in the election of Lie. Ricardo Ji~nez, whose campaign 
proposals were not substantially different from those of his 
opponents. 2 The only potential problems arising from Jim,nez's 
Congressional election lay in the refusal of the Congress to 
seat a group of opposition delegates. 3 
Jim&nez was followed in office in 1928 by Cleto Gon-
ztlez V!quez, whose policies were so similar to Jim,nez's as 
1Ricardo Fernlndez Guardia, Cartilla Hist6rica, p. 130. 
2Le6n FernMidez Guardia, Histopia de Costa Rica, II: 
114-115. 
3u.s. Minister Roy T. Davis at San Jos' to the Sec-
retary of State, 1 May 1914, 818.00/1108, MC 669. 
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not to be considered a real ohange. 4 Both could be charac-
terized as pro-democratic moderates with an interest in gra-
daul social changes and an overall improvement of Costa Ri-
ca' a economy and public works. 5 When Jim6nez was returned to 
the presidency in 19S2 for another four year term, it con-
firmed the fact that the nation was pleased by the stability 
and gradual progress for which the two leaders were known. 6 
With such internal conditions of stability and progress, it 
should have been relatively easy for Costa Rica to prusue a 
foreign policy determined by national interests rather than 
the kind of policy which characterized the years immediately 
following the overthrow of the Tinoco regime, when the ap-
proval of the United States was the primary goal. 
The situation among the Latin American states in the 
early 1920's was still characterized by the domination of 
Argentina, Brazil, and Chile. With Brazilian withdrawal 
from the League of Nations, Brazil and Argentina alone were 
in contention for leadership in the Americas, while Chilean 
efforts were directed to leadership of the Latin American con-
tingent which remained in the League of Nations. 7 At the 
4Le6n Fern&ndez Guardia, Historia de Costa Rica, II: 
114-115. 
5Ricardo Fern&ndez Guardia, Cartilla Hist6rica, p. 130. 
6Blutstein, Handbook for Costa Rica, P• 2S. 
7Norman A. Bailey, Latin America in 
(New York: Walker and Company, 1967 • pp. 
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same time, Brazil's close association with the policies of 
Woodrow Wilson in the early days of the League diminished 
the effectiveness of its resignation as evidence of its in-
dependence. This left AJ:lgentina in an extremely favorable 
position with regard to leadership among the Latin American 
states in American affairs. It is interesting to note that 
in 1921 9 Costa Rica maintained friendly relations with Ar-
gentina in spite of the isolationist tendencies of AJ:lgentine 
President Irigoyen. 8 During the same time period, relations 
with Chile were decidedly cool. 9 However, in all fairness 
it should be reported that this unfriendliness was due to an 
alleged insult to President Acosta by the Chilean Minister 
at a state dinner, which had long lingering oonsequenaes. 10 
Relations with the other major South American states 
were, for the most part, strictly pro forma. At various times 
and for various reasons, animosity to these nations surfaced 
in the Costa Rican press. However, these occasions were pri-
marily relegated to cases like that of Peru. In that instance, 
there was a strong suspicion that Peru had given material and 
moral assistance to Panama in its boundary dispute with Costa 
Bu.s. Charg' Walter c. Thurston at San Jos~ to the 
Secretary of State, No. 216, 1~ October 1921, 718.00/1 1 MC 
671. 
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Rica. 11 
As the 1920 1 s pl"Og%'essed, so too·did the nature of 
Costa Rica's relations with the South American states. Some 
of that pl"Ogress could be attributed to the growth of His-
-
panismo in Costa Rica, which emphasized the racial links 
eY..isting C!IJJM:>ng all Latin American people and including Spain. 12 
Hispanismo13 also made Costa Rica particularly susceptible to 
the "propaganda" efforts of other nations and to attempts at 
Latin American unity and the diminution of United States influ-
ence there. 14 There were exchange scholarships arranged so 
that Costa Rican students could attend the national sahools 
in South American nations such as Chile, which overlooked 
the earlier coolness between the two nations. 15 The long 
range goal was the establishment of a Pan American Institute 
for the education of promising young Latin Americans fl"Om all 
11Ibid. 
12Diario de Costa Rica (San Josg), 6 October 1927, 
cited in u.s. Consul R. M. de Lambert at San Joa' to the Sec-
retary of State, No. 1052G, 7 October 1927, Report on Gene-
ral Conditions Prevailing in Costa Rica, 23 Septem.ber-7 Octo-
ber 1927 1 818.00/1179, MC 669. 
13For a complete discussion of the phenomenon of 
Hispanismo see: Frederick B. Pike, Hispgnismo, 1898-1936 
(Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1971}. 
14u.s. Charg~ Roy T. Davis at San JosA to the Secre-
tary of State, 24 December 1926 1 MC 669. 
15u.s. Charg& Roy T. Davis at San Jos~ to the Secre-
tary of State, No. 1364 1 30 October 1928, 818.4725/1 1 MC 669. 
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nations. 16 The earlier difficulties which had clouded Cos-
ta Rican-Peruvian relations were apparently resolved during 
the 1920 1 s as evidenced by the lengthy tribute given Peru in 
the address of the Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Costa 
Rican Congress with regard to Costa Rica's contribution to 
the centennial celebration of the Battle of Ayacuoho. 17 In 
general• on the level of bilateral relations with South Ameri-
ca in the 1920 's, Costa Rica was seeking an inc?'eased harmony 
and good wili.18 The?'e is no indication that the?'e was any 
oonce?''ted effort to support the dominance of any one of these 
nations in Latin AmeI'ican affairs. Fol' the most paI't, Cos-
ta Rica seems to have joined in the overall Latin Ame?'ioan ef-
fort to withstand United States domination of the Americas, 
as will be discussed below. 
In the realm of bilateral ?'elations with Central Ameri-
can states, there was also some important p?'Ogress in the 
cou?'se of the 1920's. A major concern in this a?'ea which 
has already been discussed at some length was the boundary 
dispute between Panama and Costa Rica. In 1921, the dispute 
was still unsettled and was approaching the state of armed 
16u.s. Charg' Leo R. Sack at San Jos' to the Secre-
tary of State, No. 599, 1 February 1929, 818.4275/2• MC 669. 
17Memorias, 1924, P• vi. 
18Memorias, .!ll.!• P• xii. 
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conflict between the two nations. 19 Since at that time both 
nations were members of the League of Nations. it was sug-
gested by the British government that they take the matter 
to the League for arbitration.~ 0 In the view of Costa Rica, 
the mediation of the United States was sufficient to handle 
the dispute in keeping with any agreements requiring arbitra-
tion. 21 In fact, the Costa Rican Congress passed a resolu-
tion expressing the gratitude of the nation to the United 
States and commending that nation for its position in the 
matter as a reflection of a new and positive policy toward 
Latin America. 22 However, Panama's view of United States me-
diation was not as positive. Panama obviously felt that jus-
tice was on its side and that the United States should be 
there as well. As a consequence, the Panamanian government 
sent letters and news stories in support of its position to 
major United States news services and publications as well 
as to the London Times. 23 This was to no avail as troops 
from Panama and Costa Rica clashed in the disputed area. The 
19Robert Lansing and Lester H. Woolsey to the Secre-
tary of State, 3 March 1921, 718.1915/360, MC S71. 
20u.s. Charg' Walter c. Thurston at San Joa' to the 
Secretary of State, 28 February 1921, 718.1915/299, MC 671. 
21controversia Entre PanamS. y Costa Rica, II:239. 
22u.s. Cha~g' Walter c. Thurston at San Jos' to the 
Secretary of State, No. 59, 23 March 1921, 718.1915/382, MC 
671. 
23 eontroversia Entre Panam! y Costa Rica, !I:171. 
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United States immediately sent word to the Panamanian govern-
ment that such hostilities should cease at once, since war 
would be an inadmissable threat to the defense of the Panama 
24 Canal. At the same time, a ~uch milder warning went to the 
Costa Rican government, stressing the fact that force was not 
justifiable in this instance and indicating that such action 
caused the United States "gravest concern."25 
The refusal of Costa Rica to take the matter before the 
League of Nations may have been reinforced or perhaps even 
prompted by the attitude of the United States. The United 
States Secretary of State indicated to the Charge in San Jo-
a& that it was the desire of the United States to have the 
boundary dispute finally settled in accordance with the de-
cisi-0n of Chief Justice White. 26 Thus, if this was communi-
cated in any way to the Costa Rican government, it would be 
supported in its attitude that mediation other than that al-
ready offered by the United States was unnecessary. It be-
came clear to observers that the boundary conflict was not 
one which would be settled easily or promptly. As a conse-
24The Secretary of State to the U.S. Minister in Pana-
ma (Price), 3 March 1921, 718.1915/293, United States, Depart-
ment of State, Pa ers Relatin to the Fond · Relations of the 
United States, ngton, •• : Government 
Printing Office";"""'i936), 
25The Secretary of State to the U.S. Charg& in Costa 
Rica (Thurston), 5 March 1921, 718.1915/325a, Papers Relating 
to Foreign Relations, l!!,11 Ia181. 
26Ibid., I:182. 
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quence, it was viewed as inevitable that Costa Rican-Panama-
nian relations would remain unfriendly. 27 The possibility 
that the United States involvement in the issue was prolong-
ing the intransigence of either or both parrties was not as-
sessed at this time, although it would be a consideration in 
later years. In the interim, Costa Rica, supported by the 
United States, would be as conciliatory and amicable toward 
Panama as was possible under the circumstances throughout the 
1920's. 28 
There was an additional aspect to the boundary question 
which would fit into other major developments in Latin Ameri-
can relations during the 1920's. The involvement of the Unit-
ed States in the controversy has been outlined briefly above. 
However, there was a ramification of that involvement which 
had considerable relations to the development of a Latin Ameri-
can movement in the 1920's and 1930's to lessen the importance 
of the United States in Pan American affairs. It was report-
ed that the representatives of Argentina, Chile, and Mexico 
were supposedly spreading the word in Costa Rica that the Unit-
ed States, in spite of its apparent favoritism for Costa Rica's 
27u.s. Charg~ Walter c. Thurston at San Jos' to the Sec-
retary of State, No. 216, 14 October 1921t 718.00/1, MC 671. 
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cause, could have solved the border dispute quite easily by 
controlling Panama as it had the power to do and by ordering 
the acceptance of the White award. 29 But such speculation 
did little to bring about the settlement of the original dis-
pute and probably led to even more difficulties in the achieve-
ment of a final resolution. 
In the realm of Central American bilateral relations, 
Costa Rica took on another cause cglebre in this period. For 
obvious reasons, the criteria for extending diplomatic recog-
nition to new governments would be an extremely sensitive is-
sue with Costa Rican politicians. AB was indicated earlier, 
President Julio Acosta (1920-192~) was repeatedly accused of 
appeasement of the United States and part of the ammunition 
for those accusations lay in his acceptance of the 1923 Wash-
ington treaty which reaffirmed the Tobar Doctrine of nonrecog-
nition of revolutionary regimes. 30 A test case of the doc-
trine came in 1931 when General Hern&ndez Mart!nez seized the 
presidency by revolutionary coup in El Salvador. He denounced 
the 1923 treaty and proceeded to establish a stable and well-
aocepted government. 31 Costa Rica and El Salvador had had es-
pecially cordial relations, since they were l:zrought together 
by their common grievances against the Bryan-Chamorro Treaty 
29u.s. Charg~ Walter c. Thurston at San Jos' to the 
Secretary of State, 28 February 1921, 718.00/299, MC 671. 
3
°Karnes, Failure of Union, p. 228. 
31Neumann, Recognition, P• 24. 
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between the United States and Nicaragua. 32 This cordiality, 
combined with Costa Rican antagonism to the nonrecognition 
Doctrine of the 1923 treaty, led to the declaration early in 
1933 that, effective January 1, 1934, Costa Rica would join 
El Salvador in renouncing their adherence to the Treaty. 33 
Thus, Costa Rica and El Salvador stood together against the 
policies of the other Central American states, as well as the 
United States,which had also ratified the treaty. 
There was considerable discussion as to how these na-
tions should proceed. A plan was devised by the United States 
State Department whereby the three Central American states 
could announce that although they had decided to recognize the 
Mart!nez regime, they still viewed the treaty as binding 
among themselves. 34 The United States would thus also be 
free to I'9cognize the Mart!nez regime without impairing the 
cordiality of its Central American relaitons while at the 
same time not backing down on its treaty obligations. 35 Up-
on evidence that the Mart!nez regime was stable and popularly 
32u.s. Charg' Walter c. Thurston at San Joa~ to the 
Secretary of State, No. 216, 14 October 1921, 718.00/1, MC 671. 
33Karnes, Failure of Union, p. 228. 
34Acting Secretary of State Philips to the Secretary of 
State, 3 January 1934, 816.01/344a, United States, Department 
of State, Forei n Relations of the United States Di lomatio 
P~~~s, ~ o s., as 1ngton, D •• : Government rinting 
Of ice, 1951), V:216-217. 
35Ibid. 
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supported, President Roosevelt agreed to the plan. 86 Presi-
dent Sacasa of Nicaragua drafted an agreement for the Central 
American states embodying this plan and added the recommenda-
tion that Costa Rica's approval be sought befora the agree-
37 
ment was concluded as a matter of courtesy. Costa Rica's 
President Jim~nez and Foreign Minister Pacheco were notified 
of the plan and expressed great pleasure that their lead was 
being followed. 38 When recognition was extended to the Mar-
tinez government on January 26 1 1934, Foreign Minister Pa-
checo made a statement in which he claimed a vindication of 
the Costa Rican policy. 39 While the Treaty was technically 
in force between the United States, Nicaragua, Guatemala and 
Honduras, the principle of nonrecognition embodied in the To-
bar Doctrine was in reality finished in Central American af-
fairs. 40 It may be that the success of the bilateral action 
of Costa Rica and El Salvador should be correctly attributed 
to the response of the United States to their challenge of the 
36Assistant Secretary of State Sumner Welles to Presi-
dent Roosevelt, 8 January 1934, 816.0!/348 (notations of Pres-
ident on a photostatic copy indicate his approval, the copy 
is numbered 816.01/350), Papers Relating to Foreign Relations, 
1934, V:218-219 • 
............... 
37u.s. Minister in Nicaragua (Lane) to the Secretary 
of State, 11 January 1934, 816.01/355, ibid., V:224. 
38u.s. Minister Leo R. Sack at San Jos' to the Secre-
tary of State, 15 January 1934, 816.01/363• ibid., V:230-231. 
39u.s. Minister Leo R. Sack _.t San Jos& to the Secre-
tary of State, 26 January 1934• 816.01/410, ibid., Va256. 
40 Neumann, Recognition, p. 24. 
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1923 Treaty and specifically to the Tobar Doctrine. However, 
it took substantial courage and independence of thought and 
action for these two states to stand up to the potential 
threat of the "Colossus of the North." 
Another nation which is also credited with challeng-
ing the United States during the 1920's and 1930 1 s was Mexico. 
In view of this, it is inter-esting to look at Mexican-Costa 
Rican relations during this period, cclored as they were by 
the relationship of the United States to each nation. As no-
ted previously, Costa Rica maintained diplomatic relations 
with Mexico throughout its controversial revolutionary period. 
In the early 1920 1 s there were some reports of the propaganda 
efforts of Mexico in Costa Rica. One United States Charg~ in 
Costa Rica, Waltar c. Thurston, noted that "as by virtually 
every Latin American republic, Mexico is regarded by Costa 
Rica as the 'advance fort or bulwark standing between Spanish 
American culture and race and the imperialistic Colossus of 
the North. '"41 Thurston went on to observe that Mexico took 
full advantage of the situation by maintaining amicable rela-
tionships whenever possible. 42 
By the mid-1920•s Mexican propaganda efforts in Central 
America had become more sophisticated. In 1925, th~ Mexican 
ministers throughout Central America approached the govern-
41u.s. Chargg Walter c. Thurston at San Josg to the 
Secretary of State, No. 216, 14 October 1921, 718.00/1, MC 671. 
42Ibid. 
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ments to ~horn they were accredited with offers of broad 
43 loans. There is little doubt that Mexican policy was ef-
fective in Costa Rica in view of the attack by La Prensa of 
San Jose on the United States for its policies toward Mexi-
can President Plutarco El!as Calles. 44 However, this was not 
to continue indefinitely or without interruption. In the year 
following the loan proposals, the potential for Mexican inter-
vention in the internal affairs of Nicaragua aroee and there 
was an almost immediate Costa Rican reaction to that threat. 45 
Prior to the realization that Mexico posed a threat to Costa 
Rica, the government had tolerated Mexican domination of the 
S J , 46 h. 1 an ose press. But t is would subsequent y change. 
This brief disenchantment with Mexico's motives was 
ended within a short time as the unity of American states in 
general was strengthened. The Costa Rican: nation seemed to 
accept its racial link with Spain and to find the American 
43u.s. Charg~ Roy T. Davis at San Jos~ to the Secretary 
of State, 29 October 1925, 818.51/316, MC 669. 
44u.s. Charg~ Roy T. Davis at San Jos~ to the Secretary 
of State, No. 616G, 3 July 1925, Report of General Conditions 
Prevailing in Costa Rica, 20 June-3 July 1925, 818.00/1122, 
MC 669. 
45u.s. Charg~ Roy T. Davis at San Jos~ to the Secretary 
of State, No. 820G, 15 October 1926, Report on General Condi-
tions Prevailing in Costa Rica, 25 September-15 October 1926• 
818.00/1152, MC 669. 
46 Bryce Wood, The Making of the Good Neighbor Policx 
(New York: w. w. Norton g Company, 1§s7), p. 15. 
counterpart to Spain in Mexico, the "Aztec nation." 47 As 
was the case earlier in the 1920's, Mexico followed up on 
the fellow feeling by giving Costa Rica and other Central 
American states presents of airplanes. 48 The waxing and 
waning of Mexican influence in Costa Rica was without any 
real pattern in the 1920's. Later, as will be discussed 
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below, there would be some correlation between Costa Rican-
Mexican relations and the course of Pan American affairs. 
As opposed to Mexican relations, Costa Rica's rela-
tionship with Nicaragua never had any periods of positive 
accomplishment. Part of the problem related to the diffi-
culties between the two nations which arose because of the 
Bryan-Chamorro Treaty. When Nicaragua experiences internal 
political problems early in the 1920's which brought about 
the intervention of the United States, Costa Rica was found 
to be in the position of allegedly supporting Nicaraguan revo-
lutionaries. The Costa Rican government. in fact. informed 
the President of Nicaragua that a rebel band was in Costa Rica 
47La Prensa (San Jos~), 22 September 1927 and El Diaric 
de Costa Rica (~an Jos~), 6 October 1927, cited in U.S. Consul 
it M. de Lambert at San Jos~ to the Secretary of State• No. 
1052G, 7 October 1927, Report on General Conditions Prevail-
ing in Costa Rica, 23 September-7 October 1927, 818.00/1179 1 
MC 669. 
48 , , U.S. Charge R. M. de Lambert at San Jose to the Sec-
retary of State, No. 1341, 3 October 1928, 818.248/1, MC 669; 
U.S. Charg~ Roy T. Davis at San Jos~ to the Secretary of State, 
No. 1615, 8 August 1929, 818.248/5, MC 669. 
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preparing to CX'OSS the border into Nicaragua.~9 Somehow 
it is difficult to overlook the parallel between this situ-
ation and the one of previous years surrounding the rebel 
bands originating in Nicaragua which were responsible for 
the overthrow of the Tinoco government. Perhaps this is 
where the explanation for Costa Rican hostility lies. How-
ever, the United States took the unusual position that pre-
cisely for that reason Costa Rica should feel gratitude to 
the Nicaraguan nation and that relations between the two 
states should therefore be cordia1. 50 But such an attitude 
overlooked the animosity felt by those Costa Ricans who had 
supported Tinoco, the lingering resentment surrounding the 
Bryan-Chamorro Treaty, and the hostility occasioned by the 
presence of United States Marines in Nicaragua. 
The United States took some steps to remedy these lat-
ter problems. Early in 1923, the United States and Costa Ri-
ca finally signed an agreement by which Costa Rica would be 
consulted in the event of a decision to construct a Nicara-
guan canal so that Costa Rica's interests could receive equi-
table consideration.51 Another event which had an extremely 
49u.s. Minister Jefferson in Nicaragua to the Secre-' 
tary of State, 22 August 1921, 715.1715/206 9 Papers Relating 
to Foreign Relations. ~, II:554. 
50u.s. Charg~ Walter c. Thurston at San Jos' to the 
Secretary of State, No. 216, 14 October 1921, 718.00/1, MC 671. 
51Pan American Union, Bulletin LVII (April, 1923), p. 
404. 
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positive effect on United States-Costa Rican relations re-
garding Nicar·aguan issues occurred in 1925. At that time, 
the United States withdrew its marines from Managua in spite 
of the request of some members of the Nicaraguan government 
that they be allo1>1ed to remain. 52 On the .other side of the 
spectrum, this event did nothing to facilitate Costa. Rican-
Nicaraguan amicability. In fact, the United States was vin-
dicated in the Costa Rican press for its intervention in 
Nicaragua on the grounds that individuals who would request 
continu.ed military intervention were not worth)' of indepen-
dent self-government. 53 
Once again in 1927• Costa Rica came under suspjcion 
for harboring within its borders rebel groups which were 
54 
opposed to the current Nicaraguan government. It is entire-
ly possible that this allegation. if true. reflected the popu-
lar opinion that any canal project undertaken by Nicaragua in 
conjunction with the United States would be disastrous to 
52u.s. Charg~ Roy T. Davis at San Jos~ to the Secre-
tary of State, No. 630G, 5 August 1925, Report on General Con-
ditions Prevailing in Costa Rica, 19 July-30 July 1925, 818. 
00/1124, MC 669. 
53
u.s. Charge Roy T. Davis at San Jos~ to the Secre-
tary of State, No. 641G, 4 September 1925, Report on General 
Conditions Prevailing in Costa Rica, 16 August-4 September 
1925, 818.00/1126, MC 669. 
54u.s. Minister Charles c. Eberhardt in Nicaragua to 
the Secretary of State, No. 27, 31 January 1927, 817.00/1505, 
United States~ Department of State, Papers Relating to the For-
eign Relations of the United States, 1927 (3 Vols., Washington, 
D.C.: GOvernment Printing Office, 194"2'5"'; III:306. 
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Costa R.ican sovereignty. Therefore, aiding the disruption of 
internal order in Nicaragua would delay the construction of 
the canal and prevent the realization of the threat. If such 
a canal were constructed, it would be linked by numerous high-
ways and railways which would virtually cut Costa Rica into 
several long, narrow pieces running north and south between 
Panama and Nicaragua. 55 Feeling threatened by Nicaragua's 
relationship with the United States, Costa Rican policy in 
the 1930's would tend toward establishing close ties with 
other Central American states, such as with El Salvador in 
the matter of the denunciation of the 1923 Washington Treaty. 
Further, an effort was made to improve relations with Guate-
mala whica had taken Costa Rica's part in the boundary dis-
. 56 pute with Panama. 
The thread of United States relations with Costa Rica 
runs through all of Costa Rica's bilateral reations with oth-
er Latin American states in the 1920's. As was indicated 
earlier, the United States was viewed with I!l.ixed emotions by 
most Costa Ricans, depending upon the attitude held with re-
gard to the nonrecognition of the Tinoco regime, its fall, and 
55La Nuev~ Prensa (San Jos~), 17 November 1927, cited 
in U.S. Charg~ R. M. de Lambert at San Jos~ to the Secretary 
of State, No. 1042G, 2 December 1927, Report on General Condi-
tions Prevailing in Costa Rica, 18 November-2 December 1927, 
818.00/11e3, MC 669. 
56u.s. Charg~ Walter c. Thurstcn at San Jos~ to the 
Secretary of State, No. 216, 14 October 1921 1 718.00/1, MC 671. 
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the original exclusion of Costa Rica from the League of Na-
tions. In general, at the beginning of the decade, Costa 
Rica was wary of the united States and its motives in Central 
American affairs. This did not prevent the conduct of day-
to-day business, such as the conclusion of a treaty of extra-
dition with the United States in 1922 57 or a treaty regula-
ting the travel and business of salesmen between the two 
countries. 58 Primarily due to the ability of both nations to 
conduct "business as usual" in spite of potential problems. 
it was possible in 1925 to characterize their relations as 
"amicable. n 59 Adding to that amicability was the agreement 
concluded in 1926 with the United Fruit Company providing for 
a loan of $500,000 to the nation. 60 
57Negotiations and Text of a Treaty of Extradition be-
tween the United States and Costa Rica, 10 November 1922, Unit-
ed States, Department of State, Pa~ers Relating to the Foreign 
Relations of the United States, 19 2 (2 Vols., Washington, D.C.a 
Government Printing Office, 1938r;-I':980-993; Pan American 
Union Bulletin LIV (June, 1922), p. 625. 
58Repablica de Costa Rica, Colleci6n de Tratados [Que] 
Contiene Solamente Los Tratados Vi entes en la Pecha del 31 e 
diciembre de 1926 Ed1c1 n Ordenada por la Secretar a de Rela-
ciones Exteriores, San Jose: Imprenta Librer1a y Encuaderna-
ci6n Alsina, 1927), p. 333, 718.00/4, MC 671; Hemorias, 1924, 
p. vi. ----
59 u.5. Charg~ Roy T. Davis at San Jose to the Secre·· 
tary of State, No. 604G, 5 June 1926, Report on General Condi-
tions Prevailing in Costa Rica, 23 May-5 June 1925, 818.00/ 
1119, MC 669. 
60u.s. Charg~ Roy T. Davis at San Joa~ to the Secre-
tary of State, No. 649G, 18 September 1925, Report on General 
Conditions Prevailing in Costa Rica, 5 September-18 September 
1925, 818.00/1127, MC 669; u.s. Charge Roy T. Ddvis at San Jos' 
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The improvement in United States-Costa Ric~n relations 
was also noted in the Costa Rican press. The dontlnation of 
San Jose newspapers by Mexico was changed so that by late 
1S25, one major daily news publication was owned by the As-
sociated Press and others featured many despatches from Unit-
ed States papers. 61 Even stories of local origin reportedly 
" 1 · d" U •t d ct t 1·n'"'t1.tut1·ons and i·deals. 62 eu og1ze ni e 0 a es u Some-
how it is difficult to credit this change of press attitude 
to a sincere change of opinion about the United States, but 
the United States Chargg, Roy T. Davis, did so, explaining 
that Mexican influence had waned and that there was a "higher 
1 f · 1 . n63 c ass o JOurna 1sts. However, it should be noted that the 
threat of Mexican domination in Nicaraguan affairs may have 
led to a swing of opinion favorable to the United States as a 
viable means of preventing the extension of Mexican domina-
tion to Costa Rica. 
So strong was this swing of opinion that in a Presi-
to the Secretary of State, No. 655G, 2 October 1925, Report on 
General Conditions Prevailing in Costa Rica, 19 September-2 
October 1925, 818.00/1129, MC 669. 
61u.s. Charg~ Roy T. Davis at San Jose to the Sec1'e-
tary of Stat~, No. 695G, 25 December 1925, Report on General 
Conditions Prevailing in Costa Rica, 11 December-25 December 
1925, 818.00/1134, MC 669. 
62 Ibid. 
63u.s. Charg~ Roy T. Davis at San Jose to the Secre-
tary of State, No. 744G, 16 April 1926~ Report on General Con-
ditions Prevailing in Costa Rica, 13 March-16 April 1926, 
818.00/1139, MC 669. 
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dential election campaign, the opponents of Ricardo Jim~nez 
found his alleged anti-Americanism to be ammunition to use 
against him. 64 However, as time passed, Jim~nez's position 
was accepted as a realistic one. In leading the nation to 
its withdrawal from the League of Nations, he was credited 
with understanding that while the League could be a moral 
force in protecting Costa Rican sovereignty, it could simply 
not challenge the real power of the United States in Ameri-
can affairs. 65 
To the detriment of the United States, the favorable 
attitude of the Costa Rican press would suffer as a result of 
United States intervention in Nicaragua during 1926 and 1927. 66 
Once again, the Costa Rican press took up th~ theme of United 
States imperialism and the threat of United States military 
power. 67 However, there was some modification of the view as 
can be seen in the following extract from a prominent San Jos' 
64u.s. Charge Roy T. Davis at San Jos~ to the Secre-
tary of State, 8 January 1926, Report on General Conditions 
Prevailing in Costa Rica, 26 December-8 January 1926, 818.00/ 
1129, MC 669. 
65El Diario de Costa Rica (San Jose), March, 1926, in 
u.s. Charge Roy T. Davis at San Jose to the Secretary of State, 
No. 744G, 16 April 1926, Report on.General Conditions Prevail-
ing in Costa Rica, 13 March-16 April 1926, 818.00/1149, MC 669. 
66Howland, American Relations, p. 228. 
67
u.s. Charge ad interim Waldemar J. Ga.llman at San 
Jos' to the Secretary of State, No. 765G, 28 May 1926, Report 
on General Conditions Prevailing in Costa Ried, 14 May-28 May 
1926, 818.00/1142 1 MC 669. 
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daily newspaper: 
The danger of Yank~e imperialism, as we have stated so 
many times, is not caused by the activities of the Secre-
tary of State at Washington, but by the maneuvers of the 
arde.nt friends which the Yankee Government has in these 
republics. Almost on every occasion intervention has 
been solicited by Rome degenerate dependent upon the sup-
port of traitors who are always to be found. 68 
The reaction of the United States representative in 
Costa Rica was that Mexican influence was once again rearing 
its head as evidenced by a belittlement of Charl~s Lindbergh's 
accomplishment in comparison with a proposed flight by a Mexi-
can aviator to Argentina. 69 
• 
Another factor which may have contributed to the wave 
of anti-American sentiment in Costa Rica during 1927 was the 
general public belief in the innocence of Sacco and Vanzetti. 
There were widespread public demonstrations and the threat of 
a general strike in support of their case. 70 However, the 
68 RepP.rtorio de Americano (San Jos~), 19 November 1927, 
Translation in U.S. Chargi R. M. de Lambert at San Jose to 
the Secretary of State, No. 1092G, 2 December 1927, Report on 
General Conditions Prevailing in Costa Rica, 18 November-2 
December :J.927, 818.00/1183, l1C 669. 
69niario de Costa Rica (San Jos~), in U.S. Charg~ Roy 
T. Davis at San Jos€ to the Secretary of State, No. 983G, 24 
June 1927, Report on General Conditions Prevci.iling in Costa 
Rica, 10 June-24 June 1927, 818.00/1169, MC 669. 
70u.s. Charge Roy T. Davis at San Jos~ to the Secre-
tary of State, No. 983G, 24 June 1927, Report on General Condi-
tions Prevailing in Costa Rica, 10 June-24 June 1927, 818.00/ 
1169, HC 669; U.S. Charg~ Roy T. Davis at San Jos~ to the Sec-
retary of State, No. 1013G, 12 August 1927, Report on General 
Conditions Pr3vailing in Costa Rica, 21 July-12 August 1927, 
818.00/1174, MC 669. 
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movement died down rather quickly and was even of some even-
tual benefit to the United States because of the reports that 
the United S"tates Senate was determined to ignore foreign 
demonstrations, which gave evidence that the United States 
might be undergoing a turn toward isolationis:r.i1 Hhich could 
71 
mean that its imperialistic designs might be waning. Con-
tinued evidence of this was provided to some Costa Ricans 
by the visit of President-elect Herbert Hoover to Costa Rica 
in December, 1928, ~he first such visit by a United States 
President or Presideil't-elect. Many Costa Ricans apparently 
were ready to accept the messages of friendship and coopera-
tion offered by Hoover and they looked foI'W'ard to amicable 
relations with the United States during his Presidency. 72 
It can be aeen from the foregoing that it is difficult 
to isolate bilateral relations conducted by Costa Rica from 
its multilateral relationships. For example, as was indicated, 
the on-again, off-again amicability with Mexico seemed to be 
directly related to the status of United States-Costa Rican 
relations. In at least one instance, the Central American con-
cern with the potential threat of Mexican domination of Nica-
71u.s. Charg~ Roy T. Davis at San Jose to the Secre-
tary of State, No. 103DG, 2 September 1927, Re:?Ort on General 
Conditiona Prevailing in Costa Rica, 13 August-2 September 
1927, 818.00/1177, MC 669. 
72u.s. Charg~ Roy T. Davis at San Jose to the Secre-
tary of State, 4 January 1929, Repo»t on General Conditions 
Prevailing in Costa Rica, 17 November-31 December 1928, 
818.00GC/7, MC 669. 
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ragua led to improved United States-Costa Rican relations. 
It would then seem to follow that Costa. Rica •>Jould be in-
clined to participate in multilateral groups such as the 
Pan American Union or a Central American Union if one exis-
ted. Thus, in 1921 when a proposal was forwarded for still 
another attempt at Central Amerioan confederation, Costa Ri-
ca was willing to participate in it as it had ~een to parti-
cipate in such efforts in previous years. 
The attempted Central American Union of 1921 was sup-
posedly part of the celebration of the first centennial of 
independence. 73 A conference was convened, chaired by a 
Costa Rican, Alvarado Quiros, in which the details of the 
confederation would be worked out. 74 As had been the case 
in previous efforts, it soon became apparent that the divi-
sions among the five Central American states were far greater 
than any of the unifying influences which had prompted the 
conference. 75 A federal constitution was to be prepared by 
which each nation maintained its autonomy in internal affairs, 
provided actions of this type were not contrary to the broad 
l f h . . 76 r,1 es o t e consti tut1on. But the constitution was not to 
be drafted until the pact of union had been ratified and a 
73Le6n Fern~ndez Guardia, Historia de Costa Rica, II:109. 
74 Karnes, Failure of Union, p. 215. 
75Le6n Fern!ndez Guardia, Historia de Costa Rica, II:109. 
76Karnes, Failure of Union, p. 213. 
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. 1 . 77 nationa cons ti tnent assembly convened. The fi'.1'.'st real 
indication that there would be problems in meetint:: these pre-
liminary steps came when Pr~sident Qui1,6s was not present for 
tl1e official signing of the pact of union. 78 Although the 
official cereraony was delayed four days to await his return 
to the conference, 79 his absence, along with the reaction of 
the Costa Rican pr·ess to the prcposed union, did not bode well 
for its success, at least in Costa Rica. 8° Further, evidence 
of the potential failure lay in the fact that Nicaraeua with-
drew from the conference when it became obviol'.s that the other 
participants intended to bring the Bryan-Chamorro Treaty under 
discussion. 81 Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras and El Salva-
dor, nonetheless, signed the pact of union on January 16, 
1921. 82 
Once again, there is a suspicion that Costa Rica did 
not take the success of the union too seriously. Octav:i.o 
Beeche, the Costa Rican Minister in Washington, D. c., pre-
77rbid. 
78Ibid., p. 215. 
79Ibid. 
80El Diario (San Jose), 14 January 1921, cited in 
Karnes, Failure of Union, p. 215. 
81u.s. Charge Walter c. Thurston at San Jose to the Sec-
retary of State, No. 4, 22 January 1921, 818.00/1021, MC 669. 
82u.s. Charge Walter c. Thurston at San Jose to the Sec-
retary of State, 19 January 1921, 813.00/1047, Papers Relating 
to Foreign Relations, .!2.Z.!• I:9. 
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sented a copy of the pact of union to the Secretary of St~te, 
remarking that it was "barely a project" and "has not yet 
been approved by the Congresses in the respective countries." 83 
Ratifications of the pact were achieved in fairly short or-
der in the Congresses of Honduras, 84 El S.::i.lvador, 85 and 
Guatemala. 86 Since these three ratifications rendered the 
pact effective, 87 it was sent to the League of Nations for 
registration. 88 The Costa Rican Congress, meanwhile, re-
jected a majority report which recommended ratification and 
voted to postpone action on the union until its next session. 89 
It soon became apparent that Costa Rica was not going 
to ratify the pact. Although the pact was "viewed very favor-
ably," there was talk of close relations with the federation 
83The Costa Rican Minister in Washington (Octavio 
Beeche) to the Secretary of State, 1 February 1921, 813.00/ 
1050, ibid., I:145. 
84
u.s. Charg~ Spencer in Honduras to the Secretary of 
State, No. 70, 15 February 1921, ibid., I:153. 
85u.s. Minister Jay in El Salvador to the Secretary of 
State, 23 February 1921, 813.00/1057, ibid.~ I:154. 
86 Guatemalan Minister in Washington (Bianchi) to the 
S~cretary of State, 8 April 1921, 813.00/1069, ibid., 1:154. 
87Alberto Uclea, Honduran M~nister of Foreign Affairs, 
to the Secri==tary of State, 15 June 1921, 813.00/1088, ibid., 
I:155. 
88u.s. Charg~ Frank Arnold in El Salvador to the Sec-
retary of State, 3 June 1921, 816.00/326, ibid., I:154-155. 
89u.s. Charge Walter c. Thurston at San Jose to the 
Secretary of State, 22 June 1921, 813.00/1079, ibid., 1:156. 
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rather than membership in it. 90 Thus, this union, like 
others which preceded it, failed because the five Central 
American nations could not ratify a pact of confederation. 
The major analyst of these attem.pts at confederation in Cen-
tral America notes that while there are specific reasons 
which can be attributed to each individual failure, one of 
the three overall causes was the isolationist behavior of 
Costa Rica when it came to making the final com:mittment to 
union. 91 Thomas Karnes goes on to explain that the primary 
consideration for Costa Rica was economics. That is to say, 
there simply were no profitable markets for its products in 
Central America. 92 Further, on a less specific level, there 
was the Costa Rican concern that its political stability and 
high level of culture might be impaired thrcugh association 
. h . l ul 1 1 . hb 93 wit its ess stable, less c tura ly deve oped neig ors. 
In the specific instance of the 1921 Confederation, 
however, Costa Rica's stated motives were somewhat different 
from the foregoing. In keeping with the problems it per-
ceived because of United States domination in Nicaragua and 
throughout Central America, Costa Rica claimed that a political 
9'0u.s. Charge Walter c. Thurston at San Jose to the 
Secretary of State, No. 216, 14 October 1921, 718.00/1, MC 671. 
91Karnes, Failure of Union, pp. 248-249. 
92 Ibid. 
93 Ibid., p. 249. 
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confederation was impossible and only a spiritual union was 
.. l 94 feas1D e. This explanation, in the opinion 0f this author, 
is perhaps far more to the overall point than any specific 
arguments which might be cited. Costa Rica was well aware, 
with the Tinoco problem still fresh in nenory, of the in flu-
ence that the United States wielded over the livGs of the 
Central American republics. Confederation, er any other 
project designed to strengthen Central l\r:lerica, could suc-
ceed only with the approval of the United States, making the 
accomplishment of union less important than it was designed 
to be. Therefore, Costa Rica chose in this instance to re-
tain its freedom of action, much as Nicaragua did, by refusing 
to join the union. While there had been no indications that 
the United States disapproved this union, it should be clear 
from the foregoing that Costa Rican self interest, both in 
Central America and elsewhere in the world, could be best 
served by other means. 
One way in which Costa Rica obviously sought to serve 
its best interests was its revival of the idea of an Inter-
American Court of Justice. It should be remembered that Cos-
ta Rica had been an enthusiastic supporter of the Central 
American Court until its demise was brought about the the re-
jection of its decision on the Bryan-Chamorro Treaty by the 
United States and Nicaragua. The Costa Rican Congress passed 
9 4 Ibid. , p. 21 7 • 
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a resolution to propose the institution cf an inter-American 
body in conunemoration of the 100th anniversa'.l".'y (1826) of the 
First Congress of American Nations and in honor of Simon 
95 Bol!var. At the same time, there was discussion of an 
AMerican Lear;ue of Nations ·which could hcmdle strictly Ameri-
can problems most effectively because of the distinctive re-
lationships which existed among nations of such similar ori-
gin. 96 As will be demonstrated, the latter iden. was one which 
was quite popular with the smaller Latin American states during 
the late 1920's and early 1930's. However, in view of Costa 
Rica's rejection of the Central American union in 1921, it is 
interesting to note its advocacy of this cause. It is entirely 
feasible that the Costa Rican proposals, as well as others of 
similar nature, resulted from the failure of the League of 
Nations to accept any role in the mediation of the Tacna-Ari-
ca dispute. 97 However, in this matter as in others, the 
League deferred to the United States and the inter-American 
Conference system for a solution. 98 
95u.s. Charg~ ad interim Waldemar J. qallman at San 
1Tose to the Secretary of State, No. 773G, 2 July 1926, Report 
on General Conditions Prevailine in Costa Rica, 11 June-2 July 
1926, 818.00/1144, MC 669. 
96 Ibid. 
97 Ibid.; J. Lloyd Mecham, The United States and Inter-
American Securitv, 1889-1960 <AuRtin: University o~ Texas 
Press, 1967), pp. 93-94. 
98 Bailey, Latin America in World Politics, p. 149. 
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This brings the discussion to a consideration of Cos-
ta Rican participation, or lack thereof, :i_n the inter-Ameri-
can Conferences of the 19 20 's. The first of these was held 
in Santiago, Chile in 1923. This conference had initially 
beer1 scheduled in 1914 but had been po st:poned due to the in-
terventior! of World Har I. 99 The program approved fo~ the 
conference included nearly twenty i terns, iOO E even of which 
could be categorized as political issues which the United 
States was expected to oppose but which it had allowed in the 
hopes of preventing their success. 101 These political is-
sues primarily revolved around a proposed reorganization of 
the Pan American Union with a diminution of the control of 
the United States as their goals. 102 Prior to this time, 
representation at the Pan American Union or on the Governing 
Board was restricted to the diplomatic representatives of 
the individual countries accredited to the United States and 
obviously to those nations who had regularized diplomatic re-
99James B. Scott, ed., The International Conferences 
of American States, 1889-1928 (Publications of the Carnegie En-
dowment for International Peace, New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1931), p. 209. 
100p . f f d b , rogram of the Fi th Con erence as approve y tne 
Governing Board of the Pan American Union, 6 December 19 22, 
ibid., pp. 210-212. 
101 Mecham, Inter-American Security, p. 9 5. 
102
:tbi.d. 
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lations with the United States. 103 Further, the chairr..an-
ship of the Governing Board was held on a permanent basis 
104 by the United States Secretariy of State. It is obvious 
from the foregoing that the role of the United States in 
the Pan A..merican Union was a dor:iinant one, so that the ef-
forts of reorganization were directed to a real problem ra-
ther than to an illusion of dominance by the "Colossus of 
the North." 
There were, of course, other issues which the United 
States could be expected to oppose, such as the idea of an 
. . 105 . American League of Nations. This proposal was presented 
as a means of encouraging closer ties among the American na-
tions, with legal strictures such as binding arbitration to 
cement the nations more closely than did the Pan American 
Union. 106 In the same vein, the program contained at least 
two items designed to promote arbitration as a means of sol-
ving international disputes in the Americas 107 and proposed 
the acceptance of a uniform codification of international law, 
such .as the one to be produced by the Inter-American Congress 
103Ibid. 
104Ibi.d. 
1D5scott, Conferences of American States, 1889-19~, 
p. 211. 
106 t·~echam, Inter-~merican Security, p. 95. 
107
scott, Conferences of American States, 1889-192_§., 
p. 211. 
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of Jurists • 108 All of these issues rc;•ere linked to the dimi-
nution of United States influence, since they were prenised 
on the equal sovereignty of all American states and would al-
low Lu.tin AmePican preeuinence by the simply fact that they 
outnur:rl)ered the United States. 
The American League of Nations proposal was introduced 
by President Brum of Uruguay at the Santiago Conference in 
spite of warnings that the United States opposition to such a 
109 program would prevent its pas sage, which, in fact, occurre~ .• 
An interesting aspect of Brum' s proposal was thrJ.t he wished to 
see the Monroe Doctrine as the fundamental principle of the 
American League, with each American state issuing a declara-
tion of the Doctrine on its own behalt. 110 The United States 
took particular issue with this aspect of B:r.um's proposal, 
maintaining that the Monroe Doctrine was a unilateral policy 
h . h ld t h f b . db th . 111 w ic cou no t ere ore e appropriate y any o er nation. 
Vfoile the United States was able to carry out its opposition 
to the American League with the majority of the Conference, 
primarily due to the nationalistic jealousies which existed, 
it was apparent that such control would not be long lived after 
108rbict., p. 210. 
109 Mecham, Inter-American Security, p. 97. 
110Ibid. 
1111b. -i.a. 
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the 1923 Conference. 112 
Costa Idea, rep1"esented at ·the Conference by Alejandro 
Alvarado Quiros who was the former chairman of the Centrc:.l 
American Conference of 1921, 113 was counted among the delega-
tions in opposition to the United States by virtue of its 
position with regard to the issues outlines above. In fact, 
the resolution proposing the creation of a Permanent Court of 
A~ • J • h c • 1 114 .nmerican ustice was made by t e osta Rican de ezate. 
The tribunal would, according to the Costa Rican proposal, 
provide binding arbitration for all signatorids and arbitrate 
any disputes of non-signatories for which a special agreement 
could be reached designating the Court as arbiter. 115 How-
ever, this resolution was not adopted by the Santiago Con-
ference. It was sent, along with other proposals, such as 
the codification of American law, to the Congress of Jurists~ 
which was scheduled to meet at Rio de Janeiro in 1925. 116 
Beyond the referral of the aforementioned matters to 
112Ib. · ia., pp. 99-100. 
113
scott, Conference of American States, 1089-1928, 
p. 219. 
114Proposed Treaty Presented by the Delegation of Cos-
ta Pica Re~arding the Creation of A ?ermaneut Court of Ameri-
can Justice, ibid., pp. 452-453. 
115Ibid. 
1161 1 . d t d ~. h 4 h s . f h c <eso ution a op e vy t e 1 t ession o t e on-
ference, 2 May 1923, ibid., p. 284. 
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the Rio Congress of Jurists, there was very little of real 
progress to be noted from the proceedings of the Santiago 
Conference. As was indicated ea1•lier, Costa Rica would pick 
up the theme of the American League of Nations in 1926 and 
would continue advocacy of that idea, as well as its own 
proposals, in subsequent inter-.Anerican conferences. 
The next scheduled conference tock place in Havana 
in 1928. Many of the issues which remained unresolved after 
the Santiago Conference were again put on the agenda, which 
made the United States aware of the fact that the defeat of 
controversial mai:ters which it opposed was by no means as-
sure<l.117 
In response to the Brum proposal made at Santiar;o 
which had called for the establishment of an American League 
of Nations based on a multinational Monroe Doctrine, the 
delegation from the United States was instructed that the 
United States did not desire a discussion of the Monroe Doc-
trine at this and, for that matter, at any inter-American Con-
ference 1 despite g!'.'owing Latin American support for the Ameri-
can League idea.118 The project for the codification of 
1171,Iecham > Inter-American Secu!"i ty, :p. 10 0. 
118secretary of State to the American Delegation, 5 
January 1928, Supplementary T:atter•s :trot On the l'<~enda But Which 
May Be Proposed for Consideration Under Article 24 of the Regu-
lations, 710 ~ FO 0 2 /131a, United States, Department of State, 
Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 
192 8 ( 3 Vols., Washington, D. c.: Government Printing Office• 
1942) 9 It578. 
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American international law resulted in the Bustamante Code, 
which was presented to the Havana Conference for ratifica-
tion.119 Several of the delegations expressed reservations 
before signing the convention which recognized the name 
Bustamante Code and indicated the tentative approval of 
their nations.120 Costa Rica and Colombia joined in a res-
ervation indicating their willingness to accept the Code, 
provided it never came into conflict with provisions of 
their national constitutions. 121 By November, 1930, ten 
Latin American states, including Costa Rica, had ratified 
h B C d 122 . . t• ·11· 1 t e ustamante o e, 1nd1ca ing a w1 ingness to comp y 
with projects designed to increase Latin American unity. 
Overall, the Sixth International Conference of Ameri-
can States was a testing and re-testing of the ability of 
the United States to exert its influence in controlling the 
Latin American states within the conference system. Costa 
Rica once again participated in the conference, seemingly 
on the side of th0se nations who sought to limit United 
States influence, ~ut it was not particularly outstandine 
119code of Private International Law, Scott 2 Confer-
ences of funeri~an States, 1889-1928, pp. 327ff. 
120 Ibid., p. 443. 
121Ibid., p. 372. 
122 Ibid., p. 325. 
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even in that area. 
One outcome of the Havana Conference was an agreement 
fo:r. a Conference of American States on Conciliation and Arbi-
tration to be held late in December, 1928. 123 In essence, 
this conference was to dis cuss some of the matters on ai-,bi-
tration which the United States had blocked at Havana. The 
outcome of the Conference was a General 'I'reaty of Inter-Ameri-
can Arbitration, signed by twenty republics, and binding all 
signatories to arbitration as a means of settlinrr all dis-
putes.124 Costa Rica was one of the signatories but agreed 
only with two reservations: first, the provisions of the 
treaty were not to affect any previously existine agreements 
between Costa Rica and any other nations, whether both had 
ratified the treaty or not; 125 second, the provisions of the 
treaty did not affect any case which fell under the juris-
diction of the Costa Rican courts so long as both parties in 
the case t'ecognized the jurisdiction of those courts. 126 Ten 
other signatories of the Treaty adopted either one or both of 
these reservations.:i.27 In spite of this, by December, 1930, 
only six of the original signatories had ratified the treaty 
123Ibid., p. 458. 
124Ibid. 
12srb·d 
. 1 • , p. 4 60 • 
126 Ihid. 
127
rbid., pp. 460-461. 
168 
and of these six, four had followed Costa Rica's lead in res-
ervations,'.i..28 although Costa Rica itself had not ratified. 
The reasons for Costa Rica's failure to ratify the treaty, as 
well as its reservations in signing, can be found in the 
boundary dispute with Panama. Six n~nths before the Confer-
ence was held, the Costa Fican Foreign Minister had indicated 
to the United States Charge, Roy T. Davis, his government's 
willingness to be bound by a treaty of arbitration provided 
that there were e;uarantees that such a treaty would in no 
way affect the current state of the boundary negotiations 
. h p 129 I h C . -i-wi t anama. t was t e osta Rican concern t1.1at a gene-
ral tl'eaty of arbitration might allow Panama to reject all 
previous negotiations and resubmit the boundary question for 
mediation. In view of the length and bitterness of the dis-
pute to that point, Costa Rica was simply unwilling to allow 
this to occur, 130 viewing its own national interests as more 
important than a general arbitration treaty for the Americas. 
Although Costa Rican foreign policy during the 1920's 
was complex, it was characterized by a dominant theme, namely 
the pursuit of the best interests of the Costa Rican nation. 
In the areo of g1•eat ir;tportance to other· Latin lm•erican states 
128~1 •ct 
.l )J. • ' pp. 458-460-461 • 
129 
U.S. Minister Roy T. Davis at San Jos~, temporarily 
in WashingL:or1, D.C., to the Secretary of State, 3 July 1928, 
710.1012Washington/82, ~pers Relating to Foreign Relations, 
1928, 1:639-640. 
-
iSOibid. 
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during this period, the limitation of the influence of the 
United States in Pan Ar:ierican affaiPs, Cos-ca l~ica chose not 
to attempt ·to assw::1e a position of lea.JePship. Accepting 
the pragri1atic approach of Presideni: lcicardo J"imenez, Costa 
F.iccL rcc:Lliz12d t~1at if it atteL11Jtec1 to i,.J10re tne very real 
pmrnr of the United States in Latin .American affairs, it 
would be courting disaster. Thus, membE:l'ship in the League 
of ?;ations was seen as a needless expense which bore abso-
lutely no fruit for national policy. Secondly, even if Cos-
ta Rica had taken it upon itself to attempt to lead other 
Latin American nations, there .is little evidence to support 
the contention that any would have followed. Finally, there 
was every indication at the close of the 1920's that the in-
fluence of the United States was to be limited in the future, 
not only because of the unity of Latin Americans in opposi-
tion to it, but also due to a modification of United States 
fe-reign policy which would come to be called the Good Neighbor 
Policy. Costa Rica thus had no reason to continue to oppose 
the United States as it had in the majority of cases during 
the 1920 1 s. In addition, its independence of action with 
regard to other Latin American states would be sustained by 
the almost universally accepted non interference principles 
which marked Pan Americanism. 
COSTA RICA IN THE AMERICAN COMMUNITY OF NATIONS 
IN THE GOOD NEIGHBOR YEARS: THE 1930 1 s 
The most significant differences between the two dec-
ades under study was that in the early 1930 1 s, the overall 
scope of Costa Rican foreign policy was greatly reduced. In 
the 1930 annual report of the Minister of Foreign Affairs to 
the Congress, it was noted that while the nation attempted to 
maintain all amicable relationships, economic considerations 
had forced a cutback in the number of missions open through-
out the world and had prevented an active pursuit of policies 
which sought to establish new, friendly relationships. 1 The 
worldwide nature of this economic crisis seemingly made the 
task of remaining Costa Rican diplomats all the more diff i-
cult, since economics were held responsible for a variety of 
political disturbances with which they had to deal. 2 None-
theless, Costa Rican internationalism continued to express 
the goals and desires of the nation, as they were interpreted 
1Memorias, 1930, p. vii • 
............. 
2 Ibid., P• v. 
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by Costa Rican statesmen. Therefore, as a background to a 
discussion of Costa Rican internationalism in the 1930 1 s, 
some consideration should be given to the internal affairs 
of the nation. 
As was indicated previously, the late 1920's were 
marked by an exceptionally stable political scene in Costa 
Rica. In 1932 1 Ricardo Ji~nez sought election to his sec-
ond term as President to suooeed don Cleto Gonz'1.ez V!quez. 3 
The election campaign was an extremely active one in which 
Jim,nez was opposed by Manuel Castro Quesada. 4 Once again, 
the failure of either of the candidates to achieve the re-
quired majority put the election in the hands of the Con-
gress, which, by Gonz'1.ez V!quez's orders, was to follow pro-
oedUJ'es established by a group of Jim'1lez supporters there. 5 
The United States took much interest in the outcome of this 
election,sinoe Castro Quesada, who had been associated with 
the Tinoco regime, was notoriously opposed to United States 
3secretary of the Legation Werlich for the u.s. Minis-
ter at San Jos' to the Secretary of State No. 1251, 31 Decem-
ber 1932 1 Report on 1932, 818.00/1401 1 u;tlted States, Depart-
ment of State, Records of the Department of State Regarding the 
Internal Affairs of Costa Rica, 1930-1139 1 Manuscript Collec-
tion, National Archives, Washington, D.C. Documents from this 
collection will be cited hereinafter, with appropriate decimal 
file number for each specific document, as Internal Affairs, 
1930-1939. 
4 Ibid. 
5Major A. R. Harris, G.s., M.A., Report No. 57 from 
San JosA, 25 February 1932, National Elections: Present Polit-
ical Situation, 818.00/1352 1 Internal Affairs, 1930-1939. 
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involvement or economic penetration into Costa Rica, whereas 
Ricardo Jim~ez seemingly had no such objections.& When the 
Congressional deliberations resulted in Ji~nez's election, 
Castro Quesada announced himself in revolt. 7 It was specu-
lated that his motivation was not to seize power for himself, 
but to force Gonz41ez V!quez to hold new elections in which 
a neutral third party could be chosen. 8 Since President Gon-
z4lez V!quez refused to surrender to such extralegal means, 
the disputants were at an impasse. 9 The United States Minis-
ter in San Jos'• Charles c. Eberhardt, became directly in-
volved in the conflict by carrying messages from the Castro 
Quesada faction to the President and Ricardo Jim6nez10 in an 
attempt to assist breaking the impasae. 11 He was almost 
6Memorandum by Walter c. Thurston, Divison of Latin 
American Affairs, Department of State, to the Assistant Sec-
retary of State, 12 September 1931, 818.00/1293, Internal Af-
fairs, 1930-1939. 
7u.s. Minister Charles c. Eberhardt at San Jose to 
the Secretary of State, 27 February 1932, 818.00/1341 9 Inter-
nal Affairs, 1930-1939. 
au.s. Minister Charles C. Eberhardt at San Joa& to 
the Secretary of State, No. 12. 15 February 1932 1 818.00/1325, 
United States, Department of State, ForeiSV Relations of the 
United States, Diplomatic Paiers, 1932 ts ois., Washington, b.~.: ~overnment Printing o l!ce,-i14'e>, vzs12. 
9u.s. Sinister Charles c. Eberhardt at San Jos6 to 
the Secretary of State, No. 14, 12 February 1932, 818.00/ 
1329 1 ibid., Va514. 
iOibid. 
11u.s. Minister Charles c. Eberhardt at San Jos' to 
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immediately instructed to disengage himself from any mediation 
efforts, since this would give tacit approval to the legi-
timacy of Castro Quesada's revolt which was clearly illegal. 12 
Without Eberhardt's assistance, conferences were held among 
the contending factions, during which it became obvious that 
Castro Quesada'& insurrection had ended. 13 A pact was signed, 
witnessed by Eberhardt in his capacity as Dean of the Diplo-
matic Corps, by which Castro Quesada was granted amnesty for 
his revolt but by which his bid for power in Costa Rican poli-
tics failed. 14 
Following this brief interlude of unrest, with its 
relatively peaceful settlement, Costa Rican politics settled 
back down to a preelection dormancy. 15 Much of this tran-
quility resulted from the personal authority which surroWlded 
the Secretary of State, 16 February 1932, 818.00/1329, Inter-
nal Affairs, 1930-1939. 
12secretary of State to u.s. Minister Charles c. Eber-
hardt at San Jos4, 17 February 1932 1 818.00/1329, Internal 
Affairs, 1930-1939. 
13u.s. Minister Charles c. Eberhardt at San Jos6 to 
the Secretary of State, 18 February 1932, 818.00/1335 1 In-
ternal Affai'l'S, 1930-1939. 
14u.s. Minister Charles c. Eberhardt at San Jos' to 
the Secretary of State, 18 February 1932 1 818.00/1335 1 In-
ternal Affairs, 1930-1939. 
15secretary of the Legation Werlich for the U.S. Minis-
ter at San Josg to the Secretary of State, No. 1251 1 31 Decem-
ber 1932 1 Report on 1932 1 818.00/1401, Internal Affairs, 1930-
1939. 
17 ... 
the newly elected President Jim,nez. 16 His previous popular-
ity and the stability of his 192,,.-1928 Presidency combined 
with a gradual economic recovery to restore the pattern of 
stability and a gradual pJ:tOgress by which this period was 
charaoterized.17 
As a direct consequence of this stability, Costa Ri-
ca began to return to policies which reflected its national-
istic nature.18 In the view of the United States Minister, 
nationalism led to a resurgence of isolationism in Costa Ri-
ca by which it rejected all but the most necessary interna-
tional relationships. 19 It is interesting to contrast this 
assessment with the explanation offered by the Costa Rican 
Foreign Minister in 1930 for the reduction of international 
aotivities. 20 There is simply no means by which the causes 
for Costa Rican cutbacks in foreign affairs can be ascertain-
ed. In view of the obvious economic difficulties of the 
world, it would be impossible to completely ignore their im-
pact, or the use of this reasoning by Costa Rican officials. 
However, when decisions had to be made with regard to budgetary 
16Ibid. 
17Ibid. 
18u.s. Minister Charles c. Eberhardt at San Jos& to 
the Secretary of State. No. 1285• 25 January 1933, 818.00/ 
1~02, Internal Affairs, 1930-1939. 
19rbid. 
20Memorias • .ll!Q.1 p. vii. 
175 
reductions~ it is equally obvious that foreign affairs were 
not of the highest priority to Costa Rican policy makers who 
were traditionally characterized as isolationists. In 1933, 
the isolationist nature of Costa Rican policies took on a 
new facet as it was reported that popular programs were de-
signed to achieve Costa Rican self sufficiency in the areas 
of food production, communications, and transportation. 21 A 
press campaign was launched in support of this program, in the 
important news publications in San Jos~,whose freedom from 
government control was well known, and whose motives were un-
questionably nationalistia. 22 The high literacy rate of the 
Costa Rican population made such a campaign quite successful 
and added even more to the public approval for the Presiden-
cy of Ricardo Jimenez. 
Another new application of the traditional isolation-
ism to national policy was developed in 1935. A movement 
led by former President Julio Acosta (1920-1924) called for 
23 the creation of a standing Costa Rican army. The immediate 
reason for such a proposal was related to the alleged threats 
21u.s. Minister Charles c. Eberhardt at San Jose to 
the Secretary of State, No. 1285, 25 January 1933, 818.00/ 
1402, Internal Affairs, 1930-1939. 
22Major A. R. Harris, G.S., M.A., "Costa Rica: Propa-
ganda--Susceptibility of Public to Propaganda Effort," 27 
March 1933, 818.911/40, Internal Affairs, 1930-1939. 
23u.s. Minister Leo R. Sack at San Jos' to the Secre-
tary of State, 18 December 1935 1 818.20/16, Internal Affairs, 
1930-1939. 
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posed to Costa Rican sovereignty by Guatemala's insistence 
that the nation take part in a new Central American conf edera-
tion. 2~ Initially, all that Acosta and his supporters called 
for was the creation of a military school for the preparation 
of Costa Rican officers and an investigation of the feasibility 
of requesting military miseions from either the United States, 
Britain, France, Germany, or Chile. 25 As will be discussed at 
a later point, the military missions were eventually received 
by Costa Rica, but in connection with preparations for World 
War II rather than for purposes of Central American war. 
The concluding months of Ricardo Jim'11ez's presidency 
and the election of his successor were relatively uneventful. 26 
Lie. Le6n Cortas, who served as president from 1936 to 19~0, 
was known as a man o' great integrity and exceptionally con-
servative politios.27 His term of office continued the pat-
tern of stability and national progress established by Ricar-
do JimGnez. In the realm of foreign policy, Le6n Cort&s empha-
sized the importance of Central America above all other regions 
to the Costa Rican nation. 28 He based this emphasis on the 
24Ibid. 
25Ibid. 
26 Busey• "Presidents of Costa Rica," p. 69. 
27 Ibid. 
28Rep\'iblica de Costa Rica, Presidencia, "Mensaje del 
Licenciado Don Le6n Cort&s al Congreso Constitucional," 1 de 
mayo de 1939 (San Jos'z Imprenta Nacional, 1939), p. 6. 
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spiritual union which existed among the Central American 
states, including their shared natural wealth and conunon heri-
tage. 29 In some respects, this represented a change, at 
least superficially, in Costa Rican attitudes. Rather than 
an insistence upon the superiority of Costa Rica to its near-
est n,eighbors, Leon Cort's seemed to believe that Costa Ri-
can foreign policy should be formulated on a solid basis of 
Central American amicability. The proximity in time to the 
World War must also be taken into consideration, since United 
States policy during this period strongly emphasized the im-
portance of hemispheric solidarity to the safety of indivi-
dual nations. 
Also reflecting this change in attitude was the offer 
of Le6n Cort's to mediate a controversy between Honduras and 
Nicaragua.30 More of this will be discussed in connection 
with Costa Rica's Central American policies. However, the 
changes in foreign policy were not solely due to the external 
forces which have been noted. As the 1930's progressed, polit-
ical party activity increased and became more sophisticated so 
that by 1940, one analyst noted the beginning of a modern po-
litical age for Costa Rica.31 At that time, the Partido 
29Ibid. 
30Repablica de Costa Rica, Presidencia, "Mensaje del 
Licenciado Don Leon Cort's Al Congreso Constitucional," 1 de 
mayo de 1938 (San Jos': Imprenta Nacional, 1939), p. 6. 
31nenton, Costa Rican Politics, p. 28. 
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Republicano Nacional (PRN), founded by Ric~do Jim'11.ez in sup-
-
port of his candidacy in 1932, elected the immensely popular 
Rafael Calder6n Guardia. 32 Calder6n Guardia, regarded as a 
progressive in domestic affairs, favored aligning Costa Ri-
ca with the policy of the United States in view of the imi-
nence of war. 33 He recognized that the defenae of the West-
ern Hemisphere would rely heavily on the potential of the Unit-
ed States, supported by a unanimous Latin American community. 
However, in the decade preceding the election of Cal-
der~n Guardia, such attitudes were only beginning to emerge 
in a clear fashion. Throughout the 1920 1 s the Latin American 
community of nations had begun to demand the diminution of 
the overwhelming control of the Hemisphere by the United 
States. The outcome of these developments, combined with the 
priorities established by the Hoover and Roosevelt administra-
tions concerning the Latin American policy of the United States, 
was that by 19~0, a Costa Rican President could make an inde-
pendent choice to follow the United States in world affairs or 
to X"9ject United States leadership. This change in the rela-
tionships among the Latin American nations, labeled the Good 
Neighbor Policy by the Roosevelt administration, which will 
be discussed in greater ·detail below, did not emerge immedi-
32Blutstein, Handbook fot Costa Rica, p. 24. 
33u.s. Minister William H. Hornibrook at San Jos' to 
the Secretary of State, No. 379, 20 August 1938, Memorand"J.m 
on the Views of R. A. Calder6n Guardia, 711.18/44, Intei"I'lal 
Affairs, 1930-1939. 
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ately at the end of the 1920's. Nor was it suddenly brought 
to fruition by the inauguration of Franklin D. Roosevelt. 34 
It was not until the eve of World War II, with a number of 
years of visible implementation of the policy, that the Latin 
American nations were willing to accept the serious intentions 
of the United States in permanently denouncing any and all in-
tervention in Latin American affairs. 35 These changes also 
had the effect of making certain aspects of Latin American 
foreign policy somewhat difficult to examine due to attempts 
being made, more and more throughout the 1930•s, to present a 
united front on issues of inter-American relations. An exami-
nation of the oase of Costa Rica should make these problems 
clearer, comparing its bilateral and multi-lateral policies 
in the 1930's with those of the 1920's which were discussed 
in the previous chapter. Since the relations between Costa 
Rica and the United States are extremely important to an as-
sessment of the Good Neighbor Policy, these will be discussed 
first. 
In general, the overall good impressions made on Costa 
Rica by the withdrawal of United States Marines from Nicara-
gua, plus the realization of a potential threat of domination 
by Mexico, set the stage for a promising decade in the 1930 1 s. 
34nexter Perkins, The United States and the Caribbean 
(Revised Edition, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 
1966), P• 118. 
35wood, Making of the Good Neighbor Policy, p. 118. 
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• Further, the economic relat~onship between Costa Rica and the 
United States had become more binding by 1932 than it had been 
in previous years. Imports into Costa Rica came from a wide 
variety of sources, with the United States providing 42.7 per 
cent of all imports and G~eat Britain acting as the next high-
est source with 10.9 per aent. 36 On the other hand, Great 
Britain received 47.8 per cent of Costa Rican exports, while 
the United States received 39.3 per cent. 37 This state of af-
fairs can also be seen as contributing to the increased reli-
ance on the United States, as shipping to Europe and Great 
Britain in particular was interrupted or made difficult with 
the onset of the war. However, these factors did not neces-
sarily result in a change in policy for Costa Rica, since the 
war and its impact on shipping did not become an inunediate 
problem until much later in the decade. The inaugural message 
of President Franklin D. Roosevelt had the effect of starting 
the process of improved relations, 38 but only the passage of 
time and the demonstration of the willingness of the United 
States to act upon the stated policy would bring the process 
36u.s. Minister Leo R. Sack at San Jos~ to the Secre-
tary of State, 18 December 1933 1 611.1831/11, United States, 
Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 
Diplomatic Papers, 1934 CS Vols., Washington, D.C.: Govern-
ment Printing Office;-1'952), V:86. 
37Ibid. 
38u.s. Minister Charles c. Eberhardt at San Jos~ to the 
Secretary of State, No. 1396-G, 11 April 1933, General Condi-
tions Report, March, 1933, 818.00G.C./57 1 Internal Affairs, 
1930-1939. 
181 
to completion. 
The progress of United States-Costa Rican relations in 
the 1930's is not truly measurable in large steps. The po-
tential damage from the events surrounding the Costa Rican 
denunciation of the 1923 Washington Treaty in the matter of 
recognition of the Martinez government in El Salvador was mit-
igated to a great ex.tent by the concerted efforts of both 
sides to avoid a conflict. Costa Rican Foreign Minister Guar-
di&l hastened to assure the United States Minister in Costa 
Rica, Charles Eberhardt, that anti-American demonstrations, 
which occurred in San Jos~ early in 1934, were attributable 
to the activities of a small group of chronic "yankee bait-
ers. "39 Further evidence of Costa Rica's attempts to respond 
in kind to the United States reaction to the Martinez question 
was the expulsion from Costa Rica of a group of Nicaraguans 
who had been found guilty of insults to the United States 
flag. 40 IT is obvious that both the United States and Costa 
Rican policy makers were working diligently to maintain the 
rel~onship between their nations on at least an even keel. 
In the opinion of one United States Minister in this period, 
however, the efforts put forth by the Costa Rican politicians 
39u.s. Minister Charles c. Eberhardt at San Jose to 
the Secretary of State, S March 1934, 711.18/40, Internal Af-
fairs, 1930-1939. 
40u.s. Minister Arthur Bliss Lane at Managua to the 
Secretary of State, No. 164, 13 April 1934, 818.00/1454, In-
ternal Affairs, 1930-1939. 
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were occasioned by their desire to enlist the aid of the 
United States and its representatives in their own political 
41 
causes. In keeping with this view, the "Guardian law" was 
passed by the Costa Rican legislature in December of 1934. 42 
This law provided criminal penalties for anyone found guilty 
of insulting the representatives or leaders of any friendly 
foreign government a.nd was the cause of some popular protest 
on the grounds that it inhibiTed freedom of speech. 43 None-
theless, it can be argued that policies such as the Guardian 
law were part of the overall Costa Rican efforts at amicabil-
ity. It is entirely understandable that there would be pro-
tests over such a policy, since it came at virtually the same 
time as the stated policies of isolationism and self suf fi-
ciency for the nation. The discrepancy between this policy and 
the Guardian law can be explained in te:rms of political ex-
pediency or as a realistic evaluation of the fact that Costa 
Rica needed the amicability of the United States for its eco-
nomic survival. 
Not all Costa Ricans supported the efforts to improve 
relations with the United States. A g:r'Oup of critics of Uni-
41u.s. Minister Leo R. Sack at San Jos& to the Secre-
tary of State, No. 695, 25 April 1933, 818.00/1486 1 Internal 
Affairs, 1930-1S39. 
42u.s. Minister Leo R. Sack at San Jos~ to the Secre-
tary of State, No. 832, 4 September 1935 1 818.911/54, Internal 
Affairs, 1930-1939. 
43Ibid. 
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ted States policies in Latin America had existed for many 
years, and during the mid-1930's they were led by liberal in-
tellectuals, like Vicente Sa'11z, who had written a denuncia-
tion of United States diplomatic and economic policies in Cen-
tral America entitled Rompiendo Cadenas, which was published 
in Mexico in 1933. 44 However, it is important to stress the 
fact that official government policy was simply not influenced 
by criticism leveled by the likes of Sa~nz due to their al-
liance with Mexicans which made them immediately suspect. 
Another indication of the vulnerability of the cordial 
relations between the United States and Costa Rica can be seen 
in a reported attempt made by a San Jos~ newspaper editor to 
coerce the United States Minister, Charles c. Eberhardt, into 
payment of a bribe to prevent unfavorable stories about the 
United States. 45 But here, too, there is little probable 
correlation between the official acts of the Costa Rican 
government and the attempted bribery by a single private citi-
zen. 
The generally favorable nature of United States-Costa 
Rican relations allowed for the conclusion of a Reciprocal 
Trade Agreement in 1936. 46 But within the course of two 
44u.s. M5.nister Leo R. Sack at San Jos' to the Secre-
tary of State, No. 940, 18 November 1935, 818.00/1504, Inter-
nal Affairs, 1930-1939. 
45u.s. Minister Charles c. Eberhardt at San Jos~ to the 
Secretary of State, 24 June 1931, 818.911/31, Internal Affairs, 
1930-1939. 
46 
United States, Department of State, 'fiteaties and 
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years, this amicability was once again threatened. Mexico's 
nationalization of oil holdings reportedly received favorable 
conunent and support from the Costa Rican press as well as from 
official government spokesmen. 47 The issue was complicated 
by reports in the press that Under Secretary of State Sumner 
Welles had referred to the "Costa Rican menace" in regard to 
the current amicability of Central American relations due to 
their support of Mexico. 48 Welles sent copies of the speech 
in question, as well as press coverage of it, to the United 
States legation in San Jose, asking that as soon as possible, 
the matter be straightened out, since hff."'hatl made no such com-
ment. Because he was unaware that there were any specific 
problems with Costa Rica, he hoped to avoid any misunder-
t d . f h . 49 s an ing o t at point. 
Costa Rican officials took advantage of the United 
States preoccupation with hemispheric security in 1938 to put 
forward the sale of the Cocos Islands to the United States 
once again. They attempted to persuade the United States Min-
Other International A~reements of the United States, 1776-
1949, Vol. 6, Canada- zecholovakia (Washington, D.C.: Govern-
ment' Printing 0-fice, 1971) 1 p. 1048. 
47u.s. Minister William H. Hornibrook at San Jos~ to 
the Secretary of State, No. 72, 12 December 1938, 711.18/45 1 
Internal Affairs, 1930-1939. 
48Ibid. 
49Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles to U.S. Minis-
ter William H. Hornibrook at San Jose, 13 December 1938• 
711.18/45~ Internal Affairs, 1930-1939. 
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ister to visit the islands, although William Hornibrook had 
been specifically instructed to avoid this invitation so that 
there would be no possible misunderstanding that the United 
50 States was interested in the purchase. Then, an attempt was 
made to convince the United States that the sale of the is-
lands was essential to the Costa Rican economy in view of a 
bad crop year, and that if the Uni tecl. States would not pur-
chase them, someone else would. 51 This understated ttsomeone 
else," of course, related to a potential German or Japanese 
purchase, a constant worry in the 1930 1 s which United States 
military advisors and strategists recommended preventing in 
the .interests of hemispheric defense. 52 This issue as well 
as other defense- related questions will be discussed at great-
er length in the context of Costa Rica's preparations for war. 
But it should be remembered that the pressures of the approach-
ing war and the related concerns for the defense of the hemi-
sphere would have an important bearing upon the course of Uni-
ted States-Costa Rican relations in the late 1930 1 s. 
50secretary of State to U.S. Minister William H. Horni-
brook at San Jose, 4 January 1938, 818.014C/94, United States, 
Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 
Diplomatic Papers, 1938 Cs Vols., Washington, D.C.; Govern-
ment Print1ng Office, 1956), V:4G7. 
51Memorandum of a Conversation by the Under Secretary 
of State with the Costa Rican Minister in Washington, 28 Janu-
ary 1938, 81$.51/718, ibid., V:46R. 
52u.s. Minister William H. Hornibrook at San Jos~ to 
the Secretary of State, 29 December 1938, 818.014C/104, ibid., 
V:471. 
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Perhaps the most important single event in the realm 
of Costa Rica's relations with its Central American neighbors 
in the 1930's who reflected the same basic progress in their 
relations with the United States as did Costa Rica, was the 
crisis occasioned by the question of the recognition of the 
Martinez regime in El Salvador. Although ultimately Costa Ri-
ca chose to act independently of the other Central American 
states, first indications were that Costa Rica would act in 
conjunction with them. In fact, the Costa Rican Foreign Minis-
ter had told the United States Charg~ that any planned course 
of ~ction would be discussed with the other Central American 
nations to preserve the "harmony of action." 53 The next stage 
of the process was that the Costa Rican government informed 
its neighbors and the United States that it did not intend to 
extend recognition to the Mart1nez government in compliance 
with its obligations under the 1923 Washington Treaty. 54 With-
in six months, Costa Rican officials began to sound out the 
United States and the other Central American nations to the 
possibility that it might change its policy and extend recog-
nition to Mart!nez. 55 The inunediate response to these inqui-
53u.s. Charg~ Werlich at San Jos~ to the Secretary of 
State, 21 December 1931, 816.01/30, United States, Department 
of State, Pa ers Relatin to the Forei n Relations of the Uni-
ted States, Vos., as ingtont D •• : Government rint-
ing Office, !§'lt'6"), II:204-205. 
54 u.s~ Charg~ Werlich at San Jos~ to the Secretary of 
State, 24 December 1931, ibid., II:208. 
55u s Mi • • • nister Charles c. Eberhardt at San Jos' to the 
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ries was that Costa Rica was bound by the Treaty which it had 
signed and ratified and could not repudiate that agreement for 
reasons of "momentary expediency. n 56 This response overlooked 
several factors which played into the Costa Rican decision in 
the end. There was, of course, the result of the anti-Ameri-
can sentiment which had been prominent during the 1920's and 
which made it important for Costa Rican government officials 
to dissociate themselves from policies identifiable with Uni-
ted States domination. Then too, as has been discussed pre-
viously, there was the special nature of Costa Rica's rela-
tions with El Salvador arising out of their conunon grievance 
over the Bryan-Chamorro Treaty, plus the all too obvious as-
sociation of the situation of the 1fo.rt!nez government with the 
situation of the Tinoco regime. 
Thus, when it was reported, then confirmed, that Costa 
Rica intended to change its policy and recognize the Mart!nez 
government~ 57 the change was no real surprise to the Central 
American governments or to the United States. The Guatemalan 
Foreign Minister, A. Skinner Klee, offered to summon a confer-
Secretary of State, No. 41, 11 May 1932, 816.01/175, Papers 
Relating to Foreign Relations, ..!!.2l• V:597-598. 
56Acting Secretary of State Castle to the u.s. Minis-
ter Charles C. Eberhardt at San Jos~, No. 23, 13 May 1932, 
816.01/175, ibid.t V:598-599. 
57
secretary of State to U.S. Minister Charles c. Eber-
hardt at San Jose, 11 November 1932, 713.1311/121, ibid., Vi 
330; u.s. Ydnister Charles c. Eberhardt at San Jose to the 
Secretary of State, 12 November 193'2, 71~.1311/108, ibid. 
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ence of the Central American states to discuss the issue but 
offered little hope for its success in dissuading the Costa 
. d . . 58 Rican ecision. Costa Rica indicated interest in such a 
conference, but Foreign Minister Pacheco readily admitted that 
his purpose in attending such a conference would be to con-
vince the other Central American republics to follow Costa 
Rica's lead in the denunciation of the 1923 Treaty and the re-
cognition of the Mart!nez regime. 59 
During the visit of Foreign Minister Pacheco to Guate-
mala, which he undertook despite the fact that no conference 
had been convened, the motivations for Costa Rica's policy 
were further clarified. One crucial aspect of the decision 
to recognize Martinez was that the Costa Rican consensus, as 
seen by President Ricardo Jimenez, held that non-recognition 
was an inadequate and faulty policy for whatever purposes it 
was employed. Rather, the signatories of the Washington 
Treaty should consider policies by which positive assistance 
could be rendered to constitutional governments to avoid re-
l . b f . 60 . vo utionary overthrows e ore they could begin. This sug-
58u.s. Minister Whitehouse in Guatemala to the Secre-
tary of State, No. 816, 14 November 19 32 1 813. OOWashington/ 
388, ibid., V:331. 
59u.s. Minister Charles c. Eberhardt at San Jos~ to the 
Secretary of State, 15 November 1932, 713.1311/117, ibid., V: 
333. 
60u.s. Minister Whitehouse in Guatemala to the Secre-
tary of State, No. 834 1 30 November 1932, 713.1311/132, ibid., 
V:340. 
189 
gestion essentially :represented a request tha.t the U;iited 
States and the Central Al'!lerican nations pool resources to 
maintain the status quo and was a considerable departure from 
the mentality which prompted the justificatio~ 0f both the 
:Martinez and Tinoco coups. If such a policy had been in op-
eration in either case, there is little likelihood that eith-
er could have succeeded. For the time being, however, the im-
plementation of such a policy was not given serious considera-
tion. The subsequent course of events concerning the recogni-
tion of the Mart!nez government has already been discussed. 
In summary, Costa Rica and El Salvador's joint denunciation 
of the 1923 Treaty weakened the viability of the treaty to 
the extent that the remaining signatories eventually extended 
recognition to Mart!nez, leaving the treaty effective only 
between the United States, Honduras, Nicaragua and Guatemala, 
and an effective return of Costa Rica to a position of iso-
lation. 61 In the final analysis, the entire episode was a 
testing ground for the serioua intent of the Good Neighbor Pol-
icy. The United States was put in the position of choosing 
between direct interference in Costa Rican aff aire by denying 
the right of the nation to denounce the 1923 Treaty or of al-
60u.s. Minister Whitehouse in Guatemala to the Secre-
tary of State, No. 834 1 30 November 1932, 713.1311/132, ibid., 
V:340. 
61u.s. Minister Charles c. Eberhardt at San Joa~ to the 
Secretary of State, 26 January 1933, 818.00/1402, Internal Af-
fairs, 1930-1939. 
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lowing Costa Rica to determine its own policy in the matter. 
The choice made was stated by ·the United States Secretary 
of State to the United States Minister in Costa Rica as fol-
lows: 
We feel that Costa Rica has freely exercised its right 
to denounce the Treaty and therefore do not desire 
that you should even unofficially suggest that it re-
scind its action or otherwise indicate what course 
of action it should pursue with respect to the Treaty. 62 
Following the lead of the United States, the Central Ameri-
can states also respected Costa Rica's right of self-determi-
nation, at the same time extending recognition to the Marti-
nez government. 
The atmosphere of mutual respect and the obvious sue-
cess of the Good Neighbor Policy mentality led to a proposal 
for a Central American Conference in 1934. There was an ini-
tial problem, however, occasioned by the preparation of an 
agenda for the Conference without consultation of Costa Ri-
can officials. 63 Through the United States Minister in San 
Jose, Leo Sack, the other Central American nations received 
a warning that the normal Costa Rican reluctance to involve 
62secretary of State Cordell Hull to U.S. Minister 
Charles c. Eberhardt at San Jose, No. 30, 31 October 1933, 
713.1311/185, United States, Depdrtment of State, Foreign 
Relations of the United States Di lomatic Pa ers, 1333 
Government rinting Office, 
1950), 
63u.s. Minister Leo R. Sack at San Jos~ to the Sec-
retary of State, 30 January 1934 1 713.1311/225, Pa2ers Rela-
ting to Foreign Relations. ~' IV:426. 
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itself in any attempt~d Central American unity of action would 
be complicated by the hard feelings engendered if it was not 
consulted on the agenda before its publication. 64 Since the 
stated purpose of the Conference was a consideraticn of the 
1923 Treaty, it is questionable whether Costa Rica had any 
legitimate grievance, since by its own choice it had denounced 
the Treaty. 65 However, President Sacasa of Nicaragua indica-
ted that there was no intention to plan a conference without 
previously consulting both Costa Rica and El Salvador. 66 When 
Costa Rica was formally invited to the Conference, it agreed 
to attend but requested a postponement of the scheduled date 
due to the death of Foreign Minister Pacheco. 67 Another po-
tential complication arose when President Ubico of Guatemala 
was temporarily moved to demand that the date of the Confer-
ence remain fixed and that Costa Rica either attend at the 
scheduled time or be excluded. 68 Once again, through the good 
offices of United States diplomats in the Central American 
64Ibid., IC:427. 
65u.s. Minister Arthur Bliss Lane at Managua to the 
Secretary of State, 1 February 1934, 713.1311/228, ibid., IV: 
430. 
66 Ibid. 
67u.s. Minister Arthur Bliss Lane at Managua to the 
Secretary of State, 13 February 1934, 713.1311/239, ibid., IV: 
433. 
68u.s. Minister Arthur Bliss Lane at Managua to the 
Secretary of State, 16 February 1934, 713.1311/246, ibid., 
IV:434. 
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capitals pressing the importance of neighborly behavior among 
the Central American states, the problem was avoided and the 
conference was re-scheduled. 69 
Since the preliminary problems were re&olved, albeit 
through the efforts of the United States diplomatic corps in 
Central America, the Conference was able to consider the real 
issue which brought about the meeting, the issue: of nont>ecogni-
tion as a means of discou~agiug revolutionary changes of govern-
ment. Guatemala circulated its proposal prior to the Confer-
ence, which reasserted the principle of nonrecognition of revo-
lutionary governments but provided that recognition would be 
extended once suoh a government had " ••• been legalized in the 
constitutional manner provided by law. 70 This proposal did 
not go neaI""ly far enough to satisfy eithet• Costa Rica or El 
Salvador, both of which had already made their positions clear 
through the statements of Costa Rican Foreign Minister Pache-
co. The United States, on the other hand, felt that any pro-
posal suggesting recognition of illegally constituted govern-
ments was unacceptable. 71 However, the United States decided 
that this position must not be made known to any of the parti-
69 u.s. Charg~ Lawton in Guatemala to the Secretary of 
State, 17 February 1934, 713.1311/250, ibid. 
70Article VII, Proposed Guatemalan Treaty, cited in 
U.S. Charge Lawton in Guatemala to the Secretary of State, 
16 February 1934, 713.1311/247• ibid., IV:436. 
71secretary of State to the u.s. Minister Hanna in 
Guatemala, 3 March 1934, 713.1311/2'17a• ibid., IV:441. 
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cipanLS of the Conference so that there would be no suspi-
cio:i1 of attempted interference in the fr:ae deliberations of 
the Central American states. 72 As a consequence, there were 
no United States representatives in atte::1dance at the ses-
sions in Guatemala. 73 
Notwithstanding the efforts put forth by the United 
States to assure the success of the Conference, there was yet 
another obstacle to be overcome which no amount of diplomatic 
maneuvering seemed able to resolve quickly. Relations between 
Costa Rica and Guatemala had never been amicable and the overt 
hostility manifested between the two nations before and during 
the Conference seemed to assure the failure of all attempts 
at compromise between their positions relative to the agenda. 7~ 
In fact, an additional postponement of the Conference was sug-
gested as a means of allowing this hostility to subside. 75 
However, since it was generally accepted that neither Costa Ri-
ca nor El Salvador would be willing to accept a compromise on 
the issue of nonrecognition, it was held that any further post-
ponements would serve no useful purpose.76 
72Ibi<l. 
73Karnes, Failure of Union, p. 229. 
74u.s. Minister Arthur Bliss Lane at 'Managua to the 
Secretary of State, 5 March 1934 9 713.1311/269, Pa2ers Rela-
ting to Foreign Relations, ~' IV:444. 
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76u.s. Minister Arthur Bliss Lane at Managua to the 
Initially, it appeared that compromise beti.reen the 
Costa Rican position and that proposed by President Ubico 
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could be worked out, since the written Costa Rican response 
to the Guatemalan proposal contained reference ~o minor dis-
1 f d 1 . 77 I dd" ' agreements on y on rP-e tra e po icy. n a ition, Costa 
Rican President Ricardo Jimenez approached the United States 
Minister in San Jos~ with a. request for the State Department's 
good offices in easing the "strained relations" between his 
government and that of President Ubico. 78 This request was 
carried out by the United States Minister in Guatemala but 
the solution was not easily accomplished as the first step 
suggested by Minister Hanna was the exchange of diplomatic 
representatives between the two states. 79 The problem was 
then over which state would take the first step by sending 
or even agreeing to send a dip~omatic agent to the other. 80 
Secretary of State, Report of A Conversation with President 
Sacasa of Nicaragua, 13 March 1934, 713.1311/288, ibid., IV: 
450. 
77u.s. Minister Leo R. Sack at San Jose to the Secre-
tary of State, 16 March 1934, 713.1311/299, ibid., IV:453; 
U.S. Minister Hanna in Guatemala to the Secretarv of State, 
19 March 1934, 713.1311/302, ibid., IV:453. -
78 s . . s J , s U. • Minister Leo R. ack at San ose to the ecre-
tary of State, 7 December 1934, 714.18/22, United States, De-
partment of State, Forei n Relations of the United States 
Diplomatic Papers, 35 4 Vols., Was ington, D.C.: Govern-
ment Printing Office;-1953), IVa230. 
79secretary of State to U.S. Minister Leo R. Sack at 
San Jos~, 19 December 1934, 714.18/22, ibid., IV:231. 
80
u.s. Minister Hanna in Guatemala to the Secretary of 
State, 8 February 1935, 714.18/28, ibid., IV:232-233. 
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In addition, the Guate.ma.lans claimed that the decision was 
made especially difficult by the bad press they had received 
in Costa Rica. 81 In fact, the United States Minister in 
Guatemala reported that 
••• both the Minister of Foreign Affairs a'ld the Presi-
dent ap;>ear to be quite incapable of comprehending why 
the press there is not controlled as it is here. They 
manifestly think that the government restraint which 
prevents the press here from criticizing neighbord.ng 
republics is a valuable contribution to good understand-
ing among them and should be imposed in San Jose. 82 
Although this and other difficulties slowed the process, it 
was finally agreed that on March 1, 1935, at a designated 
hour, both Costa Rica and Guatemala would send each other tele-
grams which indicated their intention to exchange diplomatic 
representatives. 83 
Other than the beneficial results of these negotiations 
in long term Central American amicability, the immediate pur-
pose was not really served. The outcome of the 1934 Guate-
mala conference, which came and went during these squabbles, 
and which was colored by the cngoing problems, was a watered 
down pact of fraternity among the Central American states. 8~ 
To the majority of Central Americans, however, the events 
81Ibid. 
82 Ibid.$ IV:233-234. 
83u.s. Minister Leo R. Sack at San Jes~ to the Sec-
retary of State, 22 February 1935, 714.18/29, ibid., IV:234. 
84 Karnes, Fa.ilure of Union, p. 229. 
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could only be viewed as concrete evidence that the United 
States intent was to stand by the Good Neighbor Policy. This 
evidence, without a doubt, would have an important effect 
on the determination of Costa Rican statesmen to follow the 
lead of the United States in world affairs and made possible 
the Presidential candidacy of Calder6n Guardia who clearly 
t t d th t h . i . 85 s a e a as is ntention. 
Between the isolationist tendencies of the presidency 
of Ricardo Jim~nez and the Central American emphasis of the 
Leon Cort~s presidency, there was little of importance in 
the area of Costa Rican relations with the American commWlity 
of nations other than those events already mentioned. There 
are only two possible exceptions to this generalization. In 
1932, at the start of the isolationist period and before the 
advent of unrest in Central American affairs and their resolu-
tion along amicable lines, an editorial appeared in El Diario 
de Costa Rica which pointed out the very real economic threat 
posed to Costa Rica by Brazil as opposed to the imaginary 
threat of "Yankee imperialism."86 The basis of this threat 
lay in Brazil, "which through its gigantic pI'Oduction has 
85u.s. Minister William H. Hornibrook at San Jos~ to 
the Secretary of State, No. 379, 20 August 1938, 711.18/44, 
Internal Affairs, 1930-1939. 
86nr. Modesto Mart!nezt "The Real and Imaginary Perils," 
El Diario de Costa Rica (San Jose), 29 June 1932, cited in u.s. 
Minister Charles c. Eberhardt at San Jos~ to the Secretary of 
State, 7 July 1932, 711.18/38, Internal Affairs, 1930-1939. 
197 
driven down our coffee industry to depression limits. 1187 
This threat of Brazilian domination of the Costa Rican ecoR-
omy served as additional evidence which justified the need for 
Costa Rican self sufficiency and for the desirability of in-
creased friendliness in relations with the United States which 
might protect Costa Rican interests. 
The other event of some significance was the offer 
made by Costa Rica in 1937 to serve as a mediator in the boun-
dary dispute between Honduras and Nicaragua. The favorable 
development of Central American relations prior to that date 
had prompted the offer to mediate which received a great deal 
f 1 . C R' 88 o popu ar support in osta ica. In the end, Costa Rica 
was joined in the mediation efforts by the United States and 
Venezuela in compliance with the agreements reached at the 
1936 B A. C f C 'l' . d Ab' ' 89 uenos ires on erence on onci 1at1on an r itration. 
Although the mediation from all three nations was extremely 
active in the attempt to find an equitable solution, they met 
87Ibic. 
88v.s. Minister William H. Hornibrook at San Jose to 
the Secretary of State, 6 September 1937, 715.1715/552, Unit-
ed States, Department of State, Foreign Relations of the Unit-
ed States Di lomatic Pa e:;:-s, 19 S 7 ( 5 Vols., Washington, D. c.: 
Government Printing 0 ice, 195'4T';' V:66. 
89
.Acting Secretary of State to All Diplomatic Missions 
in the American Republics Except Costa Rica, Honduras, Nica-
ragua and Venezuela, 21 October 1937, 715.1715/751~, ibid., 
V:93. 
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with little er no success. 90 Regardless of the success or 
failure of the mediation efforts, the event d~rnonstrated the 
cooperativeness toward which Costa Rican policy was directed 
throughout the 1930's. It allows a broader perspective of 
the isolationism of the Ricardo Jim~nez presidency in that 
this policy was a retrenchment and establishment of a firm 
national basis upon which the gradual increase of interna-
tional involvements was based. It confirms once again the 
importance of a strong nationalism in the foreign affairs of 
the Costa Rican nation. 
Before this pattern can be conclusively demonstrated, 
howtver, the inter-American conferences of the 1930's must 
be taken into consideration. It will be remembered that de-
velopments in the inter-American conferences during the 1920's 
were directed toward the diminution of the authority of the 
United States in inter-American affairs. In some respects, 
these attempts were quite successful and it appeared that this 
trend would continue at the Montevideo Conference in 1933. 
However, the advent of the Good Neighbor Policy, as expected, 
had some bearing on those developments. 
One topic which appeared likely to be brought up for 
discussion by Mexico was the Monroe Doctrine. The Mexican 
Minister of Foreign Affairs had indicated to Josephus Daniels, 
flicts 
York: 
90 Gordon Ireland, Boundaries, Possessions, and Con-
in Central And North America and the Caribbean (New 
Octagon Books=;- 1971), p. 143. 
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the United States Minister in Mexico, that the renunciation 
of aggression agreed to by the United States obviate the 
necessity for the existence of a unilateral policy such as the 
Monroe Doctrine. 91 The United States delegation at Montevideo 
was therefore instructed that "it is not the desire of this 
Government that the Monroe Doctrine should be discussed at 
the Conference. 1192 However, on the integrally related issue 
of intervention, the United States government was more than 
willing to respect th~ national autonomy of all Latin Ameri-
can states as long as it reserved the right to intervene on 
b h lf f h l . d f . . 1 93 e a o t e ives an property o its nationa s. The 
Mexican delegation was thus blocked from causing any prob-
lems, but it did introduce the broader issue of intervention 
as opposed to arbitration binding on all states in the con-
text of "Economic and Financial Problems. 1194 The matter of 
the maintenance of peace was finally resolved by its referral 
to a special conference to be convened at a later date. 95 The 
91u.s. Ambassador Josephus Daniels in Mexico to the 
Secretary of State, 29 September 1933 1 710.G1A/220, Papers Re-
lating to Foreign Relations, 1i2l' IV:18-19. 
92 Instructions to the Delegates to the Seventh Interna-
tional Conference of American States, Montevideo, Uruguay, 10 
November 1933, 710G/371, ibid., 1V:137. 
9 3 I, . 1 
1) i ( • , IV:140. 
94
united States, Department of State, Report of the 
Delegation of the United States of America to the Seventh In-
ternational Conference o/ American States Montevideo Uru ua 
December 3::'26 1 19 3 3, Conference SerieR No. 19 Waslungton, D. c.: Government Printing Office, 1934), p. 294. 
95 Ibi·d., 32 33 PP• - • 
200 
reasons cited for the postponement of the discussion, in keep-
ing with the good intentions of the United States in not at-
tempting to avoid any free and open discussion, we?.\e that the 
delegations present at Montevideo, in particular that of the 
United States, had not been empowered to discuss this point 
due to possible conflicts with existing bilateral treaties. 96 
The willingness of the United States to commit itself 
to a discussion of its unilateral policies, such as binding 
arbitration of disputes and the essence of the Monroe Doctrine, 
was a significant step. Besides this commitment, the United 
States signed and ratified the Convention on the Rights and 
Duties of States whioh effectively eliminated intervention as 
a method of national polioy. 97 
Another area on which the United States delegation ap-
parently surrendered was on the question of the recognition 
as a means of national policy. The Mexican delegation at 
Montevideo raised the question of nonrecognition as a means of 
direct intervention and this was included in the foregoing 
agreement. The Estrada Doctrine presented by Mexico was pre-
mised on the principle that diplomatic recognition was ex-
tended by the people of one nation to the people of another 
and therefore could not be interrupted by any change of govern-
ment unless intervention were intended. 98 The Estrada Doo-
96Ibid., p. 28. 
97Perkins, The United States and the Caribbean, P• 122. 
98Neumann, Recogpition, p. 28. 
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trine was based partly on the theory of the Costa Rican schol-
ar. Luis Anderson, that the constitutionality of any govern-
ment was a matter of domestic law 1 of which any foreign in-
terpretation comprised intervention. 99 
Although Costa Rica, through one of its leading think-
ers in the field of international law. seemed to have a vest-
ed interest in the proceedings at Montevideo, it was the only 
American nation not represented there. A special message sent 
by the Conference to President Ricardo Jim,nez expressed re-
gret that Costa Rica was not represented. 100 A reply from 
Ji~nez offered no excuses or explanations why Costa Rioa did 
not participate but concurred with the aims of the Confer-
ence.101 Within the context of Costa Rican foreign policy in 
1933 9 it is not surprising that there was no attendance at 
Montevideo. The isolationism which characterized Ricardo Ji-
m&nez's presidency would certainly have militated against any 
desire to participate at Montevideo. An inconsistency can be 
seen, however, in the faot that the Montevideo Conference did 
take up questions regarding the many treaties which existed 
in the Americas for the maintenance of peaoe. 102 In view of 
the support which Costa Rica had given the Central American 
99Luis Anderson, "El Gobierno de facto," Revista de de-
recho internacional, VII (June, 1925)• cited in ibid., P• 2d. 
100 Report of u.s. Deleg1tion at Montevideo, P• 2. 
101Ibid. 
l02Ibid •• pp. 7-8. 
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Court of Justice and its proposals for an Inte!'-American Court 
of Justice in the 1920's, it would seem likely that the nation 
would be interested in any conference that would advocate the 
ideas of an American source of arbitration and reconciliation 
of disputes. It might be concluded that the rebuff adminis-
tered to the Costa Rioan proposals at Havana in 1928, in com-
bination with the general outbacks in international activity 
in the early 1930 1 s, explain the failure to be represented at 
Montevideo. Whatever the reasons were, and because of the un-
availability of Costa Rican sources on this matter, it is all 
the more difficult to speculate. Costa Rica was in the posi-
tion of a "loner" in American affairs in 1933. 
The InteJ:t-Amerioan Conference for the Maintenance of 
Peace held in Buenos Aires in December of 1936 provided Costa 
Rica an opportunity to reflect any changes in its internation-
al policies which had occurred with the election of Ledn Cdr-
tes. This oonferenoe resulted in part from the unresolved 
discussions on arbitration and peace left over from the Mon-
tevideo Conference but also in part from the concern for the 
unity of the hemisphere in the faoe of the potential threat of 
war threatening Europe. 103 Ho;wever, the Latin American states 
whose interests were primarily directed to a final denunoia-
D. Roosevelt to the Opening Ses-
States, Department of State, Re-
united St tes of erioa to the 
tion of intervention sought to have the 1936 Buenos Aires 
Conference reflect their wishes.104 
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In keeping with the modification of Costa Rican for-
eign policy, the nation was represented at the Buenos Aires 
Conference by a delegation of only two members. 105 Because 
the two Costa Rican delegates were physically limited as to 
the variety of activities in which they could participate, 
Costa Rica was not a member of the most important committee 
of the Conference, that concerned with the organization of 
peace. 106 Before drawing any significance from the size of 
the Costa Rican delegation, reference must be made to the An-
nual Report of the Costa Rican Foreign Minister for 1936. In 
that Report, the Foreign Minister catalogued an immense list 
of conferences, exhibitions, and fairs to which the Costa Ri-
can government had received official invitation. He indica-
ted that it was economically feasible for the nation to sup-
port representatives at only a fraction of these events and 
that volunteers had been sought who would represent the nation 
for patriotic reasons alone. 107 Thus, when it came to the 
most important event of the year, the Inter-American Conference 
for the Maintenance of Peace at Buenos Aires, there were few 
104wood, Making of the Good Neighbor Policy, p. 119. 
105ReI?prt of U.S. Delegation at Buenos Aires, P• 52. 
106Ibid., p. 65. 
107Memorias, 1936, pp. vii-viii. 
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funds remaining so that the nation could only afford to spon-
sor two delegates, although "patriotic" individuals had been 
invited to attend at their own expense. 108 
While it is perfectly feasible that this explanation 
is accurate, there is again no doubt that the priorities es-
tablished by the Costa Rican nation had something to do with 
the decision. President Le6n Cort's's emphasis on the pri-
macy of Central American affairs in the realm of foreign re-
lations would make the Buenos Aires Conference less important 
than other matters closer to home. Further, while this em-
phasis may have led to a consideration of sending no represen-
tatives at all, this was not practical because of the impor-
tance placed on this conference by the United States, as in-
dicated by the opening address by President Roosevelt to 
which Costa Rica was very responsive. 109 
When it came to a consideration of the matters which 
had prompted the conference, however, Costa Rica did not show 
up very well. In an effort to evaluate the existing mechan-
isms for the settlement of disputes, the conference reviewed 
the status of the five treaties which it felt reflected the 
best efforts of the inter-American system& 110 the Gondra 
iOSibid., P• xii. 
109Ibid. 
110Table Showing Ratification of or Adherence to In-
struments for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, 
Report of u.s. Delegation at Buenos Ai.res, p. 208. 
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Treaty (1923), 111 the Pact of Paris (1928), 112 the Washing-
ton Conciliation Treaty (1929),113 the Washington Arbitra-
tion Treaty (1929), 114 and the Rio Pact (1933). 115 Costa 
Rica, which had ratified the 1923 Gondra Treaty and merely 
adhered to the 1928 Pact of Paris was matched in its poor 
performance only by Argentina and Bolivia. 116 These five 
treaties formed the core of the proposal for peaoe machin-
ery for the hemisphere, woven together by a Coordinating 
Convention proposed by the United States. 117 In the end, 
111The Gondra Treaty specified reduction of military 
and naval expenditures by the signatories and suggested arbi-
tration of international disputes in the Americas through the 
use of ad hoc commissions of inquiry. The author of this trea• 
ty was tne""'eiiiinent Paraguayan Dr. Manuel Gondra. Mecham, In-
. . -ter-Amer1can Security, p. 98. 
112The Pact of Paris, more comm.only known outside the 
Americas as the Kellogg-Briand Pact, was a broad war renuncia-
tion agreement. Ibid., p. 118. 
113The Washington Conciliation Treaty was a general 
convention designed to supplement the Gondra Treaty in that it 
invested conciliatory functions in permanent diplomats as well 
as in the commissions of inquiry which were established to 
meet specific problema. Ibid., p. 106. 
114The Washington Arbitration Treaty bound all signa-
tories to submit international disputes of any nature to ar-
bitration. Ibid., P• 107. 
115The Rio Pact was basically a duplication of the 
Pact of Paris, although it had been authored in the Americas, 
by the Argentine statesman Saavedra Lamas. Ibid., p. 118. 
116Table Showing Ratification of or Adherence to In-
struments for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, 
ReJ?OJ1 of U.S. De;egation at Buenos Aires, P• 208. 
117Address of Cordell Hull to the First Plenary Session 
of the Conference, 5 December 1936, ibid., p. 86. 
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this kind of program, which would coordinate existing instru-
ments for the preservation of peace, was approved by the Con-
118 ference. But the language of an allied resolution, calling 
for the coordination of these pacts with the League of Nations, 
led to an abstention from both the United States and Costa Ri-
ca. 
119 
Costa Rica abstained from voting on the resolution be-
cause, in the first place, since it had resigned from the 
League of Nations, it was felt that the path of its national 
policy took it away from association with that organization. 12 0 
In the second place, while there was no disrespect intended 
for the League or its high ideals and goals, in the Costa Ri-
can view, an American question such as the maintenance of peace 
in the Americas should not be linked with an organization in 
which so few of the American states maintained membership. 121 
Another possible motive for the abstention, not Jilen:tioned by 
the Costa Rican Foreign Minister in his report, was the de-
sire to follow the lead of the United States in the matter. 
11 8Resolution of the Inter-American Conference for the 
Maintenance of Peace, Approved 21 December 1936, Carnegie En-
dowment for International Peace, International Law Division, 
The International Conferences of American States, Flirst Su~­
!lement, 1933-1940 (Washington, b.c.z Carnegie Endowmentor 
nternatlona1 Peace, 1940), p. 162. 
119Ibid. 
120Memorias, l!!§., p. xiv. 
121rbid., p. xiii. 
208 
The United States delegation's abstention was rooted in some-
what different motives than that of Costa Rica. In its offi-
cial report, the United States delegation pointed out that the 
best possible path for the conference to take was not to as-
sociate the American machinery with any outside institutions 
or organizations, since such association would provoke the op-
ponents of the League and give undue satisfaction to the loyal 
adherents of the League. 122 The delegates felt that the suc-
cess of the American peace machinery oould be assured only by 
avoiding the potential of sqabbles among the American statee 
over the rightness or wrongness of membership in the League of 
Nations. 123 In the end, the report concluded that the con-
ference had succeeded in this effort, 124 which was essential-
ly correct, since the League resolution was an addition to 
the Coordinating Convention rather than a part of it. 125 So 
it seems that the United States and Costa Rioa coincidentally 
took the same action in regard to the resolution. 
For Costa Rica, this resolution was by no means the 
most important issue raised by the Buenos Aires Conference. 
In fact, the so-called Consultation Pact was viewed as the 
most important in that it established a means by which war 
122Report of u.s. Delegation at Buenos Aires, p. 13. 
123Ibid. 
124Ibid. 
125Mecham 9 Inter-.American Security, p. 134. 
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and/or intervention could be avoidea. 126 On the same basic is-
sue, the matter of an Inter-American Court of Justice was 
raised in that the Conference passed a resolution which empow-
ered the Governing Board of the Pan American Union to study 
and report on all of the proposals for such a Court which had 
been submitted to the conference and all previous Inter-Ameri-
can Conferences. 127 The first proposal listed for considera-
tion was that made by Costa Rica at the 1923 Santiago Confer-
ence.128 Of the eight conventions, two treaties, one proto-
col and numerous resolutions approved by the Conference,129 
this resolution was one of the few which noted any special 
contribution from Costa Rica. Because of Costa Rica's his-
tory of isolation and lack of involvement on some of the broad-
er issues dealt with by the conference, it is not altogether 
surprising that Costa Rica took so small a part in the con-
ference. Nonetheless, their contribution was recognized in a 
congratulatory message sent by Cordell Hull to the head of the 
Costa Rican delegation• Dr. Manuel Jim'1iez. 130 
In the same spirit, Hull commended the good will and 
126Memorias, 1936 9 PP• xiv-xv. 
127Resolution of the Confer.ence, Approved 16 December 
1936, Conference of American StateA, 1933-1940, p. 144. 
128Ibid., p. 144, n. 1. 
129Mecham, Inter-Amerioa.n Seouri;ty, P• 125. 
130seoretary of State Cordell Hull to Dr. Manuel Jim€-
nez, 24 de diciem.bre de 1936, Memorias, .!!!§_, p. xix. 
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determination of all twenty-one delegations in his address to 
the closing session of the Conference, 131 which prepared the 
way for the next conference of American states scheduled for 
1938 in Lime. The Lima Conference was the last regular con-
ference before the outbreak of World War II, but it was al-
most entirely preoccupied with matters relating to the de-
fense of the hemisphere. Due to the European events which 
preceded the Lima Conference and the growing awareness of the 
Roosevelt administration of the necessity of preparation in 
the hemisphere, " ••• an intensification of the tone of good 
neighborliness was beamed on Latin America. n1 32 
Once again, Costa Rica made itself prominent by send-
ing the smallest delegation to the conference. 133 In spite of 
its size, the Costa Rican delegation benefitted with all the 
other Latin American states from the attitude of the United 
States delegation which, " ••• in accordance with the tenets of 
the Good Neighbor Policy, endeavored scrupulously to respect 
at all times the dignity and interests of each nation repre-
sented at the Conference."134 This goal was not always simple 
131Address of Cordell Hull to the Closing Session of the 
Conference, 23 December 1936, Report of u.s. Delegation at Bue-
nos Aires, p. 93. 
132 Mecham, Inter-American Security, p. 136. 
133united States, Department of State, Report of the 
Delegation of the United Statts §f America. at the Ei~hth Inter-
national Conferenoe of Amerlcantates, Lima, Pe:t'U,ecember 9--
2,, 1938 teonference Series No. so, Washington, D.C.: Gov-
ernment Printing Office, 1941), P• 228. 
134!bid., p. 38. 
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for the United States delegation,which sought a demonstration 
of solidarity against the threat of the Axis powers, since 
not all of the nations represented at Lima took this threat 
as seriously as did the United States. 135 However, the ba-
sic resolution on continental solidarity did receive the ap-
proval of the conference.136 
In the interests of achieving the success of the reso-
lution, the United States saw that issues dear to the hearts 
of some Latin American states received the close attention of 
the Li:na Conference. For example, when Costa Rica abstained 
from the initial vote on continental solidarity, along with 
Brazil, Chile, Uruguay, and Venezuela, 137 the question of the 
Inter-American Court of Justice, a favorite project of Costa 
Rica in previous conferences, was brought up for discussion. 138 
Although no steps were really taken to make the Court a real-
ity, it was clear that any demonstration of its potential suc-
cess would assure its formation. 139 In addition, the idea of 
135Mecham, Inter-American Security, p. 140. 
136chairman of the American Delegation at Lima Cordell 
Hull to the Acting Secretary of State, 15 December 1938, 710.H 
Continental Solidarity/74, PaRers Relating to Foreign Relations, 
1938 1 V:81 • ........... 
137rbia. 
138 Report of U.S. Delegation at Lima, pp. 16-17. 
139Resolution of the Eighth International Conference of 
American States, Approved 22 December 1938, Conferences of Ameri-
can States, 1933-1940, p. 254. 
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an American League of Nations was revived and referred to the 
International Conference of American Jurists for study with 
the stipulation that a report be issued before the next Inter-
American Conference. 140 Such blatant politicking by the Unit-
ed States for its resolutions' success at the Conference may 
have led to somewhat sarcastic comments by one analyst about 
good neighborliness being "beamed" on the Latin American 
states, but the effectiveness of the program cannot be de-
nied.141 
It is questionable whether such devious means were ne-
cessary in the case of Costa Rica. From all indications, po-
litical maneuvering was not necessary on their behalf but may 
have been for Chile, Brazil or other nations who were as yet 
unconvinced of the necessity of a unified program of hemis-
pheric defense, or who suspected the motives of the United 
States in suggesting such a program. Costa Rica was predis-
posed to favor the proposals offered by the United States by 
this time, due to the favorable status of their bilateral re-
lations as well as the thrust of long range Costa Rican poli-
cies. The development of Costa Rican inter-American policies, 
beginning in the 1920's was marked at first by the fluctuation 
between strong sentiments in favor of isolationism and the con-
sideration of membership in a Central American confederation. 
i40Report of U.S. Delegation at Lima, p. 243. 
141Mecham, Inter-American Security, p. 140. 
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Costa Rican national self-esteem prevented a firm commi ttment 
to the Central American Confederation of 1921, while at the 
same time relations with the United Ste.tes ranged from the 
low level of the period immediately following the Tinoco re-
gime and the problems with the League of Nations to the mod-
erately good level of amicability which characterized the 
general policy of the first presidency of Ricardo Jimenez. 
Periodically throughout this decade, Costa Rica seemed to 
flirt with closer association with Mexico until the threat of 
Mexican domination of Central America was realized and re-
sulted in a disenchantment with that nation• 
The 1930's showed a far more consistent pattern of 
development in Costa Rican inter-American relations. Early 
in the decade there was a cutback on all foreign affairs ac-
tivities which served a dual purpose in that it made possible 
substantial economies during a difficult financial period and 
at the same time permitted the consolidation of nationalistic 
sentiments which were directed into programs of national self 
sufficiency. From this foundation, Costa Rican policy was 
broadened to an intense involvement in Central American affairs. 
The nation maintained its independence of action supported by 
the Good Neighbor Policy which prevented United States inter-
ference but which protected Costa Rica, as well as other Cen-
tral American states, from the threat of overt hostilities 
among themselves. 
Thus, by 1938, Costa Rica achieved the status of an 
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independent and sovereign state which would choose the poli-
cies best suited to its national interests. It had an ad-
vantage over some other Latin American states in that its 
national interests were clearly defined and would not neces-
sarily suffer by association of its policies with those of 
the United States. To some extent, it could be argued that 
Costa Rican self sufficiency in inter-American affairs relied 
heavily upon the United States's enforcement of the inviol-
ability of the sovereign rights of all American states. How-
ever, since by the late 1930's Costa Rican policy was pre-
mised on this realistic assessment of its own stature in the 
American community of nations, this was not a negative aspect 
of Costa Rican policy. The extension of Costa Rican national 
image into broader fields of world affairs will be considered 
in the next chapter. This broader view, as applied to non-
American affairs, should serve as further confirmation of 
the foregoing views. 
CHAPTER VIII 
COSTA RICA AND EUROPE, 1919-1939 
Costa Rica's relations with Europe, as well as its 
infrequent contacts with Asia, were quite different in many 
respects from the patterns noted in regard to inter-American 
affairs. Yet in many ways, formal diplomatic relations with 
El "ope followed the same long range policy goals evidenced 
in inter-American affairs. The 1920's were characterized by 
a seemingly haphazard waxing and waning of Costa Rican enthu-
siasms for various alliances or affiliations in the Americas. 
During that same period, with the exception of a few major 
issues which will be discussed in the course of this chapter, 
there was little activity in the realm of non-American rela-
tions which can be said to have had any meaningful bearing 
upon the development of Costa Rican internationalism or of a 
Costa Rican self-image in international affairs. During the 
1930's, when inter-American affairs were characterized by 
long range goals and planning to the ends of those goals, 
Costa Rican relationships with European nations were primarily 
directed to events which were related to preparations for 
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World War II. However, before considering the preparations 
for hostilities, some analysis of the preceding events should 
be undertaken. 
Costa Rican relations with the world community of na-
tions during the 1920 1 s were conditioned by the events sur-
rounding the Tinoco coup d'etat. In fact, one of the primary 
events of the 1920's in this realm related to the nullifica-
tion of the acts of the Tinoco regime. The Amory oil conces-
sion, granted by Federico Tinoco, was included in the general 
nullification of his acts after the overthrow of his regime. 
Amory represented a syndiaate comprised of British citizens. 
As a consequence, the British government entered into negotia-
tions with the government of Julio Acosta concerning their 
rights, although the Costa Rican government did not recognize 
the right of the British government to act on behalf of pri-
vate citizens in the matter. 1 
Initially, the British felt that the Acosta goveI>nment 
had no right to confiscate the private property of its citi-
zens which was acquired in good faith by the .Amory concern, al-
though the United States had taken the position that no busi-
ness deals with Tinoco entered into by United States citizens 
were worthy of its diplomatic support and extended the principle 
1u.s. Charg~ Walter c. Thurston at San Jos~ to the Sec-
retary of State, 2 February 1921, 818.6363Am6/60, MC 669. 
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to other claimants. 2 However, this conclusion was drawn after 
it had been determined that there were no United States citi-
zens involved in the nullification. 3 The Department of State 
notified the British government that the matter of nullifica-
tion was a domestic affair of the Costa Rican republic in 
which the United States could not interfere, despite British 
requests that it do so. 4 Since the British government hoped 
to rely on the intervention of the United States to aid its 
position in the negotiations, this attitude occasioned some 
hard feelings. 5 Nonetheless, the United States supported Cos-
ta Rican off ioials in their contention that the Costa Rican 
courts had jurisdiction over the question of the rights of 
the concessionaires who had received their grants from the 
Tinoco administration. 6 The continuing negotiations which 
surrounded the settlement of claims made by the Amory group 
colored British-Costa Rican relations throughout the early 
1920's until a final agreement was reached. 
It is not the purpose of this study to judge the 
2secretary of State to u.s. Charge at San Joe~, 9 
December 1919 1 818.6363Am6/29, MC 669. 
3secretary of State to u.s. Charge at San Jos~, 29 
August 1918, 818.6363Am6/18a, MC 669. 
4secretary of State to u.s. Charg~ at San Jos~ (Mar-
tin), No. 7, 13 December 1920, 818.6363/61 1 MC 669. 
5u.s. Ambassador (Davis) at London to the Secretary 
of State, No. 1205, 11 August 1920, 800.6363/--, Papers Re-
lating to Foreign Relations, .!ilQ., II:665. 
6secretary of State to U.S. Charg~ at San Jos' (Mar-
tin), No. 7 1 13 December 1920, 818.6363/61 1 MC 669. 
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decision of the Acosta administration to refer the British 
claimants to the Costa Rican courts. It was inevitable that 
the repudiation of the Tinoco regime would include a repu-
diation of its acts. Therefore, consistent with the policy 
demonstrated by the Acosta government which sought the favor 
of the United States by a complete rejection of association 
with Tinoco, the Amory concession was nullified. Further, 
when that nullification was questioned, the matter was re-
ferred to the courts as a point of national policy which 
covered the rights of foreign investors. The support re-
ceived for that decision from the United States added to the 
strength of the Costa Rican determination to remain firm in 
asserting its national sovereignty. 7 
It is interesting, although not particularly rele-
vant, to speculate as to the possible differences in Costa 
Rican policy had there been properties of United States citi-
zens affected by the nullification act. The diplomatic cor-
respondence between the State, Department and its representa-
tives in Costa Rica clearly indicates that a thorough inves-
tigation was conducted to assure the fact that there were no 
United States properties involved before a decision was made 
R • • • 8 to support the Costa ican position. However, Costa Rican 
?secretary of State to U.S. Charg~ Walter c. Thurston 
at San Jose, 19 July 1921, 818.6363Am6/90, Papers Relating to 
Foreign Relations, 2J!ll, !:664-665. 
~U.S. Consul Benjamin F. Chase at San Jos~ to the Sec-
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policy was also determined by the relative importance of re-
lations with Great Britain to those with the United States. 
As was noted previously, the economic links between the Brit-
ish and Costa Rican nations gradually diminished in the early 
years of the twentieth century so that by the end of the 
1920's, the primary commercial interests of the Costa Rican 
nation centered on the United States. However, at the time 
of this controversy, the threat of a commercial boycott of 
Costa Rican goods in British markets was an extremely serious 
tr ~eat to the well-being of the nation. 9 Such a threat was 
made in veiled terms to President Acosta by the British rep-
resentative at San Jose, 10 which led to the negotiation of 
an issue which the United States regarded as a cut and dried 
11 legal precept. While Costa Rica essentially was forced to 
negotiate on the nullification of the Amory concession, the 
leadership of the Acosta administration expressed hope that 
the United States would provide unqualified support for their 
retary of State, 22 May 1920, 818.6363/30, Papers Relating to 
Foreign Relations, 1920 1 I:839; Secretary of State to U.S. Con-
sui Benjamin F. Chaie"at San Joe,, 4 June 1920, 818.6363/30 1 
ibid., I:840; Secretary of State to u.s. Charg~ at San Jose, 
29 August 1918, 818.5363/18a, MC 669. 
9 . U.S. Charg' Walter c. Thurston at San Joe~ to the 
Secretary of State, 14 February 1921, 818.6363Am6/60, Papers 
Relating to Foreign Relations, ~' !:646. 
10ibid. 
11Ibid., !:647. 
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position. 12 
In the end, this complex issue was settled fairly 
amicably. The United States supported Costa Rica's right 
to settle the matter without interference. The Chief Jus-
tice, White, of the United States Supreme Court agreed to 
serve as a ~ediator and Costa Rica readily acceptect. 13 Fur-
ther, it was agreed that the Amory concession would be put 
into Costa Rican hands as the Central Costa Rican Petroleum 
Company, with the British shareholders maintaining sizeable 
investments in the venture. 14 By the time the mediation was 
completed in 1924, the original Amory claim, which was held to 
be legitimately nullified, 15 no longer existed. As a conse-
quence, British-Costa Rican relations were able to continue 
on a fairly amicable level, although the shift of trade to 
the United States minimized the importance of that cordiality 
to the Costa Ricans. 
While preoccupied with the negotiations concerning the 
Amory concession, Costa Rican officials also entered into ne-
12u.s. Charg~ Walter c. Thurston at San Jos~ to the 
Secretary of State, 25 February 1921, 818.6363Am6/66, Papers 
Relating to Foreign Relations, 1921, I:647; U.S. Chargi Roy 
T. Davis at San Josi to the Secretary of State, No. 321, 31 
August 1923, 818.00/1079, MC 669. 
13Pan American Union, Bulletin LV (October, 1922), p. 
404. 
14Ibid. 
15Pan American Union, Bulletin LVIII (February, 1924), 
P• 196. 
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gotiations with several different groups for tracts of Cos-
ta Rican land for use as foreign settlements. One such group 
was a Japanese concern interested in the establishment of a 
l l . "d ' C R' 16 co ony a ong a ti e water in osta ica. Another example 
was reportedly a German offer of $1,000,000 in 1918 for a 
large tract of land. 17 While the United States representa-
tive in Costa Rica investigated the matter and found out that 
18 th.ere had been no such offer, the original news of the pro-
posed sale to Germany came from the Costa Rican Minister in 
Italy. 19 Th.is leads to .the possible conclusion that Costa Ri-
ca was not serious about the colonization proposals. In fact, 
it might be that negotiations for colonization projects were 
conducted to please the nations interested in the establishment 
of Costa Rican settlements at the same time that the projects 
kept the United States alert to the possibility of problems 
with Costa Rica and therefore more receptive to Costa Rican 
views. 
A possible exception was a French colonization proposal, 
sponsored by the Costa Rican consul in Paris, which had ended 
16u.s. Charg~ Benjamin F. Chase at San Jos' to the 
Secretary of State, No. 42 1 15 October 1918, 818.52/-- 1 MC 669. 
17u.s. Minister in Italy to the Secretary of State, No. 
85, 23 November 1918, 818.52/1, MC 669. 
18u.s. Charg' Benjamin F. Chase at San Jos~ to the 
Secretary of State, 10 December 1918 1 818.5213, MC 669. 
19u.s. Minister in Italy to the Secretary of State, No. 
85, 23 November 1918, 818.52/1, MC 669. 
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"disastrously," com:plicated by the general dislike for the 
French consul at San Jose. 20 There is no indication from 
available correspondence a~ to the seriousness with which 
Costa Rica entered into these negotiations. However, the 
United States was quite concerned about the potential threat 
to the Panama Canal posed by the proximity to i~ of large 
European or Asiatic colonies. 21 The idea that colonies lo-
cated within Costa Rican territory were a threat to the se-
curity of the Panama Canal would recur throughout the 1920 1 s 
and 1930 1 s as reports of various proposals for the establish-
ment of such colonies were ma.de. 
The most serious colonization proposal came in the 
late 1930 1 s in connection with the impending European war. 
In mid-1937 1 representatives of the Refugee Economic Corpor-
ation, based in the United States, approached officials of 
the State Department to request United States intervention 
with Costa Rica in regard to a relaxation of its immigration 
restrictions. 22 Their purpose was to arrange for the purchase 
of a tract of land in Costa Rica upon which they intended to 
20u.s. Charg~ Walter c. Thurston at San Joa~ to the 
Secretary of State, No. 216, 14 October 1921, 718.00/1 9 MC 671. 
21war Department U-HLA to the Secretary of State, 21 
May 1919, 818.52/6, MC 669; Secretary of State to u.s. Consul 
Benjamin F. Chase at San Jose, 5 June 1919 1 818.52/4, MC 669. 
22 Memorandum, Department of State, Division of Latin 
American Affairs to the Under Secretary of State, Division of 
Western Europe, 12 May 1937 1 818.52G31/1, Internal Affairs, 
1930-1939. 
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sponsor a settlement of German Jews. 23 The United States de-
clined any official action at that point, although it was in-
dicated that a "humanitarian recommendation" would be passed 
on to the appropriate Costa Rican officials. 24 Initial in-
vestigation by the State Department revealed that one of the 
reasons for Costa Rica's stringent immigration policies re-
lated to some previous bad experiences and that a lengthy pro-
cess of education would be required to distinguish the German 
Jewish immigrants from other groups. 25 
None of these initially unfavorable responses seemed 
to discourage the Re.fugee Economic Corporation. In August, 
1937, the group purchased the Tenorio Ranch, comprised of ap-
proximately 50,000 acres at a price of one dollar per acre 
from the Bank of Costa Rica which had foreclosed its mortgage 
some years before. 26 The purchase is only allud~d to in the 
official correspondence concerning the activities of the Ref-
ugee Economic Corporation and that there are no details l~-
ported there. It is possible that the Corporation hoped to 
evidence their good faith and financial backing by the pur-
chase, although they had received no guarantees that any 
2 3Ibid. 
24Ibid. 
25 Internal Memorandum, State Department, to Mr. Dug-
gan, 21 July 1937, 818.52G31/7, Internal Affairs, 1930-1939. 
26
rreland, Boundaries and Conflicts, p. 7. 
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J . h . ~ . 27 ewis enugres would be allowed to enter Costa Rica. While 
the United States was supporting the Corporation by humani-
tarian arguments, it is apparent that the Costa Rican govern-
ment was also receiving recommendations from the German em-
bassy in San Jos~ as to the undesirabili·ty of a Jewish settle-
. c . 28 ment in osta Rica. At this time, the United States repre-
sentatives retreated somewhat from the issue to avoid the 
appearance of attempting to influence the Costa Ricans. 29 
Further, there was some concern that the hostility felt to-
ward immigrants in general might be " ••• fanned into a wave of 
anti-American sentiment which would be unfortunate from the 
standpoint of our present cordial relations. ,, 3o 
In the end, the Costa Rican goverrunent resolved the is-
sue by declaring the Tenorio Ranch to be an area prohibited 
for a colonization project. 31 Despite this, the Refugee Eco-
nomic Corporation continued its efforts to have its settle-
ment project recognized for another two years, although these 
27u. s. Charge ad interim Harold M. Collins at San Jos' 
to the Secretary of State, 6 August 1937, 818.52G31/9, Inter-
nal Affairs, 1930-1939. 
28Ibid. 
29 Ibid. 
30u.s. Minister William H. Hornibrook at San Jos~ to 
the Secretary of State, No. 2, 6 September 1937, 818.52G31/12, 
Internal Affairs, 1930-1939. 
31u.s. Military Attach~ Cohen in Panama to the Secre-
tary of State, Report No. 4030, 30 September 1937, 818.52G31/ 
22LH, Internal Affairs, 1930-1939. 
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efforts failect. 32 The importance of this series of events 
to the course of Costa Rican foreign affairs lies in the po-
tential impact of both United States and German policies to-
ward the question of Jewish settlement in Costa Rica. The 
United States took precautions to avoid any interpretation 
of its actions as interference with Cos~a Rican policy de-
cisions. On the other hand, it seems evident that German 
diplomats took advantage of Costa Rican prejudices and poli-
cies against immigration. They also brought pressures by 
alluding to a potential purchase of canal rights from Costa 
Rica to influence the Costa Rican decisions. It is difficult 
to ascertain the relative importance of these factors in Cos-
ta Rica's final decision. What is evident, however, is that 
Costa Rican policy makers chose their own path on the Jewish 
settlement question, as they would in other areas in the 1930's. 
On an indirect basis, Costa Rica was involved with 
several European nations in this period. There was concern 
over the placement and employment of numerous European immi-
33 grants. Potentially serious problems were caused by Costa 
Rican unemployment due to the worldwid~ depression, not to 
mention the competition presented by immigrants to Costa Rica 
32There are several boxes of State Department corres-
pondence relating to the continued efforts of the Refugee Eco-
nomic Corporation. All are filed under the 818.52G31 designa-
tion in Internal Affairs, 1930-1939. 
33Memorias, l11Q_, P• viii. 
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for available jobs. 34 Unfortunately, there are no statis-
tics available to substantiate these fears expressed by 
Foreign Minister Octavio Beeche in his 19 30 annual report. 
In addition, Beeche maintained that European irrunigrants were 
using Costa Rica as a "stop off" on their way to the United 
States by acquiring the status of naturalized Costa Ricans 
and then applying for visas to enter the United States. 35 
Latin American nations su.ch as Costa Rica traditionally had 
larger United States immigration quotas than did European na-
tions. Therefore, it was advantageous for immigrants to ac-
quire naturalized Costa Rican status before they tried to en-
ter the United States. Added to these factors were problems 
of political unrest being attributed to the immigrants by 
Beeche. 36 Therfore, Costa Rican governments decided to re-
strict immigration and to toughen up the naturalization laws 
as well as to make increased use of expulsion of undesirable 
immigrants. 37 Besides the impact of such a program on tne 
general level of immigration, there was also an important 
effect upon colonization projects, similar to those already 
mentioned, undertaken in the 1930 1 s. 
34 rb · id., p. 
35Ib .. 1a. 
36 Ibid. 
37rbid. 
ix. 
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One rather large group of immigrants, whose status was 
effected by the tightened up policies,was the Italians. Since 
the early 1920's,a good many Italians had entered Costa Rica 
d h d b . . . . 1 . 1 38 an a ecome active, especially in commercia circ es. 
These Italian immigrants were well-accepted in Costa Rican 
society and presented no serious problems until 1932 when 
negotiations were under way between Costa Rica and the United 
States to ease and improve the availability of the Panama 
Canal to ships of Costa Rican registry. 39 The question arose 
whether Costa Rica would, by virtu.e of its amicable trade re-
lationship with Italy and by the naturalized status granted to 
Italian businessmen residing in Costa Rica, have to grant 
that same status to Italians shipping through the Canal from 
Costa Rica. 40 However, since the Costa Rican government as-
sured the United States that there was no formal agreement by 
which it was bound to give Costa Rican national status to Ital-
d h 1 b d "ff' ul . 41 ian tra era, t ere wou d e no 1 1c ties. 
The issue of special status for Italians arose again in 
38u.s. Charg~ Walter c. Thurston at San Jos~ to the Sec-
retary of State, No. 216, 14 October 1921, 718.00/1, MC 671. 
39secretary of State to 
hardt at San Jos~, No. 174, 15 
Relating to Foreign Relations, 
40 Ibid. 
U.S. Minister Charles c. Eber-
March 1932, 718.652/Sa, Papers 
1933, V:266. 
-
41u.s. Minister Charles c. Eberhardt at San Jose to the 
Secretary of State, No. 836, 29 March 1932, 718.652/6, Papers 
Relating to Foreign Relations, ~, V:267. 
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the 1930's when Costa Rica attempted a regularization of its 
trade relations with a number of European states. The pur-
pose of this was to limit the tariffs which restricted the im-
portation of Costa Rican coffee, bananas, and cacao to Euro-
pean markets. 42 Of particular importance was the proposed a-
greement with Italy which included Costa Rica~ ~ational sta-
tus for Italian businessmen residing in Costa Fica. 43 As was 
indicated, however, that special status never reached the 
44 
stage of a binding agreement. But it was obvious that Italy 
cuntinued to hold a special place in Costa Rican policy. 
One possible explanation for this special stature for 
Italy was offered by the United States Minister in San Joa~, 
William Hornibrook, supported somewhat by the concerns of the 
State Department. He speculated that Fascism had taken on a 
great deal of importance in Costa Rica and that it had to be 
watched, since the potential for war existed in Europe. The 
"watching" resulted in a report• late in 1939, about the at-
tendance of Costa Rican officials at a reception at the Italian 
embassy in San Jos~ in honor of King Victor Emmanuel's birth-
42u.s. Charge Werlich at San Jos~ to the Secretary of 
State, No. 1251, 31 December 1932, Report on 1932, 818.00/ 
1401, Internal Affairs, 1930-1939. 
43u.s. Minister Charles c. Eberhardt at San Jos~ to 
the Secretary of State, No. 1485, 8 June 1933, 718.653/1401, 
Papers Relating to Foreign Relations, lill., V: 269. 
44Ibid. 
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45 day. From the fact that the attendance of high government 
officials, including the President, at the party was not re-
ported in the semi-official daily press, it was concluded by 
Hornibrook that the influence of Fascism had waned and was 
therefore no further worry to the United States. 46 
The worries of the United States's Costa Rica watchers 
were not reserved to such nebulous concerns as ·the importance 
of Fascist influences. As was mentioned previously, during 
the inunediate pre-war years, there were reports of the inten-
tion of Germany to purchase canal rights through Costa Rica. 47 
The primary concern of the United States with such a proposal 
was, of course, the potential threat to the security of the 
Panama Canal in the event of war. 48 However, this threat was 
not held to be equally serious by different branches of the 
United States government, since the State Department felt that 
the threat was minimal and that a German canal would most 
likely be used for supply purposes rather than as an offensive 
45u.s. Minister William H. Hornibrook at San Jos~ to 
the Secretary of State, No. 962, 13 November 1939, 818.46465/1, 
Internal Affairs, 1930-1939. 
46Ibid. 
47 s ·1· "' U •• Mi itary Attache Lt. Col. J. B. Pate at San 
Josg, Military G-2 Report, 18 March 1938, 818.812/SLH, Inter-
nal Affairs, 1930-1939. 
48 f 1 . . . f . l' Memorandum rom tle Division o American Repub ics, 
Department of State, 26 March 1938, attached to U.S. Minister 
William H. Hornibrook at San Jose ~o the Secretary of State, 
19 March 1938, 818.81217, Internal Affairs, 1930-1939. 
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49 
outpost. On the otl1er hand, military observers were grave-
ly concerned, not only by the potential threat to the Panama 
Canal, but also by the threat to the constructiou of the pro-
N. 50 posed 1caraguan canal. 
In the end, the civilian viewpoint won out. It was 
concluded that no action could be taken by the Urdted States, 
since it might be construed as interference with Costa Rica's 
rights of self determination. 51 It can be argued that this 
decision not to interfere was premised on indications from 
Costa Rican sources that no German offers had been accepted 
nor were any likely to be. 52 However, the factors leading to 
the Costa Rican decision with regard to a German canal pro-
ject were Costa Rican in origin, albeit influenced by the 
pragmatic acceptance by Costa Rican leaders of the status of 
the nation relative to the strength of the United States. 
Perhaps as an indication of its independence f~om United 
States influence, the Costa Rican government also gave serious 
consideration to the employment of a German military mission 
49 Ibid. 
50u.s. Military Attache Lt. Col. J. B. Pate in San 
Jose, Military G-2 Report, 18 March 1938, 818.812/BLH, Inter-
nal Affairs, 1930-1939. 
51u.s. Hinister William H. Eornibrook at San Jose to 
the Secretary of State, No. 72, 12 December 1938, 711.18/45, 
Internal Affairs, 1930-1939. 
52 Ibid. 
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during 19 39. 5 3 Al though this plan was never brol..i.ght to frui-
tion, it too served as fair warning to the United States that 
Costa Rica could and would choose its own path in its relations 
with the European powers aa well as with Wes·tern Hemispheric 
nations. 
The abortive Serm~"'l military mission v.as in direct con-
trast to the Spanish mission 1 which visited Costa Rica in 1922, 
to improve Costa Rican police forces and militia units. 54 
This mission resulted from the wave of good feeling which 
characterized Costa Rican-Spanish relations at that time. 55 
However, the presence of an officer of the Spanish Civil Guard 
in Costa Rica occasioned a minor crisis for the Acosta ad.minis-
tration in that the Congress balked at approving the agree-
ment with Spain on the grounds that the increased militarism 
which it represented was con~rary to traditional Costa Rican 
policy. 56 Thus, al though the special nature of the relation-
ship between Spain and Costa Rica may have contributed to an 
interest in a Spanish military mission, in the final analysis 
53u.s. Minister William H. Hornibrook at San Jose to 
the Secretary of State, 27 June 1939, 818.20/18, Internal Af-
fairs, 1930-1939 • 
• 
54u.s. Charge Roy T. Davis at San Jose to the Secre-
tary of State, No. 102, 7 September 1922 1 818.105/--, MC 669. 
55u.s. Charge Walter c. Thurston at San Jose to the Sec-
retary of State, No. 216, 14 October 1921, 718.00/1, MC 671. 
56u.s. Charge Roy T. Davis at San Jos~ to the Secre-
tary of State, No. 215, 14 March 1923 1 818.105/2, MC 669. 
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the strength of Costa Rican national tradition held firm. 
Generally, by the late 1920 1 s there were very few, if 
any1 events of notoriety in Costa Rican relations with Europe. 
A few commercial ties were maintained, although none was out-
standing in any way. 57 The relationships with individual na-
tions were, for the most part, not significant enough to 
merit individual attention. Costa Rica's Foreign Minister, 
Rafael Castro Quesada, characterized European relations as 
having become more concerned with hwnanitarian interestsJ 
wrich occasioned numerous conferences and meetings dealing 
with social issues such as narcotics and labor problems. 58 
These issues were not viewed by Costa Rican officials as im-
portant enough or as ~ielding enough demonstrable results to 
warrant any special efforts on their part. 59 As was discus-
sed in connection with Costa Rican participation in the League 
of Nations, Costa Rica had never been able or willing to send 
representatives to any sessions of the International Labor Or-
ganization. Even in the realm of inter-American affairs in 
this period, Costa Rica's representation was at best minimal 
due, in part, to financial problems, a.a was discussed in the 
previous chap·cer. 
57Memorias, ~' P• x. 
58Memorias, ~' pp. vi-vii. 
59Ib. ic.l.' p. vii. 
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The path of Costa Rican foreign affairs changed mark-
edly in the 1930's, beginning with the budgetary difficulties 
which led to outbacks in diplomatic missions throughout the 
world. 60 According to Foreign Minister Roberto Smyth, an 
additional handicap to Costa Rican diplomacy in Europe was 
the death of Manuel de Peralta during 1930, after more than 
fifty years of service in the Costa Rican diplomatic corps. 61 
It should be remembered that Peralta represented Costa Rica 
at the League of Nations and had been responsible for notifying 
the European nations of Costa Rica's declaration of war against 
Germany in World War I. Therefore• between the loss of its 
premier European diplomat and its financia1 difficulties, Cos-
ta Rica began the 1930's on less than an active level in its 
relations with Europe. 
One problem which intruded on this relative inactivity 
was that of the formal diplomatic recognition of Soviet Rus-
sia and the potential for the spread of Communism throughout 
Costa Rica. Rather than ·being a simple matter of reoogni ti :)n 
of a new government• the extension of diplomatic relations t-_> 
Soviet Russia was construed as the recognition of the Commun-
ist ideology of the government. 62 There was considerable 
60 Memorias, 1!!.Q., pp. v-vi. 
61 Ibid., P• v. 
62u.s. Charg' Roy T. Davis at San Jos' to the Secre-
tary of State, No. 75, 7 December 1929, 861.77 Chinese Eastern/ 
633, United States, Department of State, Papers Relating to the 
2 31J 
discussion in the Costa Rican Congress that the establish-
ment of relations with Soviet Russia oould enhance the im-
f C • • C R. 63 age o ommunism in osta ioa. As a result, while offi-
cial channels of communication were opened with Russia, it 
was only through the diplomatic missions maintained by both 
nations in Paris. 6 ~ 
The rather speedy resolution of this potantially un-
settling question of Soviet-Costa Rican relations oan be ta-
ken to indicate any one of a number of possibilities. The 
isolationism whioh characterized the inter-American polioy 
of the early 1930's may have already been in operation for 
relations outside the Americas by the late 1920's. There 
is the equally likely possibility that financial considera-
tions motivated the limited relationship with Soviet Russia 
as it limited other relationships in the early 1930's. 
In contrast to the limited sphere of Costa Rican 
foreign relations, the 1930's was a time of great activity 
for the Ge!rman government in Latin Amerio.a. An important 
goal of German foreign policy was to assure the neutrality 
of all of Latin America if a war were extended to include 
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1929 (3 Vols., Wash-
ington, b.c.: GOvernment Printing o/tici';-r943), II:408. 
63 U.S. Consul R. M. de Lambert at San Joa' to the 
Secretary of Stkte, No. 1216, 6 December 1929, 718.61/1 1 MC 
671. 
64u.s. Charg' Roy T. Davis at San Jos4 to the Secre-
tary of State, No. 75, 7 December 1929, 861.77 Chinese Eastern/ 
633, Papers Relating to Foreisn Relations, !!!!.• II:&JOB. 
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the United States. 65 The German government felt that the 
prevailing anti-German sentiment in Latin America would have 
to be met by a lengthy educational process and the expendi-
ture of considerable sums of money to pI'Oduce a propaganda 
effort to counteract that of the United States. 66 German 
ministers throughout Latin America felt that few if any La-
tin Americans truly understood the aims of the Third Reich 
and the New Order. Further, they were concerned about the 
negative attitude of the Catholic Church in Latin America to-
ward Germany and its influence on Latin Americans. 67 Ger-
man policy makers were convinced that economic motivations 
would prompt the majority of Latin American nations to remain 
neutral,despite the urgings of the United States that they 
join in the war effort. 68 However, to assure this course of 
events and to avoid arousing any additional hostility toward 
Germany, the German missions throughout Latin America were 
65Memorandum by the Head of Political Division IX (Frey-
tag), 17 September 1939t Doc. 86-4497/E 105434-37, United States, 
Department of State, Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918-
1945, Series D (1937-1945), (Washington, D.C.z Government 
Printing Office, 1953), VIII:87. 
66Ambassador in Argentina (Thermann) to the Foreign 
Minister, 2 August 1938, Enclosure #1, Memorandum of the Meet-
ing in Montevideo by the Chiefs of Mission in Argentina, Bra-
zil, Chile, and Uruguay, 28-29 July 1938, Doc. 624-6903/E 
518244-56, ibid., V:BSS-66. 
67Ibid. 
68Memorandum by the Head of Political Division IX (Frey-
tag), 17 September 1939, Doc. 86-4497/E105434-37 1 ibid., VIII: 
86. 
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instructed to act with great reserve in expressing opinions 
on political matters and to confine themselves to economic 
lt l t . 69 or cu ura ques ions. The reasons cited for this were 
primarily related to the impact of the Good Neighbor Policy 
and the effectiveness of the program of inter-American soli-
darity resulting from the Conferences of American states. 70 
Perhaps the only positive or direct policy which the German 
missions were encouraged to recommend was that all of the La-
tin American states join in protests over British "violations 
of international law," with regard to interference with neut-
ral shipping. 71 This recommendation was a logical one for 
the Latin American states, including Costa Rica, to follow in 
any case, since the shipping in question was primarily of 
Latin American registry. 72 As long as Latin America continued 
to support the rights of neutral shipping, there was an as-
surance of German markets for Latin American products. 73 
69copy of a Communication to All Diplomatic Missions 
in America, Enolos ed in the letter from the Director of th, ·. 
Political Department (Woermann) to the Embassy in Spain, 1'.' 
October 1939, Doc. 165-4218/£073923 1 ibid., VIII1304. 
?Oibid. 
71Memorandum by the Head of Political Division IX 
(Freytag), 17 September 1939 1 Doo. 86-4497/E105434-37, ibid., 
VIIIs88. 
72Ibid. 
73Ibid. 
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In more specific terms, Germany was also directly in-
terested in Central America although not in Costa Rica indi-
vidually. Generally, it was felt that the Central American 
states would follow the lead, if not the dictates, of the 
United States. 7~ Onoe again, however, it was indicated that 
an extensive German propaganda effort could at least post-
pone any action by these nations which would be unfavorable 
to Germ.an interests. 75 Nonetheless, the German observers 
felt that the Good Neighbor Policy would work to Germany's 
advantage only if these nations believed their independence 
of action in foreign affairs was being maintained. 76 Since 
this was approximately the same rationale which motivated 
United States policy during this period, it would seem that 
all of Latin America, including Costa Rica, would truly be 
free of any excessive pressures on the course of their for-
eign policies. 
As a consequence, at the end of the 1930's, Costa Ri-
ca was confronted with a choice between the neutrality which 
would in effect support the policy purposes of Germany in 
that Costa Rica would retain its rights to export foodstuffs 
74Minister for Central America and Panama (Reinbeck) 
to the Foreign Ministry, 14 November 1938 1 Doc. 634-257/ 
168874-75 1 ibid., V1884. 
75Ibid. 1 Vt885. 
76Minister in Mexico (Freiherr von Ludt) to the For-
eign Ministry, 8 April 1938 1 Doc. 600-257/168777-79, ibid., 
V:928-829. 
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to Germany. Or, Costa Rica could choose to respect the "new 
bonds of solidarity," which characterized the inter-American 
community of nations in the late 1930's77 and join the Unit-
ed States in the defense of the bemisphere. 78 Although there 
had been a growth of Costa Rican nationalism during the early 
1930 1 s, leading to policies of self sufficiency and isola-
tionism, 79 which had been extended to discussions of increased 
armaments and militarism in Costa Rica, by the mid-1930's, 80 
the choice was eventually maee to act within the structure of 
the American community of nations. 
As was indicated at the beginning of this chapter, 
there were few events of any great significance which charact-
erized Costa Rioan relations with Europe once the Tinoco inter-
lude ended and Costa Rica resigned from the League of Nations. 
In part, this can be attributed to the conscious policy of 
Costa Rican statesmen and in part to the realistic evaluation 
77Minister of Foreign Relations of Peru to the Govern-
ment of the United States, 2 August 1938 1 Conferences of A~~ 
can States, 1933-1940 1 p. 215. 
78Extract of President Roosevelt's Comments, White 
House Press Conference, 15 November 1938, Radio Bulletin No. 
267, 710.H Continental Solidarity/2, Papers Relating to For-
eign Relations,.!!!!• Va39. 
79u.s. Minister Charles c. Eberhardt at San Jos4 to 
the Secretary of State• No. 1285, 25 January 1933, 818.00/ 
1402 1 Internal Affairs, 1930-1939. 
80u.s. Minister Leo R. Sack at San Jos6 to the Secre-
tary of State, 18 December 1935, 818.20/18, Internal Affairs, 
1930-19390 
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of Costa Rica in the world community of nation during the 
1920's and 1930's. As has been demonstrated, Costa Rica was 
affected by the Great Depression and by the diplomatic ma-
neuvering which characterized the rise of the Third Reich. 
Consequently, Costa Rican statesmen dealt with the problems 
whieh surrounded European immigration and colonization pro-
jects. Costa Rican statesmen became more aware that the 
first basis for foreign policy rested in the security of 
their inter-American relations and in their realistic ap-
praisal that European powers and their concerns were simply 
not that important to Costa Riaa. Thus, Costa Rican policy 
once again refleated the independence of action which charact-
erized its inter-American relations. 
CHAPTER IX 
CONCLUSION 
The international attitudes and policies of Costa Ri-
ca gradually became more sophisticated through the use of 
diplomatic means in the service of national interests. Be-
fore attributing that increased sophistication to any par-
ticularly Costa Rican factors, it should be observed that the 
conduct of foreign affairs by all of the American states 
seemed to acquire a polish and maturity during the same time 
period. However, certain patterns which are peculiar to Cos-
ta Rica may be discerned. 
Internal political conditions to a large degree dic-
tated the nation's foreign affairs inunediately after World 
War I as the Tinoco administration sought to regularize its 
international status. The personal intransigence of Wood: ow 
Wilson in refusing to accord diplomatic recognition to the 
Tinoco regime placed Costa Rica's relations with the United 
States in a primary position which may not have truly reflected 
the priorities dictated by national interests. In spite of 
Tinoco's desire to win recognition from the world community of 
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nations through his declaration of war against Imperial Ger-
many, Costa Rica's international status continued to be dom-
inated by the United States even after Tinoco was overthrown. 
As a consequence, Costa Rica was not admitted to the Paris 
Peace Conference;nor was it granted original member status 
in the League of Nations. 
The efforts of Julio Acosta, President of Costa Rica 
in 1920, to ameliorate relations with the United States jeo-
pardized his own popularity. His administration sought and 
received membership in the League of Nations but the remain-
der of Costa Rica's foreign policy demonstrated no discernible 
patterns. It would be possible to characterize Costa Rican 
foreign policy under Acosta as a status quo policy which had 
as its only design the nation's return to pre-Tinoco stature 
in the world community of nations. The problems which arose 
with Great Britain over the nullification of the Amory oil 
oonoession, as well as the reaurrenoe of the bounda:t:'y dispute 
with Panama, were settled with the mediation of the United 
States in an attempt to achieve the goal of status quo. In 
addition, in traditional Costa Rican fashion, the Central 
American Union of 1921-1922 was considered and then rejected 
by Costa Rican leadership. 
The problem of ties binding Costa Rica to the United 
States was impo~tant in the presidential election oam.paign 
of 1924. Characteristic of the campaign and subsequent presi-
dency of Ricardo Jim~ez was a repudiation of such ties and 
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the attempts to seek means of conducting relations with the 
world community of nations which were not associated with the 
United States. There was a period of closeness with Mexico 
prompted in part by shared unfavorable experiences with the 
United States's interference and in part by the growth of 
Hispanismo which stressed the ties among all Latin nations. 
At the same time, relations with Spain were strengthened aR 
evidenced by Spain's aid in protecting Costa Rican property 
and lives in Germany during World War I. In keeping with 
these sentiments, as well as a growing sense of which poli-
cies best served national interests, Costa Rica tendered its 
resignation from the League of Nations during the Jim,nez ad-
ministration. There had been few,if any, benefits to that mem-
bership for Costa Rica,and the financial burden of membership 
was no longer considered justifiable, in view of pressing 
needs for internal improvements. 
Further, in the search for alternative means of con-
ducting international affairs, the Jim,nez administration 
sought to free itself from all appearance3 of United States 
domination. There was a reported wave of anti-American press 
as well as some anti-American demonstrations. This anti-
American sentiment can be partially attributed to Mexican in-
fluences in Costa Rica which related more correctly ~o in-
ternal Mexican conditions than to the matters under considera-
tion here. However, the main thrust of the anti-Americanism 
reflected during the Jim6nez administration can be found in 
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the desire to free the nation from all external influences in 
the determination of its foreign policy. 
The succeeding administration of Cleto Gonz~lez v1-
quez, from 1928 to 1932, was primarily characterized by its 
attention to the restoration of internal stability and the re-
newal of the economic strength of the nation as a continua-
tion of part of Jim,nez's programs. In the realm of foreign 
affairs, this administration promoted Costa Rican plans for an 
American League of Nations and an Inter-American Court of In-
ternational Justice. Both of these programs reflected the 
growing awareness of Costa Rican statesmen that the foundation 
of Costa Rican foreign policy should rest on its inter-Ameri-
can relations and in the realization that European concerns 
were not of primary importance to Costa Rica. 
The assessment that Costa Rica should diminish the le-
vel of its foreign involvements was reflected in presidential 
messages during the late 1920's and early 1930 1 s. The empha-
sis, however, was on the economic necessity for such a pro~ ~am 
rather than on any long term foreign policy goals. The thrtut 
of foreign policy during the same period can be seen as an iso-
lationist approach by the second Jim~nez administration, from 
1932 to 1936. In his second administration, Jimenez articu-
lated isolationism as a need for self sufficiency and stronger 
nationalistic feeling on the part of the Costa Rioans. 
The ultimate success of these plans was assured by the 
Good Neighbor Policy upon which the United States embarked 
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in 1932. United States policies of noninterference with the 
affairs of all American states aided Costa Rican plans for 
independent action as the nation availed itself of the good 
offices of United States diplomats in Central America to 
avert conflicts with its closest neighbors,as in the case of 
the Guatemalan dispute of 1934. As part of its isolationist 
policy, Costa Rica also did not attend the 1933 Montevideo 
Conference of American States,which resulted in the confirma-
tion of the nonintervention consensus among all American 
states. 
By 1936 1 it could be observed that Costa Rica had suc-
ceeded in its attempts to reawaken nationalistic sentiments 
among the population. With the inauguration of Le6n Cort6s 
as President in that year, the tone of Costa Rican foreign 
policy changed in that it was broadened to include the concern 
of the nation with Central American affairs, as opposed to the 
strict isolationism enunciated during the previous administra-
tion. As plans for hemispheric defense ceveloped with the ap-
proach of World War II, Costa Rica deferred to the United 
States on broad policy issues, while it retained the right of 
ohoice in other areas. This was evidenced by consideration 
given to proposals for colonization by Europeans and the ca-
nal project sponsored by German interests. Within the context 
of broad guidelines for hemispherio defense, Costa Rica was 
free to act as it chose in all matters of foreign policy. 
The increased ability and willingness of Costa Rican 
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statesmen throughout the 1920's and 1930 1 s to accept realistic 
limitations on Costa Rican international policies enhanced 
their stature in dealing with other nations, for their decisions 
were firmly based on a realistic assessment of their ability 
to act. Therefore, no energy was expended in attempts to 
circumvent the United States so that the full attention of 
Costa Rican leadership could be directed to those matters in 
which their decisions were most meaningful. For example, it 
could be speculated that Federico Tinoco might have been far 
m::>re successful in his attempts to acquire diplomatic recog-
nition from the United States had he concentrated his effoI'ts 
on the achievement of solidarity of opinion among Latin Ameri-
can states as to the legitimacy of his government. The strat-
egy adopted by El Salvador, following the advice of Costa Ri-
ca, in the early 1930 1 s to achieve the recognition of the Mar-
tinez regime testifies to the importance of even one strong 
advocate for a nonrecognized government. However, before too 
rash a conclusion can be drawn, changes in United States policy 
between 1917 and 1931 must also be taken into consideration. 
When the Good Neighbor Policy modified the prevailing attitudes 
of the United States toward the right of self determination in 
Latin America., Costa Ricar was in an advantageous position to 
assist the Mart!nez ~egime, wherea~ in 1917 there ma.y have 
been no strong advocate of similar strength for Costa Rica. 
The international attitudes and policies of Costa Ri-
ca, as they emerged on the eve of World War II, combined many 
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experiences from the preceding twenty years with favorable 
policies on the part of the United States, which allowed the 
nation considerable ft'eedom of action, and a readiness to 
accept the limitations imposed by the nation's size and 
strength relative to that of the United States. The strong 
nationalistic sentiments~which were characteristic of Costa 
Rica throughout the nineteenth century~continued to serve 
its leadership well in providing them a strong base of con-
fidence upon which to rely in their dealings with the world 
community of nations. The lessons of the Tinoco debacle pre-
vented Costa Rican statesmen from making grave overestimations 
of their influence or authority and therefore added an aura of 
strength and independence of action to their policy decisions 
which were carefully chosen not to exceed the real strength of 
the nation. 
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